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ABSTRACT
Non-state actors can now easily spread their visual messages and directly communicate
with their publics online. ISIS is a prime example for a militant group that has built a relatively
robust structure for its visual campaign both at the central and provincial levels. In response,
numerous states have been complementing their military operations against militant groups with
a visual media component. In Sinai, ISIS’s local province (Wilayat Sinai) and the Egyptian
military have used photography to project their contesting messages over the past few years. In
this dissertation project, I conduct content and visual framing analyses on a sample of 1905
images to examine the interactions between military conditions and photographic output,
opposing visual frames, and visual semiotic constellations. An interactive model of visual
contestation emerges from this case study to map the key contextual factors, image components,
and visual message prongs necessary to understand visual contestation in the online
environment.
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1

INTRODUCTION

State and non-state actors strive for presence in the public space. In today’s networked society,
however, communication constitutes the public space where the power relations are shaped and
decided (Castells, 2007). States have attempted to control the mainstream media and means for
public communication, which pushed social movements to use small, alternative, and
participatory media tools that are harder to control (Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi,
1997). Khomeini and his followers, for example, used audiocassettes of lectures and
photocopying to spread their ideas in the lead up to the 1979 Iranian revolution. The Polish
opposition movement used typewriters and carbon copies to disseminate its messages leading up
to the 1989 uprisings (Sreberny-Mohammadi & Mohammadi, 1997). Indonesian students used
mobile phones for mobilization against Suharto in 1998. Protestors used text messaging in the
Philippines in 2001 leading up to the ouster of Estrada and e-mail in the 2006 Belarusian protests
(Shirky, 2011). Activists used social media in the Arab Spring uprisings to prepare, coordinate,
and garner the world’s attention (Howard & Hussain, 2011).
New media technology has led to a highly contested communication space, where nonstate actors can compete with state actors. Using social media and encrypted group messaging
applications, non-state actors can embolden their presence, spread their messages, and interact
with target publics. Such practices have led to what Shirky (2011) calls the Conservative
Dilemma, or states’ loss of monopoly in the public space and inability to fully control and censor
new media. The percentage of American adults using social media rose from 5 percent in 2005 to
69 percent in 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2017), with the number of global social media users
reaching 2.8 billion (Kemp, 2017). Further, new media technologies facilitate the participation of
media users in the production process. Using smart phones, digital cameras, and editing tools,
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anyone can shoot and then disseminate their photographs and videos on social media platforms.
Hence, activists, social movements, non-governmental organizations, and militant groups have
taken advantage of such technologies and platforms to increasingly compete with state actors in
the marketplace of ideas (Powers & Armstrong, 2014). In response, states and government
institutions, including presidencies, embassies, ministries, and armies, have also increased their
social media presence over the past decade to maximize the channels through which they can
interact with receptive publics and overcome other political players during times of conflict.
1.1

ISIS’s Media Campaign
ISIS is a prominent example of how a non-state militant actor appropriates new media

technologies and messaging applications to disseminate its messages. Building on a history of
militant groups’ media operations since the Soviet war in Afghanistan, ISIS has established a
relatively robust structure for its media campaign. ISIS’s media campaign involves producing
and disseminating centralized multi-lingual media products (i.e., publications, videos,
infographics, posters, leaflets, books, audio news bulletins, and hymns) and localized, provincial
multimedia output (i.e., provincial photo reports and videos). ISIS has also encouraged its
followers to wage media jihad, which involves reposting, creating, and curating content as well
as participating in hashtag campaigns and Twitter raids. For ISIS, media jihad is as important as
carrying guns to fight enemies on the ground (Al-Himma Library, 2016).
Online campaigns are key to ISIS’s efforts to magnify disrupting message frames and
radicalize/recruit supporters. The widespread use of the internet generally allows militant groups
to overcome their resource disadvantages (Ingram, 2016; Welch, 2014) and shift the balance of
power in conflicts (McCauley, 2015). It also serves as a substitute for communication forms, a
behavioral catalyst, a source of information and inspiration, and a facilitator of violent
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radicalization (Carter, Maher, & Neumann, 2014; Dragon, 2015; Gill & Corner, 2015). In his
book, Leaderless Jihad, Sageman (2008) argues that the role of global militant groups has
become more of an inspiration to local individuals that are virtually connected in internet chat
rooms. In that sense, the internet becomes a “source of nonrelational, vertical diffusion of
movement ideology” that is then horizontally diffused via social media (Hafez & Mullins, 2015,
p. 969). This diffusion allows ISIS and its supporters to often circumvent governments’
surveillance on physical recruitment or training sites. Further, empirical studies reveal that
convicted terrorists use the internet as a key source of information, communication, exposure to
militant groups’ media products, and preparation for attacks (Behr, Reding, Edwards, &
Gribbon, 2013; Gill et al., 2017; Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2013).
ISIS’s media campaign has endured for over a decade despite military pressure and
territorial losses. Between 2007 and 2009, the surge of American troops in Iraq along with the
Awakening Sunni tribal movement rolled back the Islamic State of Iraq’s physical presence and
put the group on the brink of complete destruction. That military defeat, however, did not
eliminate the group’s media campaign. Instead, ISIS disseminated textual and visual products
and even declared two ministry cabinets in 2007 and 2009 to project an image of itself as a
functioning state despite the military setbacks and loss of territory (Al-Furqan Media, 2007,
2009). By 2018, ISIS had lost almost all its territorial grounds in Iraq (e.g., Falluja, Mosul, Tal
Afar, Ramadi, and al-Hawija) and Syria (e.g., Manbij, Palmyra, al-Bab, and Raqqa). Five months
before the onset of the Mosul and Raqqa operations in late 2016, ISIS’s spokesman Abu
Muhammad al-Adnani reiterated that losing Mosul, Raqqa, or any other city would not defeat a
group that had once lost its lands in Iraq and retreated to the deserts before returning as a
caliphate (Al-Furqan Media, 2016a). The subsequent territorial losses have decreased ISIS’s
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media output, but again the group’s media campaign is still enduring at the time of this writing.
ISIS continues to disseminate its centralized and provincial media products almost daily, with
provinces outside Iraq and Syria becoming more active (Winter, 2017). ISIS’s media presence is
crucial to its global brand as it returns to its insurgent roots. In such transitional periods, social
media becomes a much more important battlefield and a site of interaction with the group’s
supporters to offset its military, territorial, and human losses.
To fight ISIS on the group’s social media turf, several state and non-state actors have
shifted to the same platforms and technologies that the group itself uses. The Iraqi, Syrian, and
Egyptian security forces, for example, have used social media to present an alternative image to
what ISIS depicts in its claimed provinces in Iraq, Syria, and North Sinai. The Iraqi Federal
Police disseminated images and videos almost daily to about 350,000 followers on its official
Facebook page during the 2016-2017 Mosul operation. Over the past few years, the Syrian army
has been active in disseminating visual images of the fight against ISIS to a total of about
200,000 followers on its official accounts on Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Telegram.
Similarly, the Egyptian military spokesperson’s social media accounts—with a total of over
seven million followers on Facebook and Twitter—have become the main official source of
news on the fight against ISIS in Sinai.
Others have also launched media campaigns on social media, including the U.S.
Department of State’s Think Again Turn Away campaign (Katz, 2014) and the French Ministry
of Interior’s “Stop Djihadisme” (Giovanni, 2015). These campaigns used still imagery,
infographics, videos, and written tweets to counter ISIS’s messages. Several militant groups have
also taken part in the social media warfare against ISIS, ranging from al-Hashd al-Shaabi
(Popular Mobilization Front) and the Kurdish Peshmerga in Iraq to Jabhat Fath al-Sham in

5

Syria. In addition, a number of non-governmental organizations have launched countermessaging campaigns to combat ISIS in the social media battlefield and fight violent extremism
(e.g., The Carter Center, 2017; Women Without Borders, 2016). Taken together, most actors
now appear to agree that military battles are insufficient on their own to respond to ISIS;
engaging on the media battlefield is also necessary.
This study examines the Sinai visual media campaign between ISIS’s Wilayat Sinai and
the Egyptian military in 2016 and 2017. As the following will demonstrate, the strategic
importance of the militant groups’ visual media campaigns, Sinai’s location, and the Egyptian
media strategy in Sinai combine to warrant a close analysis of this online site of visual
contestation.
1.2

The Importance of Visual Media Campaign
Visuals are increasingly dominating the contemporary media landscape, serving as

important catalysts of presence in today’s networked society. Displacing the preceding linguistic
turn, scholars have signaled a “pictorial turn” in the 21st century (Mitchell, 1994) which installs
sight as the leading sense (Mcluhan, 1969), turns viewers into picture-minded people (Finnegan,
2015), transforms the real world into images well-trained spectators can perceive (Azoulay,
2008; Debord, 2002), and hails images as the “dominant modes of activist engagement”
(Brunner & Deluca, 2016, p. 287). The historic adage “seeing is believing” captures the
perspective that viewing something usually implies some proximity to the truth (Messaris &
Abraham, 2001). Moreover, offline and online publications have incorporated photos in recent
decades to compete for viewers, increase selective attention, and motivate reading of the
accompanying text (Gibson & Zillmann, 2000; Knobloch, Hastall, Zillmann, & Callison, 2003;
Zillmann, Knobloch, & Yu, 2001).
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Although each of these findings concerning the impact of visual images emerge from
studies of western visual culture, statistics point to a rise in visual persuasion and interest as
global phenomena. Worldwide consumers take over one trillion digital photos a year, with at
least 75 percent of which using cell phone cameras (Heyman, 2015). On Facebook, photos
account for 75-90 percent of advertising effectiveness and performance (Osman, 2017), with an
average of 300 million new photos uploaded daily (Zephoria, 2017). Instagram users upload
another 52 million photos on an average day (Statistic Brain, 2017). As a result, online
communicators seeking to engage and interact with the public often consider utilizing images as
a key communication tool.
Recognizing the existence of such a global context, Islamist militant groups are
increasingly using visuals as a key element in their media campaigns to achieve several goals. As
early as the 1980s, the Afghan Mujahideen leader Abdullah Azzam incorporated photography in
his publications, including al-Jihad and al-Bunyan al-Marsus (The Impenetrable Edifice)
magazines as well as Laheeb al-Maaraka (Flames of the Battle) weekly newsletter (e.g., see
Islamic Union for the Afghan Mujahideen, 1985; Mujahideen Services Burreau, 1988). The
Afghan Mujahideen also used video cameras to document some of their military operations. In
the 1990s, the prominent Chechen rebels leader Commander Khattab described visuals as a
means to multiply the impact of killing Russian soldiers by showcasing operations and spreading
fear among Russians (Intel Center, 2005). The Chechen rebels introduced ultraviolence as a
salient feature in their videos, transforming beheadings and executions of Russian soldiers into
media spectacles (Friis, 2015). In the 2000s, al-Qaeda leader Abdelaziz al-Muqrin expressed his
regrets for not recording the 2000 USS Cole attack and called on the group’s followers to
visualize their operations (Al-Muqrin, 2008).
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Today, al-Qaeda and its successors are no longer dependent on mainstream media’s
visual coverage. Each group has their own cameras, operators, and editors to document their
attacks and transform them into media events (Dauber, 2009). These visuals can create imagined
communities that comprise smaller communities (Han, 2009; Rabin, 2012), transform the viewer
into a virtualized citizen (Mi, 2005), and allow him or her to virtually witness constructed scenes
(Jaguaribe & Lissovsky, 2009; Noble, 2010). Islamist militant groups use visuals in an attempt to
inoculate their followers against opposing media or state frames, maintain the loyalty of their
members, and inspire new attacks (Winkler, Damanhoury, Dicker, & Lemieux, 2016).
Although al-Qaeda’s use of visuals has expanded beyond its predecessors’ visual media
products, its photographic campaign has been largely segmented. Al-Qaeda exhibited a clear
understanding of the differences between Western visual culture (Deluca, 2006; Freedberg,
1989) and Arabic oratory culture (Jones, 2012). Al-Qaeda was highly dependent on written text
in its Arabic magazines, including Sada al-Malahem (Echo of the Battles) and Dhuruat al-Sinam
(The Pinnacle) to reach Arab readers, compared to its visually dominated English-language
magazine targeting western readers. In its last issue of Sada al-Malahim in 2011, for example,
the magazine editors used a total of 30 images (Al-Malahim Media, 2011). Similarly, the group
used only about another 30 images in its ninth and latest issue of the Swahili-language magazine
Gaidi Mtaani (Al-Kataib Media, 2017). On the other hand, the 17th and most recent issue of the
same group’s Inspire exhibited 170 images (Al-Malahim Media, 2017). Inspire’s Open Source
Jihad sections illustrate the use of ample photographs to call for and facilitate attacks in the
West.
ISIS, however, has taken militant groups’ photographic campaigns to new levels since the
self-declaration of the caliphate in 2014. Still imagery has played an integral role in the group’s
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media campaigns and played a key role in the targeting of various audience groups (Milton,
2016; Winter, 2018a; Zelin, 2015). Expanding on the approach of al-Qaeda, ISIS embedded its
photographs in its Arabic newsletter al-Naba’, its English-language magazine Dabiq, its Frenchlanguage magazine Dar al-Islam, its Russian-language magazine Istok, its Turkish-language
magazine Konstantiniyye, and its multi-lingual magazine Rumiyah. Further, taking advantage of
advanced commination technologies and accessible social media platforms, the group also
introduced new ways of packaging its photographs into daily provincial news briefs and photo
reports. Between October 2014 and October 2015, for example, ISIS claims to have disseminated
14,523 images and 1,787 photo reports (Joscelyn, 2015). It also disseminated around 52,000
images between January 2015 and August 2016 on Twitter (Milton, 2016) and almost another
50,000 images in the second half of 2017 on pro-ISIS Telegram channels (GWUPOE, 2017).
Despite the sharp decline in ISIS’s media products after its defeats in Mosul and Raqqa,
photographs remain the group’s favored medium (Winter, 2018a). ISIS’s much refined and
rigorous photographic campaign is the outcome of years of development in its media operations
and advancements in communication technologies.
Ample evidence points to the role of visual media products as potential catalysts for
engagement in violent action. Following the Manhattan truck attack that killed eight civilians in
October 2017, for example, the federal criminal complaint revealed the ISIS-inspired driver had
3,800 images and 90 videos featuring ISIS productions on his cell phone (Chavez & Levenson,
2017). Another federal criminal complaint revealed that an ISIS-inspired man who detonated an
explosive device in a New York subway tunnel in December 2017 acted on ISIS video materials
calling for attacks in the West (U.S. Department of Justice, 2017). These recent incidents are not
anomalies. Half of the individuals prosecuted for terrorism-related offenses in the United States
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between 2001 and 2011 had visual media products in their possession at the time of arrest
(Winkler, 2015). Similarly, the British law enforcement agencies recovered almost 350 videos
produced by al-Qaeda, ISIS, and other groups on the digital devices of 48 convicted terrorists
between 2004 and 2017 (Holbrook, 2017). Further, law enforcement agents associated the 33
images displayed in al-Qaeda’s Inspire article “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of your Mom” with
several attacks including the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013 (O’Neil, 2015).
1.3

The Importance of Studying Sinai
The value of non-state actors’ online campaigns varies, however, based on localized

conditions that viewers experience in their day-to-day lives. For ISIS, Sinai in particular has
emerged as a critical site for audience targeting. Sinai’s religious weight, contemporary political
significance, and geographic location render it a distinctive location for ISIS’s military and
media operations. Sinai’s religious significance spans across the three Abrahamic religions:
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. In the Hebrew Bible, Sinai is one of the four sacred places on
earth (Brooke, 2008) and the revelation site of the Mt. Sinai covenant to Moses (Kugel, 2008).
Jesus and Mary passed through Sinai in their journey to Egypt, an event which later played a key
role in the establishment of Christianity (Batanouny, 1985). In Islam, the Qur’an explicitly
mentions Sinai by name twice and Mt. Sinai 10 times with the name, al-Tor. During the
leadership of the second Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (634-644 AD), Sinai was also the gate for
the Arab conquests in Egypt and North Africa (Al-Qudsy & Rahman, 2011). Islamist militant
groups have built on Sinai’s religious significance in Islam to strengthen rhetorical and
ideological appeals associated with the defeat of Israel across the border and liberation of
Palestine.
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Sinai’s contemporary political significance arises from its history as a site of contention
and collaboration in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Sinai was the battlefield of a prolonged war
between Egypt and Israel that culminated with the 1973 war, leading up to the full liberation of
Sinai from Israeli forces in 1982. Nonetheless, the Camp David Treaty between Egypt and Israel
restrained the Egyptian military presence in Sinai, allowing only civil police and the United
Nations forces in Zone C, or eastern Sinai alongside the border (“Camp David Accords,” 1978).
This military annex has played a role in weakening the Egyptian state presence in Sinai over the
years. Only recently has Israel allowed the deployment of Egyptian military forces in Zone C to
assist Egypt in fighting the Sinai insurgency (Miller, 2014). Further, Israel has reportedly
conducted several drone strikes against militants in Sinai since 2013 (“Israeli drone strike kills
suspected Islamic militants in Egypt,” 2013; Wainer, Ferziger, & Feteha, 2016). The shifting
relationship between Egypt and Israel in relation to Sinai has created political tensions and
served as a primary factor to justify violent action against Egyptian security forces.
In addition, Sinai’s unique location as an intercontinental bridge to Asia and the Levant
has provided local insurgent groups with a launch pad to repeatedly attack their enemies. Israel
has indeed been a target of the Sinai insurgency for over a decade. When the Sinai-based
Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad group) carried out three bombings on
South Sinai resorts in October 2004, it mainly targeted Israeli tourists, killing over 20 of them
(“Al-Qaeda ‘behind Egypt bombings,’” 2004). When the Sinai-based militant group Ansar Bayt
al-Maqdis (Supporters of Jerusalem) made its debut in 2011, its militants bombed the Egyptian
pipelines exporting natural gas to Israel 13 times in the first year only (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis,
2012). It also claimed responsibility for at least five rocket cross-border attacks on Eilat between

11

2012 and 2014 (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, 2014b). Sinai’s border with Gaza and Israel renders it a
hotspot for militant insurgency with regional aspirations.
Thus, Sinai has been of special importance to ISIS’s ideological resonance and military
goals since the group decided to expand beyond Iraq and the Levant in 2014. ISIS has claimed its
status as an Islamic Caliphate fighting off crusaders represented by the U.S.-led coalition and its
collaborators. Sinai, on the other hand, gave ISIS a strategic foothold closer to Israel and boosted
its anti-Jewish rhetoric. In its official pledge of allegiance to ISIS in November 2014, Ansar Bayt
al-Maqdis (2014a) vowed to keep fighting the Jews, describing them as Islam’s biggest enemy.
Four days after that pledge, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in his first official audio speech as the socalled Caliph, mentioned the word “Jews” 12 times and accepted Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’s pledge
of allegiance in a bid to fight the Egyptian security forces, support Jerusalem, and terrorize Jews
(Al-Furqan Media, 2014). Over a year later, ISIS released another audio speech in which alBaghdadi mentioned the word “Jews” 11 times and explicitly warned Israel. The ISIS leader
proclaimed:
We haven’t forgotten Palestine for a second, and we will not forget it...We are getting
closer to you day after day and you’ll be harshly punished. You’ll never feel blissful in
Palestine, oh you Jews. It will never be your land or home. And Palestine will not be but
a grave for you (Al-Furqan Media, 2016b).
Operating under the ISIS banner, Wilayat Sinai claimed to have targeted al-Ouga border crossing
with Israel, the Eshkul Israeli settlement, and the Egyptian military forces stationed closer to the
border with Israel at least 10 times. The Egyptian security forces, however, were ISIS’s primary
target in most of the 700 attacks in Sinai between November 2014 and March 2017 (TIMEP,
2017a).
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By way of justification, Wilayat Sinai has highlighted Egypt’s collaboration with the
Israeli military, the aftermath of airstrikes on the civilian population in Sinai, and the status of
the Egyptian security forces as apostates. In 2016 and 2017, the group also claimed that Israeli
air fighters and helicopters launched airstrikes in North Sinai over a dozen times. Subsequently,
Wilayat Sinai stepped up its intelligence operations in the peninsula, as evidenced by the killing
of the military commander of Bir al-Abd city and the assassination attempt against both
Ministers of Defense and Interior in their secret visit to Arish in December of 2017 (Mourad
Higazy, 2017a, 2017b).
Sinai has also received much attention in ISIS’s media operations. In May of 2016, ISIS
launched a coordinated visual campaign, in which 14 Iraqi, Syrian, and Libyan provinces
released videos of support to praise Wilayat Sinai militants. The videos highlighted the EgyptianIsraeli military collaboration and reiterated Sinai’s importance as the gate to liberate Jerusalem
(Okail, 2016). Wilayat Sinai has also served as one of the most productive provinces beyond Iraq
and Syria in terms of media products in the past few years (Milton, 2016). As ISIS suffered
territorial losses in 2017, Wilayat Sinai’s media products were relatively more prevalent (Winter,
2017a). Following President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, ISIS
chose Wilayat Sinai’s video release “The Religion of Abraham” as the main platform for its first
media response, condemning Hamas, the Palestinian authority, and Egypt for the decision
(Wilayat Sinai, 2018).
Taken together, Sinai offers ISIS a rich environment to attack the strongest Arab military,
threaten Israel, and bolster its own ideological resonance. By tapping into the Crusades and the
1948 Nakba (Catastrophe) master narratives in Islamist thought (Halverson, Corman, & Goodall,
2011), ISIS uses Sinai to foreground Israel as a target and the liberation of the third holiest
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Muslim site (Jerusalem) as a goal. With the announcements of Syria and Iraq’s liberation in
December 2017 (Iraqi PM Media Office, 2017b; Russian MoD, 2017), United States’ military
leaders have discussed ISIS’s aspirations to establish a larger presence in Sinai and Libya as the
next phase (U.S. Department of Defense, 2017). By May of 2017, about 80 percent of Wilayat
Sinai militants were foreigners, according to the spokesman of al-Tarabin tribe that fights
alongside the Egyptian military in North Sinai (Mikhail, 2017). With smuggling networks
connecting Sinai to Libya, Sudan, and Gaza (Awad, 2016; Sabry, 2016), more foreign fighters
could be joining Wilayat Sinai. Further, the escalating tensions surrounding the status of
Jerusalem after the U.S.’s recognition of the city as Israel’s capital adds to Sinai’s relevance as a
new frontline for ISIS foreign fighters. Thus, focusing on the visual campaign of Wilayat Sinai
as a key ISIS province is imperative to understanding how the group’s media campaign is
moving and adapting in this transitional period after major territorial losses in Raqqa and Mosul.
1.4

The Importance of Egyptian State’s Media Response
In response to the rise of ISIS in Sinai, Egypt has broadened its censorship methods to

control the information coming out of the peninsula. Egypt imposed a media blackout on North
Sinai, where the clear majority of the state’s counterterrorism security operations have taken
place. Since the end of 2013, reporting from North Sinai has become a risky endeavor for
Egyptian and foreign journalists, as security forces have assaulted some reporters, arrested
others, and even accused a few of acting as agents of terrorism (Marroushi, 2013; Shilad, 2017;
“The Journalists and Reporters in North Sinai condemns the arrest of ‘Al-Shorouk’ Journalists,”
2013). To bolster the country’s grip on the information flow during the war on the Sinai
insurgency, Egyptian President Abdelfattah al-Sisi approved an anti-terrorism law in August
2015, which punishes journalists for false news on terrorist attacks and counterterrorism
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operations (Kamel, 2015). The law imposes a fine of between 200,000-500,000 Egyptian pounds
(equivalent to 11 to 28 thousand dollars) and can bar the offending journalist from practicing the
profession for up to one year. The law identifies false news as “contradicting the official
statements released by the Ministry of Defense” (Transcript of Counterterrorism Law, 2015, p.
12).
In the aftermath of the new law, Egyptian military’s reporting on Sinai has become
indisputable. The media’s reporting on such operations has sharply decreased (TIMEP, 2017a).
Journalists have become largely unable to verify the number of counterterrorism operations,
militant groups’ attacks, and deaths as well as the scale of military activity. Instead, Egypt-based
media outlets typically rely upon the military’s information and figures as officially presented.
The only exceptions to the Egyptian military’s frames are a few media outlets operating in
Turkey and Qatar, such as al-Sharq, Mikamilin, and al-Jazeera Arabic. The result of the
reconstituted media context is that the Egyptian military spokesperson’s Facebook page has
become the main source of news on the Sinai conflict, disseminating statements, images, and
videos to almost seven million followers.
Nonetheless, Egypt’s censorship methods have not hindered accessibility to Wilayat
Sinai’s online media products. Wilayat Sinai continues to disseminate its visuals on ISIS’s
official Telegram channels, which then recirculate in pro-ISIS channels and on other social
media platforms. In fact, Egypt ranks third amongst Arab countries for accessing ISIS online
content, only after Saudi Arabia and Iraq (Frampton, Fisher, & Prucha, 2017).
Thus, the Egyptian government is now engaged in a media war between the statecontrolled media apparatus and ISIS. The Egyptian state consistently vows to eradicate the
“enemies of the nation and religion” in Sinai (News24, 2017, p. 1). ISIS, on the other hand,
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produces ample media products celebrating attacks against Egyptian soldiers, whom it also
deems apostates and enemies of the religion (O. Ashour, 2016). Putting out an abundance of
contradictory information during war can magnify both sides’ opposing narratives and result in a
much more dangerous conflict (Powers & O’Loughlin, 2015). Examining the Sinai visual war
between Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military will yield an understanding of how opposing
visual messages compete in a polarized digital media environment. It will also highlight visual
strategies and techniques in this localized, mediated conflict that can guide the government,
NGOs, grassroots initiatives, and communication respondents in future efforts to develop
alternative frames and narratives.
1.5

Outline of Dissertation Chapters
Chapter two will identify the study’s three main research questions explaining how they

add in important ways to the existing literature on the relationship between military activity and
media output, on visual framing of conflicts, and on western frameworks of visual semiotics.
Then, it will explain the study’s methodology by defining the project’s scope and describing the
two components of the study’s mixed-methods approach.
Chapter three will highlight the situational context of the Sinai conflict between the
Egyptian government and ISIS. It will trace the origin of violence in the Sinai Peninsula to the
three waves of attacks in 2004, 2005, and 2006. To elaborate on the context, the chapter will
discuss the role of social and economic conditions in North Sinai, security repercussions of the
2004-2006 attacks, political developments amid the 2011 revolution, former President
Muhammad Morsi’s ousting in 2013, and the government’s crackdown on the Muslim
Brotherhood supporters in the emergence and growth of the Sinai militant insurgency.
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Chapter four will examine the relationship between local and regional military conditions
and Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s photographic campaigns. First, it will discuss the
frequency and scope of the state and the militant group’s photographs in conjunction with
claimed attacks and counterterrorism operations in 2016 and 2017. Second, it will underscore the
relationship between media output and visual messaging strategies, on the one hand, and other
contextual military factors at the local and regional levels, including loss of leaders and
introduction of new groups to the battlefield. The chapter will present a review of the key
military events that corresponded to surges or declines in the photographic response in the Sinai
visual conflict.
Chapter five will explain the context-specific visual frames Wilayat Sinai and the
Egyptian military utilized in their photographic campaigns. The chapter will describe the militant
group and the military’s recurring visual frames in 2016 and 2017. It will utilize Entman’s four
framing associations as a framework to examine how the frames on each side cohered around a
unique message. The chapter will then identify emerging interactive strategies through which the
opposing visual frames contested in the online environment.
Chapter six will discuss the applications of visual semiotics in the Sinai visual conflict. It
will lay out Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s use of viewer distance, camera angle,
direct eye contact, facial expressions, and subjective shots in the portrayals of different character
types. The chapter will juxtapose these applications with the assumptions about western
standards of visual grammar. Then, it will present the interactive strategies that both groups
adopted at the level of semiotic constellations.
The concluding chapter will propose an interactive model of visual contestation by state
and non-state actors. It will discuss the key variables in this model: situational context,
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immediate context, image components, visual frames, and semiotic constellations. The chapter
will end by highlighting future areas of research that can expand our understanding of visual
contestation.
2

SIGNIFICANCE AND METHODOLOGY

To examine the Sinai visual conflict between the state and non-state actors, this study intersects
with three bodies of scholarly literature that relate to subject. The first involves previous research
examining how the quantity and nature of media campaigns correspond to changes in the level of
military activity on the ground in conflict. The second involves studies investigating how
mainstream media, states, and non-state actors visually frame conflicts. The third involves
research exploring how media players incorporate visual semiotics to create symbolic meaning in
cross-cultural settings.
2.1

Relationship between Photographic Output and Military Activity
The quantity of photographic output is an important determinant of presence in the online

sphere. Presence is “the perceptual illusion of nonmediation,” which involves social richness,
realism, transportation, and immersion (Lombard & Ditton, 1997, p. 8). Presence in the
individual’s mind requires media appearance (Castells, 2007). The frequency and repetition of
images exhibit the displayed issue’s importance and salience (Bruce, 2014; Y. Huang & Fahmy,
2013; King & Lester, 2005), accumulate meaning (Boyd, Boyd, & Kerr, 2015; Hall, 1997),
facilitate comprehension of complex details (Jewitt & Oyama, 2008), create and reinforce
stereotypes (Batziou, 2011), render particular interpretations more memorable (Entman, 1991),
overshadow alternative or fuller perspectives (Griffin, 2004), and set the boundaries for the
discourse (Entman, 1993). Hence, the scale of the photographic output and image frequency are
key factors in visual campaigns.
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During conflicts, military activity often influences state actors’ photographic output. State
actors have typically increased the incorporation of photography in their media efforts during
war. In WWI and WWII, for example, a large pool of official war photographs appeared in
illustrated newspapers, magazines, and exhibitions in Europe and North America (Cookman,
2009; Goldstein, 2009; Jolly, 2003; Zelizer, 1998). Today, tens of thousands of WWI and WWII
photographs are in London’s Imperial War museum, the United States Library of Congress, the
Australian War memorial, and the British, German, Russian, Canadian, and Austrian National
Archives (Green, 2015; Roberts, 2014; The Library of Congress, 2018). In the 2012 Gaza War,
the Israeli military tweeted an image per day on average (Seo, 2014). In the Syrian Civil War, the
Syrian Presidency posted over two images per day on Instagram at times of escalated tensions
(Holiday, Lewis, & Labaugh, 2015). Across both time and place, state actors tend to complement
their military operations with photographs during conflicts.
Militant groups in contrast do not conform to a set media response during conflicts.
Studies indicate an increase in ISIS’s operational and celebratory photographs in post-attack
Twitter campaigns (Melki & El-Masri, 2016; Melki & Jabado, 2016; Vitale & Keagle, 2014), but
they point to a decline in the group’s photographic output over extended periods of military
pressure (Milton, 2016; Winter, 2018a). For example, ISIS’s photographic output dropped
substantially between summer 2015 and late 2016, when several military operations were
underway to liberate ISIS-controlled towns and cities (Milton, 2016). At the local level,
however, ISIS’s Ninawa and Sinai provinces disseminated more photographs when facing
intensified military pressure (Damanhoury, 2017; Damanhoury, Winkler, Kaczkowski, & Dicker,
2018). Ninawa’s photographic output tripled upon the onset of the east Mosul military operation.
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Further, Hamas’s al-Qassam Brigade was tweeting almost three times the number of Israel’s
images per day amid the mounting military pressure on Gaza (Seo, 2014).
This study will expand on the existing literature to better understand the relationship
between military activity and the photographic campaign. State actors invest money and time to
produce and distribute war photographs during conflicts. Although several states have launched
photographic campaigns to complement their military actions against ISIS, no study has yet
investigated how they compete with ISIS in the media space nor how their outputs interact with
the on-ground military conditions. This study intends to fill that gap in the literature by
investigating how a state actor’s photographic campaign complements its military efforts and
interacts with a militant group’s activity on the ground. Additionally, the contemporary militant
groups like ISIS enjoy an expansive, intercontinental presence through affiliated groups in
several countries. Military pressure on the group’s strongholds and media operation centers may
influence its media response elsewhere. Nonetheless, existing studies underscore the quantity of
ISIS’s photographic output in response to either local military operations (e.g., Damanhoury,
2017; Damanhoury et al., 2018) or the overall military pressure in the region (e.g., Milton, 2016;
Winter, 2018). This study will compare the impact of both local and regional military conditions
on the state and non-state actors’ photographic campaigns.
The study’s first research question asks: what is the relationship, if any, between local
and regional military factors and the frequency of both the photographic output and visual
messaging strategies in the Sinai conflict? To answer the question, I will begin by examining the
quantity of photographs and scenic elements in ISIS’s Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s
campaigns in relation to the localized military conditions (e.g., the militant group’s claimed
attacks and the military’s counterterrorism operations in Sinai). Then, I will examine the quantity
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of photographs and scenic elements in both campaigns in relation to ISIS’s key regional military
conflicts.
2.2

Visual Frames
Framing is a key approach to understanding how actors construct their messages. The

message frame is “a central organizing idea…that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of
events” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 143). A frame also highlights certain aspects of a
communication text which can impact the individual’s attitudes, opinions, and information
processing (Entman, 1993). A powerful frame will usually exemplify Entman’s four framing
associations: problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment
recommendation (Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009). As a result, powerful frames can tell stories
that impact how people understand and evaluate an issue, achieve frame alignment between the
communicator and the individual(s), and/or influence behaviors. As Shah, McLeod, Gotlieb, and
Lee (2009) rightly point out, frames can apply to various topics (context-transcendent) or
encompass only a particular topic or issue (context specific). Determining the most salient
frames requires an examination of the words, sentences, photographs, captions, headlines, leads,
and/or related quotations (James W. Tankard, 2001).
Framing applies to images due to their inherent characteristics that render them key
devices in message construction. Messaris and Abraham (2001) lay out three distinctive
properties of photographs that make them less intrusive and more effective framing tools for
messages than their verbal counterparts. First, the analogical relationship between the image and
its meaning makes the visual depictions appear more natural. Second, the indexicality, or the
true-to-life quality of the photograph, renders it more effective than other types of text. Third,
unlike verbal language, the photograph lacks an explicit propositional syntax and thus depends
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on contextual and verbal cues. Visual framing usually operates through the frequency of the
images, the related textual information, and the selection, exclusion, and presentation of depicted
people and objects (Y. Huang & Fahmy, 2013). The related text often serves as anchorage that
“directs the reader through the signifieds of the image” (Barthes, 1977, p. 156). Hence, the image
along with the title, caption, and/or other accompanying text constitute the visual frame
(Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011). Photo captions are the most common key framing devices that
can indicate the elements in the scene (Barthes, 1977), tell a story (Green & Dill, 2013), establish
the immediate verbal context (Birdsell & Groarke, 1996), and reinforce or undermine the frames
(Parry, 2010). Taken together, visual frames can reflect political inclinations and critical choices
(K. Greenwood & Jenkins, 2013), promote preferred readings (Batziou, 2011; Y. Huang &
Fahmy, 2013), influence perceptions and reinforce stereotypes (Saleem & Anderson, 2012),
elicit strong emotional responses (Brantner, Lobinger, & Wetzstein, 2011), and serve as pegs for
larger narratives (Zelizer, 2004). Each of these factors help explain the wide scope of studies
examining visual frames at times of conflict.
Studies examining the visual framing of conflicts fall under four research areas: framing
by the media, state actors, non-state actors, and both state and non-state actors comparatively.
The media framing of conflicts is the most prevalent. Many visual studies find differences in
how international newspapers, magazines, wires, and TV channels visually frame conflicts, such
as the first Gulf War (Griffin & Lee, 1995); the 9/11 attacks and the 2001 Afghan war (Fahmy,
2010; Fahmy, 2004, 2005; Griffin & Lee, 2002), the 2003 Iraq invasion (Fahmy & Kim, 2008;
Fahmy, 2007; Parry, 2011), the 2004 Beslan school siege (Patridge, 2005), the 2006 IsraelLebanon conflict (Parry, 2010), the 2008 anti-China/Olympics protests (Y. Huang & Fahmy,
2011, 2013), the 2008-2009 Gaza War (Fahmy & Neumann, 2012), the 2009 Sri Lankan civil
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war (Neumann & Fahmy, 2012), the Arab Spring uprisings (Bruce, 2014), and the Syrian
conflict (K. Greenwood & Jenkins, 2013). These studies either identify the existence of contexttranscendent frames (e.g., peace and war frames in the Sri Lankan and Syrian Civil Wars and the
human-interest frame in the 9/11 attacks, the Afghan War and the Arab Spring) or generate
context-specific frames that relate to the conflict under study (e.g., Israeli and Lebanese
perspective frames in the 2006 Israeli-Lebanon conflict and the Tibetan independence frame in
the 2008 Olympic torch relay protests). Besides the identification of visual frames, Parry (2010)
uses Entman’s four associations as a backdrop to map each group of frames under their
respective function. Many also analyze the photo captions as the key accompanying text to help
identify the salient visual frames, unclear elements, and/or context.
The second research area exhibits how state actors themselves use media products to
visually frame their conflicts. Studies indicate an evolution of state actors’ visual campaigns
during conflicts since the mid-nineteenth century. In the 1853-1856 Crimean War, mainly
Britain’s commissioned photographers depicted soldiers together behind the frontlines in static
shots and concealed deaths (Cookman, 2009), but the American Civil War photographs
subsequently showed scenes of death and atrocity on the battlefield (Trachtenberg, 1985). In
WWI, the Anglo-American visual campaigns introduced the progressive, hero narrative by
depicting military victories, staged battle action, and only enemy corpses (Chouliaraki, 2013;
Jolly, 2003; Kazecki & Lieblang, 2009) and demonized Germany by showcasing its atrocities in
Belgium (Green, 2015). In WWII, American visuals maintained the hero-soldier narrative by
censoring depictions of dead Americans (Goldstein, 2009), demonized Nazis in post-war
photographs of concentration camps (Zelizer, 1998), and created an epic war frame using
dynamic and dramatic scenes of battle (McClancy, 2013). The media’s horrific images of the
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atrocities in Vietnam, however, undermined the American visual frames of epic war and hero
soldiers (Hagopian, 2006). Subsequently, states shifted to “techno war” images, illustrated in
photographs of missiles and shells in the sky during the First Gulf War (Sontag, 2003, p. 52) and
drone imagery in the twenty-first century conflicts (Ohl, 2015). State actors have recently
complemented depictions of military technology with humanitarian aid and societal support
visual frames and censorship of death imagery (Chouliaraki, 2013; Holiday et al., 2015).
With the increasing presence of non-state militant actors on social media and the rise of
al-Qaeda as a threatening security challenge around the turn of the century, a third research area
has emerged seeking to understand how such groups visually frame violent conflicts. Some
studies examine videos disseminated by the Chechen rebels, al-Qaeda Central, al-Qaeda in Iraq,
the Islamic Army in Iraq, the Islamic Front of the Iraqi Resistance, Partisans of the Sunna Army,
and Supporters of Islam, among others (Intel Center, 2005; Arab Salem, Reid, & Chen, 2008;
Weisburd, 2009). These studies break down the videos by visual frames, such as suicide attacks,
beheadings, hostage taking, brotherhood, tributes, honoring the dead, training, and rewards for
membership. More recent studies narrow the focus only on ISIS’s execution videos by
delineating nuanced frames (e.g., unity of the Ummah, justified violence, and grotesque, abject,
and sublime horror) and/or highlighting recurring visual elements (Barr & Herfroy-Mischler,
2017; Chouliaraki & Kissas, 2018; Friis, 2015; Kraidy, 2017). However, studying ISIS’s
photographs remains the most prevalent (e.g., Damanhoury, 2017; Damanhoury & Winkler,
2018; Damanhoury et al., 2018; Stratcom Centre of Excellence, 2016; Tan, O’Halloran, Wignell,
Chai, & Lange, 2018; Wignell, Tan, & O’Halloran, 2017; Wignell, Tan, O’Halloran, & Lange,
2017; Winkler, Damanhoury, Dicker, & Lemieux, 2018; Winkler et al., 2016). These studies
reveal a wider range of recurring military and state-building visual frames (e.g., combat, near
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enemy, far enemy, heroes, and state-building) and bonding icons (e.g., monotheism hand gesture,
Qur’an, communal prayers, fighters, weapons, and flags). They also point to the about-to-die
visual trope as a salient component of ISIS’s visual campaigns to depict impending deaths and
destruction. At times, Entman’s four associations classify the identified visual frames. For the
most part, framing studies of militant groups like ISIS apply transcendent frames to different
conflicts and locales and they use photo captions and on-screen texts to identify unclear
contextual information.
The fourth and least prevalent research area relates to the comparative visual framing of
both state and non-state actors in a single conflict. The increasing social media presence of state
institutions and militant groups allows scholars to gauge the online visual contestations in
contemporary conflicts. In the 2012 Gaza conflict, the Israeli military constructed its message on
Twitter using unity and resistance as the main visual frames, while Hamas mostly depicted
civilian casualties and icons of resistance, such as Hamas leaders, soldiers, and projectiles (Seo,
2014). In the Syrian Civil War, the Syrian government mainly used solidarity, humanity, and
victory visual frames on Facebook, while the opposition used threats of the Syrian regime,
casualties, and military victories as the most prominent visual frames (Seo & Ebrahim, 2016).
These studies indicate that non-state militant actors adopt a more emotional approach, compared
to an analytical framework by state actors. In the U.S.-led coalition’s fight against ISIS, killing
Muslims, killing journalists, and treatment of women emerged as the recurring frames in the U.S.
Department of State’s Think Again Turn Away videos, compared to Levant as the starting point,
media war against ISIS, role of martyrs, and benefits for believers visual frames in ISIS’s video
(Allendorfer & Herring, 2015). Using these frames, ISIS casts a wide net of initiating messages,
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while the U.S. Department of State defensively emphasizes a singular underlying theme that ISIS
is the enemy.
This study builds on the fourth and most recent research area to comparatively examine
how both sides compete over the visual framing of the same conflict. With the ability of Sinai’s
political actors to bypass the mainstream media and interact directly with their target audience,
understanding how they construct their own messages has become as important as investigating
more commonly studied media frames. Most framing studies, however, neither investigate state
actors’ visual frames in contemporary conflicts nor inspect the contestation and interactions
between the frames of state and non-state actors. Moreover, militant groups have established
localized media centers to represent their affiliates and provinces that operate in different
contexts. ISIS claims to operate in over 30 provinces, each with its own media office (Al-Furqan
Media, 2016c). The existing studies examining militant groups’ visuals mostly sample media
products of several groups together (e.g., Salem et al., 2008; Weisburd, 2009) or focus on ISIS’s
centralized media (e.g., Kraidy, 2017; Wignell, Tan, & O’Halloran, 2017). This study intends to
narrow the focus on ISIS’s provincial media to generate more context-specific visual frames.
Further, different actors may shift their content over time for multiple reasons. Cross-sectional
analyses are less likely to identify shifts and interactions in the visual framing of prolonged
conflicts. This study examines the visual framing of a prolonged conflict over an extended period
to account for such shifts in content and the interactions between individual frames to develop
coherent messaging.
Accordingly, the study’s second research question will ask: How do the state and the
militant group construct visual frames in their photographic campaigns in the Sinai conflict? To
answer the question, I will examine the visual frames that Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian
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military used over two years. I will also investigate the role of photo captions and other
accompanying text as framing devices in both photographic campaigns. Then, I will analyze the
recurring human characteristics, bonding icons, and visual tropes and how those functioned
within the identified frames. Finally, I will explore the interactions between the individual visual
frames on each side and how they engage with the opposing messages.
2.3

Visual Semiotics
Visual semiotics can play an important role in the viewer’s perception of the image.

Visual semiotics, or what Barthes (1978) calls photogenia, are devices that have “corresponding
signified[s] of connotation sufficiently constant to allow incorporation in a cultural lexicon of
‘effects’” (p. 23). Such devices include the viewer’s perceived distance, camera angle/viewer
position, eye contact, subjective shots, size, focus, color, and lighting, among others. Visual
semiotics constitute a key visual framing device that reveals the stylistic and connotative
representation (Rodriguez & Dimitrova, 2011). As an integral part of all images, the semiotic
elements may often appear random and unintentional. Nevertheless, they can function in
strategic ways. Together, visual semiotics compose a visual grammar that helps understand the
image, prompt character involvement, and convey symbolic meaning (Kress & van Leeuwen,
1996; Rose, 2001).
Most studies examining visual semiotics and/or their impact have their roots in western
culture. First, studies analyzing visual semiotics often examine message construction as it
appears in western media, ranging from American and British publications to newswires (e.g.,
Borah, 2009; Fahmy, 2004; Hardin et al., 2002; Parry, 2011; Parry, 2010; Shin, Fahmy, & Lewis,
2012). Second, most overarching frameworks explaining the construction and composition of
visuals are limited to the United States and Western Europe. Hall’s (1966) proxemics framework
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and his breakdown of distance into four zones, for example, is developed after observations and
interviews with middle-class American adults living in the northeast coast. Kress and van
Leeuwen (1996) stress that their proposed grammar for visual design is not universal, but rather
confined their analysis to the contemporary western culture. In fact, they trace a shared history of
visual semiotics to the rise of perspective and subjectivity as social values in the European
Renaissance. Branigan’s (1984) theory of subjectivity and his discussion of point-of-view as a
visual semiotic source follow a set of rules and assumptions based mainly on American, French,
and Italian films. Developing subjective shots further into a typology, Ortiz and Moya (2015)
sample GoPro videos on YouTube and Vimeo that were mostly shot at the United States. Third,
the experimental studies examining the impact of visual semiotics mostly involve
American/western European college samples (e.g., see Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe,
1997; Cummins, Keene, & Nutting, 2012; Kraft, 1986; Mandell & Shaw, 1973; McCain,
Chilberg, & Wakshlag, 1977; Wanta, 1988).
Nonetheless, recent studies have begun to indicate that Arab media apply visual
semeiotics to a limited extent. Mainstream Arab media use visual techniques in their coverage to
convey symbolic meaning and subjectively depict news stories. In its coverage of the Palestinian
children during the second intifada, for example, al-Jazeera was more likely to depict the
children at a close-medium distance and from low-angle shots, compared to NBC (Aqtash, Seif,
& Seif, 2004). In its coverage of the 9/11 attacks, al-Hayat newspaper used long shots of the
rubble to dehumanize the other, in contrast with its coverage of the Afghan War victims (Fahmy,
2010). In the 2010 Iraqi elections, Baghdad (Sunni), Furat (Shiite), and Hurria (Kurdish)
television channels exhibited bias by portraying their respective candidates at a close distance
and from an eye-level (Al-Rawi & Gunter, 2013). Further, in the coverage of the Arab Spring,
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Arab networks (al-Arabiya, al-Jazeera, BBC Arabic, and al-Hurra) were all likely to use
subjective camera shots (Bruce, 2015).
Media campaigns of Arab-based militant groups are also utilizing visual semiotics to
bolster the messaging in Arabic-language products. Between 2001 and 2010, Al-Qaeda videos,
for example, increasingly incorporated direct eye contact between its leaders (e.g., al-Zawahiri
and Adam Gadahn) and the viewer to complement its calls for action (Martin, 2011).
Subsequently, ISIS utilized direct eye contact, close-medium distance, and positive facial
expressions in its martyr images in al-Naba’ newsletter (Winkler et al., 2018), differential
camera angles to convey power in its centralized video productions (Kraidy, 2017), and
subjective camera shots in its provincial imagery and video output (Damanhoury, 2017; Lesaca,
2015; Perlmutter, 2016).
This study will add to these studies focusing on media outlets and Arab-based militant
groups by examining the comparative use of viewer distance, camera angle, eye contact, facial
expression, and subjective shots as visual semiotic tools in the two opposing photographic
campaigns. These five visual semiotic sources play differential roles in conveying power and
symbolic meaning.
2.3.1

Viewer Distance

The perceived distance between the photo subject and the viewer relates to the
humanization of the photo subject. When shots are snapped from a closer distance, they tend to
prompt a connection with the photo subjects and depict them as individuals; when shot from a
comparably longer distance, they tend to characterize the photo subjects as “types” and “others”
rather than familiar individuals (Cohen, 2009; Jewitt & Oyama, 2008; Silva, Rodriguez, Banares,
& Talavera, 2017). Edward Hall’s (1966) theory of proxemics posits that intimate, personal,
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social, and public distances have respective roles in differentiating between intimates, friends,
acquaintances, and strangers. To illustrate, immigrants appeared at a distance in the photographs
of Spanish national newspapers between 2013 and 2014, representing them as the distant other
(Silva et al., 2017). A similar social distancing of immigrants from the viewer in other Spanish
and Greek newspapers reinforces the same conclusion (Batziou, 2011). In the meantime, the
majority of close up and medium shots appearing on the covers of Times and Newsweek
magazines in the United States between 1991 and 2004 showed American political figures
significantly more than foreign leaders, creating a more comfortable relationship with those
sharing the American identity (Kang & Heo, 2006). Hence, the choice of shot sizes and distance
can be deliberately made to create or avoid the viewer’s connection with the photo subject.
2.3.2

Camera Angle

The camera angle can depict the symbolic power of the photo subject. These connotative
meanings are mainly analogical, “translating a spatial relationship into an evaluative one” (Kraft,
1986, p. 305). In that sense, looking down at a person typically prompts lower evaluations in
terms of power, dominance, and credibility compared to looking up to a person in the image,
while eye-level shots suggest visual parity and equality. For example, Mandell and Shaw (1973)
find that respondents positively evaluated the person photographed from a low camera angle,
placing the viewer looking up at the photo subject, in terms of power within a news item,
compared to that photographed from a high camera angle where the viewer looks down on the
photo subject. Similarly, Kraft (1986) reports that respondents judged a basketball player as
better and bolder when depicted from a low angle. Further, the Associated Press photographs
after the fall of the Taliban regime increasingly portrayed Afghani women at the eye level
prompting symbolic equality and visual parity, compared to their portrayal as symbolically
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powerless using high angles before the fall of Taliban (Fahmy, 2004). In the same sense, looking
down at Iraqi civilians gathered around Allied troops to receive aid is likely to prompt lower
evaluations of Iraqis in terms of power (Parry, 2011), while looking up to a perpetrator with
bloodstained hands after killing a soldier conveys symbolic power (Kampf, 2006).
2.3.3

Eye Contact

Eye contact between the viewer and the photo subject relates to evaluations of human
connection and status. Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, and Jolliffe (1997) show that viewers can
interpret the photo subject’s mental state whether they are exposed to an image of the full face or
just an extreme close-up shot of the eyes. Direct eye contact often establishes an imaginary
connection between the photo subject and the viewer, through which the former makes a demand
(Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996), calls for action (Martin, 2011), and conveys hierarchy and status
(Tang & Schmeichel, 2015). However, to better understand the photo subject’s message, one
must take the immediate visual context into account as well, including human characteristics
(e.g., age, gender, and body position) and the surrounding elements (e.g., other humans,
weapons, and destruction). In that sense, an adult hostage in an orange jumpsuit looking directly
at the camera as he kneels in the desert in front of a standing, masked ISIS militant holding a
knife sends an entirely different message than a toddler hugging her wrapped gift and looking
directly to the camera as she stands next to a Christmas tree. Meanwhile, the avoidance of eye
contact between the photo subject and the camera helps reinforce the relationships of social
inequality when it comes to the representation of the other in mainstream media (Batziou, 2011).
2.3.4

Facial Expressions

Facial expressions are important visual elements that can influence the viewer’s
perception in many ways. Facial expressions draw attention (Vuilleumier, 2000), self-present
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individuals (DePaulo, 1992), reflect their emotions (Adolphs, 2002; Carroll & Russell, 1996),
overrides situational information (Ekman, 1972; Fridlung, Ekman, & Oster, 1987), and create
empathy (Buck & Ginsburg, 1997; Keltner & Bonannno, 1997). Positive facial expressions (e.g.,
smiling and laughing) imply happiness, positive intentions, altruism, and increased sociability
(Schmidt & Cohn, 2001), generate positive responses (Sullivan & Masters, 1991), elicit less
skepticism (Forgas & East, 2008), and infer higher affiliation and dominance (Knutson, 1996).
To bolster the liberation frame after the 2003 Iraq invasion, for example, the Sun newspaper used
photographs of smiling coalition soldiers as they interacted with Iraqi people (Parry, 2011). On
the other hand, negative facial expressions (e.g., fear, anger, and sadness) impact the viewer’s
heart rate (Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990), elicit more skepticism (Forgas & East, 2008),
and infer low affiliation and low dominance (Knutson, 1996). To complement its civilian
casualties frame during the 2012 Gaza conflict, for example, Hamas tweeted images of weeping
parents as their children’s corpses laid in front of them (Seo, 2014).
2.3.5

Subjective Shots

Subjective camera shots constitute another visual semiotic source that can prompt viewer
identification with the photo subject. Cohen (2001) defines identification as a process, in which
the viewer merges with the character in one role. The identification process with photo subjects
has been juxtaposed with the use of first person narration, through which the reader can read a
novel and imagine him/herself as the character in the story. Applying the same concept to
visuals, Branigan (1984) argues that point-of-view shots serve as a tool for visual subjective
narration, whereby the viewer takes the character’s position in the scene. Ortiz and Moya (2015)
break down subjective camera shots into three types. The embodied point-of-view shot does not
show the character’s body (e.g., a sniper shot pointing at a target). The referentially embodied
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point-of-view shot shows parts of the character’s body or used props (e.g., a GoPro shot of the
photographer’s rifle firing at a target). The out-embodied shot gives an external look at the
character’s body (e.g., an over-the-shoulder shot of a person reading a newspaper). The interplay
between the point-of-view and reaction or reverse-angle shots indicates the main character in the
action (Rose, 2001) and further promotes viewer identification with him/her (Ortiz & Moya,
2015). Further, subjective camera shots foster a greater sense of presence in the portrayed scene
and can result in frequent arousal responses (Cummins et al., 2012). These visual techniques are
prevalent in first-person shooter-games, such as Call of Duty and Grand Theft Auto, which
appeal to many young males (Perlmutter, 2016). As a result, subjective camera shots are
potentially powerful visual semiotic sources that filmmakers, photographers, and game designers
use to prompt identification and elicit presence.
This study will expand on the existing literature by examining the application of these
visual semiotic strategies in two opposing media campaigns in a non-western context. Although
Arab states are now active social media players, no study has systematically investigated how
they apply visual semiotics. Further, social media has provided an accessible battleground where
different actors can compete. Comparative studies, however, either focus on visual semiotics
across different mainstream media outlets (e.g., al-Jazeera vs. NBC) or in different militant
groups’ media products (e.g., Dabiq vs. al-Naba’). This study moves a step further by comparing
how state and non-state actors within the same situational context incorporate visual semiotics to
convey power and symbolic meaning.
Thus, the study’s third research question will ask: what are the similarities and
differences in the Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s deployment of visual semiotics in
their respective photographic campaigns? To answer this question, I will examine viewer
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distance, camera angle, eye contact, facial expression, and subjective shots across the
photographs that depict human beings as photo subjects. I will also compare how Wilayat Sinai
and the Egyptian military used visual semiotics to depict the different human character types.
Then, I will identify whether these applications align with or differ from the assumptions of
existing frameworks of visual semiotics.
In sum, this study aims at building an interactive model that helps understand visual
contestation as a communicative phenomenon in the online environment. It will reveal how the
quantity of photographic output and the military context interact between state and non-state
actors in the online environment. It will show how the two sides frame the conflict through
photographic content and how those frames interact with one another. It will pinpoint the
functions of visual semiotics as compositional elements and explore how those elements intersect
with the choices of the other side of the conflict. The model will thus investigate the role of
context, content, and form in the construction of visual messages in conflict between state and
non-state actors.
2.4

Methodology
2.4.1

Scope

To obtain a better understanding of Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s
photographic campaigns, the study examines all 1905 Sinai-related images that both sides
disseminated online from January 1, 2016 to December 31, 2017. The focus on this two-year
period relates to the 175 percent surge in Wilayat Sinai’s claimed attacks in 2016 (TIMEP,
2017a), the extension of the Martyr’s Rights Egyptian military operation in Sinai into three
stages in 2016 and 2017 (Eleiba, 2017), and the extensive military pressure on ISIS in its
heartlands that led to vast territorial losses in Iraq and Syria by the end of 2017 (Iraqi PM Media
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Office, 2017b; Russian MoD, 2017). The ISIS dataset comprises 395 images in 30 photo reports
and 405 images in 105 daily news briefs that Wilayat Sinai disseminated on ISIS’s official
Telegram channel Nashir. This Telegram group has served as the main hub for dissemination
and the most reliable means for collecting ISIS’s official media products since late 2015, after
the intensive crackdown on the group’s activity on Twitter. The Egyptian military dataset
comprises 1105 Sinai-related images in 214 Facebook posts that the Egyptian military
spokesperson disseminated on his official page. This Facebook page is the main hub for the
military’s official news on Sinai as well as various other activities, including the Minister of
Defense’s meetings with foreign officials, the military chief of staff’s events, military parades,
and joint training operations with foreign troops. This page is also the most reliable means for
collecting all the Egyptian military’s photographs, compared to the official Twitter account and
website that post only a fraction of the Facebook photographs.
To indicate the intensity of military conditions at the local level, this study uses the Tahrir
Institute of Middle East Policy’s (TIMEP) data on Wilayat Sinai’s claimed attacks and the
Egyptian military’s counterterrorism operations in Sinai for 2016 and 2017. TIMEP’s Egypt
Security Watch reports highlight Wilayat Sinai’s claimed attacks between December 2014 and
September 2017. The reports aggregate the group’s official statements of responsibility released
online and in ISIS’s al-Naba’ weekly newsletter. After obtaining TIMEP’s monthly figures for
Wilayat Sinai’s claimed attacks between January 2016 and September 2017, I applied the same
method to acquire the figures for the remaining claimed attacks in October, November, and
December 2017. I compiled Wilayat Sinai’s statements of responsibility on Telegram and ISIS’s
al-Naba’ issues 100-112 (issued between October 5 and December 28, 2017). In the meantime,
TIMEP’s reports also contain the official number of the Egyptian military’s counterterrorismism
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operations in Sinai between January 2015 and July 2017. The reports aggregate the Egyptian
military’s official statements on the spokesman’s Facebook page. After obtaining TIMEP’s
monthly figures for the Egyptian military’s counterterrorismism operations between January
2016 and July 2017, I also applied the same method to acquire the figures for the remaining
operations from August to December 2017. To complete the dataset, I compiled the Egyptian
military’s official statements on the spokesman’s Facebook page.
To indicate the intensity of military conditions at the regional level, this study uses the
Global Terrorism Database on ISIS’s attacks in Iraq and Syria in 2016 and 2017, as well as the
official launching date of heightened military operations against the group in its two key cities.
The study limits the regional context to Iraq and Syria because they were the sites of over 90
percent of ISIS’s attacks over the two years and the battleground for the major coalition military
operations (GTD, 2017). Mosul was ISIS’s de facto capital in Iraq for three years and the site
where al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate in summer 2014. It was also one of ISIS’s main media
operation centers (Wilson Center, 2017). The Mosul military operation officially began on
October 17, 2016 and the Iraqi Prime Minister announced the full liberation of the city on July
10, 2017 (Iraqi PM Media Office, 2017a; Sanchez, McLaughlin, & Blau, 2016). Similarly,
Raqqa was the group’s capital, main hub in Syria, and a key media center for years. The Raqqa
military offensive officially began on November 6, 2016 and the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic
Forces announced the full liberation of the city on October 20, 2017 (Damon, Balkiz, & SmithSpark, 2017; Withnall, 2016). The study uses October 2016 as the breaking point that signals
intensified military pressure on ISIS regionally.
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2.4.2

Method of Analysis

To answer the first research question and investigate the relationship between the local
and regional levels of military activity and the frequency of photographs and visual messaging
strategies in the Sinai conflict, I use a mixed-method approach. Using SPSS to conduct all
descriptive statistical tests, I first utilize Pearson coefficient analyses to test the correlations
between Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s photographic outputs, respectively, and the
level of local military activity as indicated by the claimed attacks and counterterrorism
operations. The test demonstrates the linear relationships at different data points. Second,
independent sample t-test analysis compares the Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s
monthly photographic outputs before and after the onset of regional military pressure on ISIS in
Iraq and Syria in October 2016. The test determines the differences between the means at
different periods of military activity. Then, I further examine the shifts in recurring scenic
elements as they relate to military events, using Pearson coefficient, t-tests, and chi square
analyses. Finally, a qualitative analysis of the military events corresponding to surges and
declines in photographic output complement the statistical tests.
To answer the second research question and identify how each side framed the content of
its photographic campaign in the Sinai conflict, I use a qualitative grounded theory approach to
generate context-specific visual frames in Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s photographs.
The Straussian approach to grounded theory involves the inductive, bottom-up development of
categories, subcategories, and/or conceptual codes from empirical indicators (Grbich, 2007). To
understand the role accompanying text as framing devices, I qualitatively examine how the photo
captions and other related text convey complement the photographs in conveying visual frames.
To investigate the role of visual elements that previously complemented identified ISIS frames in
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other photographic samples (see Damanhoury et al., 2018; Wignell, Tan, & O’Halloran, 2017;
Winkler et al., 2018), I include religious symbols, flags, weapons, state-building, death and the
about-to-die categories in the content analysis coding instrument. I then expand on Parry’s
(2010) approach by mapping Entman’s (1993) four framing associations: problem definition,
causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and treatment recommendation to better understand how
the individual frames on one side interact together to constitute an overarching message. Further,
I examine how the frames from the two opposing sides interact together to define the Sinai
conflict.
To answer the third research question and identify how Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian
military incorporated visual semiotics in their photographic campaigns, the study conducts a
quantitative content analysis of key semiotic elements in the dataset. The image serves as the unit
of analysis, and building on Patridge’s (2005) methodology, photo captions and/or other
accompanying text determine contextual information. Prior to the coding process, I assigned a
number, date, and source to each image and determine whether its incorporates textual
information or not. The study adapts a 21-item coding instrument first created to examine Dabiq
imagery (Winkler et al., 2016), and later applied to images in ISIS’s Arabic-language publication
(Winkler et al., 2018) and its provincial campaigns (Damanhoury, 2017; Damanhoury et al.,
2018).
Five items appearing on the modified coding instrument serve as the basis of the analysis
to identify how each side depicts the human characters through semiotic elements. The viewer
distance variable examines the perceived distance between the viewer and human character(s):
intimate, personal, social, public, or mixed. The camera angle variable determines the camera’s
position in comparison to the character(s): low, high, eye level, or mixed. The eye contact
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category reveals the level of interaction between the human character(s) and the viewer: direct
eye contact, looking away/mixed, eyes closed/mangled, or not applicable. The facial expression
category further elucidates the nature of interaction by examining the emotions exhibited by the
human character(s): positive, negative, neutral/mixed, or not applicable. Finally, the subjective
shots category determines the use of identification-inducing techniques: embodied POV,
referentially-embodied POV, out-embodied shots, or not applicable.
The remaining 11 items on the modified coding instrument identify the immediate visual
context of the images by noting recurring features of depicted human characters and the
photographs. Two coders examined each photograph for the number of humans (one, 2-10 small
group, 10 or more large group or no human), age (infants, children, adults, mixed, or not
applicable), gender (male, female, mixed, or not applicable), and body position (on knees not
praying, sitting, standing, laying down, praying, mixed, or not applicable). To examine the
previously identified visual elements in ISIS’s visual campaigns, the coders examined the
presence of death (yes or no), destruction (ongoing fire/explosions, destroyed infrastructure, or
not applicable), use of the about-to-die trope (possible death, certain death, presumed death, or
not applicable), state-building (social services, law enforcement, economy, city/natural
landscapes, media distribution, mixed, or not applicable), infrastructure (buildings, bridges,
vehicles, military weaponry/equipment, mixed, or not applicable), religious symbols
(monotheism finger gesture, Qur’an, prayer, religious shrine, mixed, or not applicable), and the
presence of flags (ISIS, United States, Egypt, other, mixed, or not applicable).
I analyzed the entire dataset and a second trained coder coded 10 percent of the dataset to
calculate inter-coder reliability. Due to the large dataset (N=1905) in this study, testing intercoder reliability on a subsample of 190 images met the minimum acceptable size requirement of
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10 to 20 percent and no less than 50 units (Neuendorf, 2002). The study used Cohen’s kappa as a
sensitive reliability coefficient that goes beyond the simple percentage agreement and considers
the expected agreement and the possibility of agreement due to chance (Bell, 2008). The overall
Cohen’s Kappa value of the two coders was 0.95, indicating strong inter-coder reliability (see
Table 2.1).
Table 2.1 Inter-coder Reliability for Coding Variables in Content Analysis
Variable

Percent Agreement

Human
Age
Gender
Body Position
Distance
Camera Angle
Eye Contact
Facial Expressions
Subjective Shots
Death
Destruction
About to Die
State-Building
Infrastructure
Religious Symbols
Flags

98.96%
98.96%
99.48%
96.37%
96.89%
96.89%
97.92%
98.96%
98.44%
100%
95.33%
96.89%
96.37%
98.96%
100
98.96

3

Cohen’s Kappa
0.98
0.97
0.99
0.94
0.95
0.94
0.96
0.98
0.86
1
0.87
.94
.92
.98
1
.94

THE SINAI CONFLICT

Sinai is the name of an Egyptian Peninsula that connects Africa and Asia. Historians differ on
the origin of the name Sinai, with some linking it to Sin the God of the Moon in the Sumerian
civilization and others tying it with the word Sen (tooth) in reference to the shape of its
mountains (N. Greenwood, 1997). A greater consensus exists on its geographical boundaries.
Despite being part of Egypt, the Sinai Peninsula is in west Asia, lying alongside the Red Sea and
the Suez Canal, which mark the northeastern border of the African continent. In 1906, a British-
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Ottoman agreement created the border that demarcates Sinai from Palestine and the Levant
(Shuqair, 1991). The total area of Sinai is 61,000 square kilometers, or over six percent of
Egypt’s total area (Egypt’s Information Portal, 2018) and 30 percent of the country’s coastlines
(Hussein, 1996). Sinai spreads from the Mediterranean Sea in the north to Ras Mohamed in the
south, as well as from the Gulf of Aqaba, Israel, and Gaza in the east to the Gulf of Suez and the
Suez Canal in the west (see Figure 3.1).

Figure 3.1 Map of the Sinai Peninsula. Source: Library of Congress/Central Intelligence
Agency, 1988.
The governmental divisions of the Sinai Peninsula changed over the years. In 1960, the
Egyptian government established a local, civilian administration in each of the border
governorates, except for Sinai that remained under military rule. When Israel occupied the Sinai
after the 1967War, it divided the peninsula into two military government units: North Sinai with
its headquarters in al-Arish and South Sinai with its headquarters in Sharm El Sheikh (A.
Roberts, 1990). In the wake of the 1973 Egyptian-Israeli War, however, former Egyptian
President Sadat declared Sinai a single governorate, with al-Arish as its capital, and appointed its
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first civilian governor in 1974 (Hussein, 1996). Five years later, Sadat issued a decree breaking
the peninsula into two distinct administrative units, with al-Arish as the capital of the North and
al-Tor as the capital of the South. The 1979 decree also attached the small parts of Sinai west of
the Suez Canal to Suez, Ismailiya, and Port Said governorates (Hussein, 1996). Ever since, Sinai
has spanned across the five different governorates, with the vast majority of the peninsula falling
in the North Sinai and South Sinai governorates.
Sinai is home to a heterogeneous mix of people, including a wide range of Bedouin
tribes, Egyptians of the Nile Valley, Palestinians who moved to Sinai after 1948, and Bosnians.
Egypt’s official figures indicate a total population of 455,000 people in North Sinai and 173,000
people in South Sinai (CAPMAS, 2017). Bedouins, in particular, constitute the most distinctive
collective in the Sinai social demographic (Ammar, 2014). The word “Bedouin” is derived from
the Arabic word “Badu,” which refers to nomadic people of the desert who originated in the
Arabian Peninsula and the Levant. Many Bedouin tribes moved to and settled in the northern and
southern parts of the peninsula over the centuries (Stewart, 1991). The population figures,
however, do not truly reflect the number of the Bedouins, as thousands hold identification papers
but do not enjoy full citizenship rights (Bradley, 2008). Despite the lack of definitive official
figures on the Sinai Bedouin population, contemporary press figures range from 200,000 to
380,000 (ICG, 2007; Morrow & Al-Omrani, 2007), up from a population of 40,000 Sinai
Bedouins in 1906 (Shuqair, 1991). For Bedouins, tribal loyalties, land rights, and communal
agreements take precedence over national identity and state borders (Bradley, 2008). Today, the
Sinai Bedouins’ culture and Arabic dialects remain closer to their brethren in the Arabian
Peninsula and the Levant than to Egyptians of the Nile Valley.
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Nonetheless, the Sinai Bedouins are not a single homogenous group. Tribal agreements
indicate that at least 15 major Bedouin tribes constitute a “mosaic of populations” that share
Sinai (ICG, 2007, p. 10). Al-Sawarka and al-Rumaylat comprise two key tribes settled in alArish, Sheikh Zuwayid, and Rafah in the North. Al-Sawarka is the strongest and most populous
tribe in Sinai with about 70,000 members (Sabry, 2015) and up to 13 different clans (Hussein,
1996). Another powerful Bedouin tribe in Sinai is al-Tarabin, which mainly spans across North
Sinai, Nuwaiba in South Sinai, Palestine, and Negev desert in South Israel (Shuqair, 1991). AlMasa’id, al-Dawaghra, and al-Bayyadiyya tribes settle in the West (Mubashir & Tawfik, 1978).
Al-Tayaha, al-Ahywat, and al-Azazma tribes reside in Central Sinai, with al-Azazma extending
to lands in Palestine and Jordan (Bradley, 2008). In the South of the penisula, al-Towara, named
for al-Tor mountain, is a confederation of several tribes, including al-Alayqat, Muzayna, Awlad
Sa’id, al-Sawalha, and al-Jibaliyya. Although the ethnicity of al-Jibaliyya tribe has its origins in
the Bosnian and Wallachian slaves that the Roman emperor sent to Sinai in the sixth century, it
has now become a part of South Sinai’s Bedouin tribes and a member of the Towara
confederation (Glassner, 1974; Shuqair, 1991). The South Sinai tribes live in the Sharm Sheikh
and Dahab regions as well as in the inner mountains (ICG, 2007).
3.1

Understanding the Origins of the Sinai Conflict
The lands of Sinai serve as an important site of contestation in the current conflict

between Egyptian security forces and Sinai insurgents due to both economic and national
security considerations. Economically, the Sinai Peninsula is vital for Egypt because it borders
the Suez Canal, a key source of the country’s income since former President Nasser nationalized
it in 1956 (Suez Canal Authority, 2018). With tourism serving as another key pillar of Egypt’s
economy, the Sinai Red Sea resorts in South Sinai generate a crucial part of tourism revenue
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(Hassan, 2015). Recently, the Egyptian and Saudi governments announced that a total of 1000
square kilometers in South Sinai will become part of the transnational, megacity project NEOM
(“Saudi’s Bin Salman talks about megacity project in South Sinai,” 2018). Militarily, Sinai is key
to Egypt’s national security as it has always been the gate for Egyptian rulers expanding
eastward or outside forces marching to North Africa over the centuries (Himdan, 1993). For the
past 70 years, Israel has fought four wars against Egypt in Sinai in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973.
To better understand the situational context of the present-day conflict between the
Egyptian Military and Wilayat Sinai, this chapter analyzes the unstable relations between
Bedouins and the changing Sinai rulers since the late 1960s and the precipitating events that have
contributed to the emergence of violence in the North. After highlighting the strategic division
between North and South Sinai and the role of Bedouins in Egypt’s military struggle against
Israel during the occupation period, I will discuss multiple contextual factors, including social
alienation, waning economy, and the emergence of the smuggling industry in the North in the
post-occupation period. Then, I will trace the origins of the Sinai insurgency to the three waves
of attacks in South Sinai, the subsequent security crackdown, and the human rights violations
during the initial rebellion period in the early twenty-first century. I will identify the role of the
political context after the 2011 revolution, including the ouster of former President Mohamed
Morsi in 2013 and the government crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood supporters, in the
evolution of the Sinai insurgency and the intensification of conflict.
3.2

The Occupation Period 1967-1982
On June 5, 1967, Israel attacked Egypt, destroying almost the entire Egyptian air force on

the tarmac (Bradley, 2008). Subsequently, the Israeli ground forces marched to Sinai and fought
with the Egyptian military in both the northern and southern parts of the peninsula. During the
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fighting Sinai Bedouins provided Egyptian officers and soldiers with food, water, and aid. They
also created volunteer rescue groups to treat and transport the injured. After Israel defeated the
Egyptian military, Bedouins also hid the officers and soldiers from the Israeli forces in al-Arish
homes, gave them fake North Sinai identification cards, and worked with the Egyptian military
intelligence to establish an evacuation center in Beer al-Abd (Hussein, 1996). The war resulted in
an Israeli occupation of the entire Sinai Peninsula that humiliated, expelled, and terrorized many
Sinai Bedouins, pushing about half of the pre-war population westward to the Nile Valley
(Himdan, 1993).
The Israeli occupation between 1967 and 1982 had a differential impact on the North and
the South. The North Sinai population suffered the most. Israel saw the building of settlements in
the North as an opportunity to create a Jewish buffer zone between Sinai and Gaza that would
divide the region and disrupt the flow of weapons (Gorenberg, 2006). To build such settlements,
the Israeli army expelled thousands of Bedouins from their tents and lands. On January 14, 1972,
for example, the then military commander Ariel Sharon ordered “the destruction of the orchards,
the blocking up of the water wells and the deportation of the villagers” to build the Yamit
settlement on the Mediterranean and surrounding agricultural settlements in the Rafah area
(Weizman, 2007, p. 98). Later, the Israeli forces admitted to expelling nine tribes and almost
5000 Bedouins in that single incident, while tribal leaders put the number closer to 20,000
(Gorenberg, 2006).
By contrast, the Israeli occupation came with some benefits for the Bedouins of South
Sinai. Prior to the 1967 War, Bedouins in the South were living in poverty and isolation in
sparsely populated areas under Egyptian military rule (Hussein, 1996). Israel spent billions of
dollars to build roads connecting South Sinai with the coast of Eilat, establish civilian ministries,
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introduce water, telephone, and electrical lines, and transform the region into a source of wage
labor to thousands of Bedouins (Claiborne, 1982; Shipler, 1982). The Israeli Ministry of Defense
also employed about 1200 Bedouin men to work in oil fields, construction, and tourism in the
South, with job openings outnumbering Bedouin men in Abo Rodeis during 1972 (Glassner,
1974). In addition, the Ministry of Labor provided vocational courses, the Ministry of Education
worked with Bedouins to build more schools, and the Ministry of Health established clinics
(Glassner, 1974). The main economic development in the South, however, was in tourism. Israel
built the Ophira key resort town and its airport, as well as the Di Zahav and Neviot settlements.
The new settlements and tourism resorts in the South similarly opened new employment
opportunities for the Bedouins. In sum, the Israeli occupation resulted in higher standards of
living for the South Sinai Bedouins.
Despite working alongside the Israeli administration during occupation years, the Sinai
Bedouins played a key role in the resistance movement. In the years leading up to the 1973 War,
the Sinai Bedouins created popular resistance groups, such as the Sinai Arab Organization, that
carried out military operations against the Israeli forces, including the targeting of Israeli jets in
al-Arish airport, the destruction of the headquarters of the Israeli military ruler and the Military
Intelligence building in the same city, the kidnapping of Israeli soldiers, and the confiscation of
weapons (Hussein, 2010; Sabry, 2015). Further, the Bedouin tribes reportedly refused Israel’s
offer to declare Sinai a state and asserted their allegiance to Egypt and Nasser in a publicized
press conference in al-Hasna, North Sinai in October 1968 (Abdelazim, 2013; El-Kouny, 2013).
In the 1973 War, the Bedouins also sided with the Egyptian military, serving as guides in the
desert and providing intelligence on the locations of Israeli army units (Hussein, 1996).
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The Camp David Accords laid the groundwork for the end of the Israeli occupation. Less
than a year after Sadat gave a historic speech at the Knesset in November 1977 calling for the
establishment of peace based on justice, he took part in the Camp David summit with the then
Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin and U.S. President Jimmy Carter in September of 1978.
Both the Egyptian and Israeli leaders negotiated the terms for a peace treaty, which they later
signed in March 1979. In compliance with the Camp David Accords, Israel gradually withdrew
its forces and settlers from Sinai, culminating in the full liberation of the peninsula on April 25,
1982. The only exception was that Israeli forces and settlers remained in Taba until 1989.
Israel’s withdrawal from Sinai, however, further reinforced its preferential treatment of
the South over the North. The Israeli forces razed Northern settlements to the ground as they
evacuated Sinai, including the coastal town of Yamit and its surrounding agricultural lands
(Claiborne, 1982). In his autobiography, the then newly-appointed Minister of Defense Ariel
Sharon describes the destruction of the infrastructure in Yamit and surrounding settlements as a
necessity to prevent the creation of an Egyptian population center of at least 100,000 people
alongside Israel’s border (Sharon & Chanoff, 2002). By contrast, the withdrawal from South
Sinai and the evacuation of its settlements did not result in similar levels of destruction. The
infrastructure in Ophira, Neviot, and Di Zahav settlements were left intact for Egypt to expand in
subsequent years (Weizman, 2007).
The occupation period resulted in lasting suspicions of the Sinai Bedouins. Despite the
role that the Bedouins played in the resistance movement, some did collaborate with the Israeli
forces (Hussein, 1996). Bedouins also lived in Sinai under an Israeli administration that
established schools, ran hospitals, managed the tourism industry, and controlled trade. Thus,
many Egyptians in the Nile Valley perceived the Bedouins as traitors for accepting occupation
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and collaborating with the Israeli administration in Sinai for about 15 years (ICG, 2007). The
better socioeconomic conditions for some Bedouins during the occupation fueled the distrust
even further and triggered security concerns (Pelham, 2012). These suspicions increased the
isolation of the Sinai Bedouins and widened their schism with the rest of the Egyptian
population.
3.3

The Post-Occupation Period 1982-2003
The return of Sinai to the Egyptian state triggered hopes for multiple development

projects across the peninsula. In 1974, feasibility studies for development projects had already
begun, as Egypt had regained control over parts of Sinai after the 1973 war (Eleiba, 2013). Amid
the restoration of its authority over the entire Sinai Peninsula, the Egyptian government voiced
its plans to repair roads to facilitate transportation, buy existing hotels to boost the tourism
industry, install pipelines and stations for added water supply, develop power plants to deliver
electricity, and build housing units to accommodate the Sinai population (Lief, 1982). The
government also announced a national project in 1994 to allocate 75 billion Egyptian pounds for
the development of Sinai until 2017.
But the Egyptian state did not fulfill many of its promises to develop Sinai. The multistage, long-term national project to develop the entire Sinai Peninsula failed. According to a
Nasser Academy for Military Science study, sector-based planning and lack of a clear vision
stalled this national project and signaled its failure (Al-Tahtawy, 2012). Military General Adel
Suleiman, who served as an intelligence officer in Sinai, highlighted corruption as another reason
behind the failure to implement other development projects in Sinai (Eleiba, 2013).
However, the Egyptian government did continue to focus on the development of the
tourism industry in South Sinai. The tourism industry flourished in South Sinai in the 1990s and
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early 2000s. Egypt expanded Ophira and its former Israeli airport in the South, transforming
Sharm El Sheikh into an international touristic destination. The infrastructure in Neviot and Di
Zahav laid the groundwork for Egypt’s future developments in Nuwaiba and Dahab to emerge as
key towns on the Red Sea. The number of hotels increased from 17 in 1994 to 225 in in 2002,
which prompted an increase in the South Sinai population by over 70 percent (ICG, 2007).
Although the booming tourism industry provided many new employment opportunities, hotels
mainly employed migrants from the Nile Valley while forcefully removing Bedouins from the
rapidly expanding, coastal territories in South Sinai (Dentice, 2018).
On the other hand, North Sinai suffered continued economic marginalization after Egypt
regained control of the peninsula. The Egyptian regime treated North Sinai as a demilitarized
security zone (Aziz, 2016). The agricultural sector suffered in the North due to diminishing rain
water and irrigation water from al-Salam Canal not reaching lands beyond Beer al-Abd, (ICG,
2007). The government also resettled Egyptians from the Nile Valley to al-Arish and provided
them with economic opportunities to alter the North Sinai population (Pelham, 2012). As a
result, Bedouins did not benefit much from the agro-industry jobs. By the mid-1990s, some
Bedouins resorted to smuggling drugs and gold through underground tunnels (Sabry, 2015).
Following the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, weapons became another commodity that they
smuggled between North Sinai and Gaza (Abu Mudallala & Al-Agha, 2011).
The post-occupation period deprived the Sinai Bedouins of basic human rights, especially
in the North. The Egyptian government did not only frame the Bedouins as potential spies, but
also treated them as second-class citizens (Aziz, 2016). It denied them land ownership rights
(Pelham, 2012), excluded them from government and security positions (Sabry, 2015), and
refused to grant some Bedouins citizenship (K. Ashour, 2016). Some of the Sinai-located
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members of al-Azazma tribe, for example, have remained stateless for decades (Mohamed,
2016). Moreover, the entire Sinai Peninsula did not house any universities in the post-occupation
period, which partially explains why only five percent of the North Sinai population had
achieved higher education by 1996 (CAPMAS, 1996). Further, over 95 percent of the North
Sinai population had no access to the public sewage network and over 50,000 people had no
access to water by the mid-1990s.
3.4

The Initial Rebellion Period 2004-2010
Historically, Sinai had no radical Islamist movement fighting the state or attacking

civilians (Sabry, 2015). Even when militant groups such as al-Jihad and al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya
were carrying out attacks in mainland Egypt between the 1970s and 1990s (e.g., the assassination
of former President Sadat, the attack on Assyut Security Directorate, and the Luxor massacre),
Sinai did not encounter such havoc. In October 2004, however, militants carried out three
synchronized bombings in the South Sinai resort towns of Taba and Nuweiba, killing 34 people
and injuring more than 150 others. The bombings were the first major terrorist attacks in Sinai
and the first on Egyptian soil since the 1997 Luxor attack (“Al-Qaeda ‘behind Egypt
bombings,’” 2004). Subsequently, militants carried out major synchronized bombing attacks in
Sharm El Sheikh in July 2005 and in Dahab in April 2006, killing over 100 people in total across
the two operations.
The perpetrators of the attacks in Sinai were from North Sinai. Following the Sharm El
Sheikh bombings, the militant group Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad Fi Ard al-Kanana
(Monotheism and Jihad in Egypt) claimed responsibility for the attack as well as the 2004
bombings (“Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad in Egypt Claims Responsibility for Sharm El Sheikh Attacks,”
2005). The statement identified group members from al-Sawarka, Tarabin, al-Masa’id, and al-
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Tayaha tribes. The Egyptian Ministry of Interior later attributed the 2006 Dahab attack to the
same group (Ramadan, 2014). Khalid Musa’id, a dentist from al-Sawarka tribe, founded the
group with Nasr al-Malahi, a law graduate from a Palestinian descent residing in al-Arish (O.
Ashour, 2016; Pelham, 2012). They recruited Bedouins and Palestinians in areas that had
suffered from unemployment and lacking infrastructure, such as Sheikh Zuwayid and Rafah in
North Sinai (ICG, 2007). After the police killed Musa’id in 2005, al-Malahi assumed leadership
and extended the group’s ties with Salafi militants across the border in Gaza (Said, 2017).
At the local level, the 2004-2006 attacks signaled an unprecedented rebellion against the
Egyptian state in Sinai. The Sinai-based group chose strategic targets in the South that would
hamper Egypt’s flourishing tourism industry and disrupt Egyptian-Israeli relations. The targets
included hotels, campsites, restaurants, and markets in the resort towns of Taba, Nuweiba, Sharm
El Sheikh, and Dahab. The group also vowed to continue the war to evict Jews and Christians
from “the Zionist axis of evil and prostitution in Sinai” (Mahmoud, 2005, p. 1). Moreover, the
dates of the attacks carried a clear message of defiance to the Egyptian state. The 2004 bombings
that killed 12 Israeli tourists took place on October 7, one day after the 31st anniversary of the
1973 War against Israel. The 2005 bombings took place on July 23, which marked the 53rd
anniversary of the 1952 revolution that overthrew King Farouk, declared Egypt an Arab republic,
and installed an Egyptian military ruler. The 2006 bombings took place on April 24, on the eve
of the 24th anniversary of Sinai’s liberation. At the time of the attacks, the Minister of Interior
Habib al-Adli asserted that the militants’ choice to align these national occasions with their
attacks was no coincidence (Slackman, 2006).
The Sinai attacks also revealed the expansion of al-Qaeda’s ideology in the peninsula.
First, the name that the North Sinai-based militant group chose— Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad
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—implied a linkage to Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s militancy in Iraq. In 2000, Al-Zarqawi was in
charge of al-Tawhid wal-Jihad training camp in Herat, Afghanistan (McCants, 2015). He then
founded Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in Iraq to fight the American forces and subsequently
pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2004 (Weiss & Hassan, 2015). Second, the rhetoric of Jama’at
al-Tawhid wal-Jihad in Egypt was pro-al-Qaeda despite any lack of official affiliation. The group
explicitly framed the attacks on South Sinai resorts as a response to Bin Laden and al-Zawahiri’s
calls for jihad and a retaliation against the U.S.-led coalition’s intervention in Afghanistan and
Iraq (“Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad in Egypt Claims Responsibility for Sharm El Sheikh Attacks,”
2005).
In response, the Egyptian state cracked down on the North Sinai Bedouins. General
Habib al-Adli, who assumed the role of the Minister of Interior and began clamping down on
Islamists one day after the 1997 Luxor attacks, applied his brutal campaign in Sinai after the
Taba Bombings. The campaign involved arbitrary arrests, detentions, and torture of thousands of
Bedouins (Sabry, 2015). Human rights organizations estimated the State Security Investigations
apparatus arrested approximately 3000 people from al-Arish, Rafah, and Sheikh Zuwayid after
the Taba attacks, including family members to obtain confessions and pressure wanted persons to
surrender (O. Ashour, 2016). Several North Sinai residents claimed that interrogators tortured
them in various ways, such as stripping them naked, hanging them by the hands, and
electrocuting them (Human Rights Watch, 2005). The State Security Investigations extended its
mass arrest campaigns after the Sharm El Sheikh bombings, resulting in the detention of about
600 more people by late August 2005 (Human Rights Watch, 2006). According to the Sinai
Prisoners Defense Front, civilian courts sentenced 300 in absentia, military courts sentenced
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several hundred more, and at least 100 Sinai detainees were still in prisons by 2010 (as cited in
Sabry, 2015). The crackdown fueled resentment among the Sinai Bedouins (Pelham, 2012).
Meanwhile, the booming underground smuggling industry provided economic gains for
the North Sinai Bedouins. Israel and Egypt imposed a blockade on the Gaza strip after Hamas
seized it from Fatah forces loyal to the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in June 2007.
With the blockade severely restricting the flow of goods into Gaza, the underground tunnels
became the main source of basic goods (Abu Mudallala & Al-Agha, 2011). From mid-2007 to
November 2008, the number of tunnels linking North Sinai to Gaza soared from 20 to at least
500, increasing the scale of the illegal trade to over 600,000 dollars of goods annually (AlSorani, 2008). The devastating 2008 Gaza War bolstered North Sinai’s smuggling industry even
further and, by late 2010, over 1200 tunnels were operating to smuggle food, water, fuel,
construction materials, and weapons (Abu Mudallala & Al-Agha, 2011; Yaari, 2012). The
growth of illegal trade between Sinai and Gaza continued to increase, as the related Egyptian
state-imposed punishments were relatively lenient. According to Egyptian security official
Khaled Okasha, Egypt’s posture towards the smuggling industry not only provided the North
Sinai Bedouins with a source of income, but it also halted armed activity in the peninsula
temporarily between the 2006 Dahab bombings and the 2011 uprisings (as cited in Sabry, 2015).
The tunnels also facilitated a Salafi militancy spillover from Gaza into North Sinai. One
key factor contributing to Sinai’s Salafi militancy was crossover of Salafi preachers from Gaza to
North Sinai (Dentice, 2018). Building on existing grievances in the North, some of these
preachers called for violent resistance against the state, supporting Palestine, and denouncing the
traditional Sufi orders (McGregor, 2016). Salafism spread amongst the youth and some Bedouins
called for boycotting and fighting the government (Yaari, 2012). Another contributing factor
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involved the militants escaping into northeast Sinai in 2009 when Hamas cracked down on Salafi
groups in Gaza (Pelham, 2012). The relocated militants regrouped and created a number of
factions, some of which eventually merged to form the Sinai-based group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
(O. Ashour, 2016). By late 2010, Tawhid wal-Jihad, al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya, the Mujahideen
Council, and Jaysh al-Islam were among the militant groups operating in Sinai (Aziz, 2016).
Together, these groups laid the groundwork for a more refined militant insurgency that merged
localized grievances with an external Salafi militant ideology.
3.5

Post-Revolution Period 2011-2013
On January 25, 2011, demonstrators took to the streets of Cairo, protesting the brutality

of al-Adli’s Ministry of Interior. Three days later the police forces withdrew from the streets,
gave way to the demonstrators to take over the Tahrir Square in downtown Cairo, and prompted
the Egyptian military to deploy its forces across the country. Further, about 24,000 prisoners
were able to escape from the Egyptian jails during the revolution (Salah & Talaat, 2011). The
continuous nationwide protests and escalating demands culminated in former President Mubarak
stepping down and transferring power to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces on February
11, 2011. The council then ruled the country until June 29, 2012, after which the Muslim
Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi took over as the first Egyptian President since the
revolution.
In Sinai, violence against the Egyptian security forces increased during the revolution.
Apart from sporadic Sinai protests on January 25, 2011, attacks against security compounds and
the State Security Investigations buildings erupted in North Sinai after the police killed a 22year-old demonstrator in Sheikh Zuwayid on January 27 (Sabry, 2015; Salim, 2011). Among
those who escaped from Egyptian jails were Salafi militants who reportedly resorted to North
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Sinai, bolstering the existing network of militant groups (Pelham, 2012). After Mubarak stepped
down, the attacks against the Egyptian security forces continued in Sinai, with a total of 19
attacks under the rule of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (Al-Beheiry, 2017). One of
the most notable was in July of 2011, when masked militants with black flags attacked a security
facility in al-Arish that killed at least three. The incident occurred following a protest by North
Sinai Bedouins demanding the release of their relatives in connection with the Taba bombings
(Al-Tabarani, 2011; “Martyrdom of 3 including a Military Officer and the Injury of 19 in an
attack by masked militants raising Black Flags on Al-Arish Security Facility,” 2011). The
militants later distributed documents, titled “al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula,” in al-Arish, Sheikh
Zuwayid, and Rafah, “condemning the Egyptian military over the Camp David Peace Accords”
(as cited in Sabry, 2015, p. 145). Reiterating their demands to release their detained relatives,
armed Bedouins later besieged the Multinational Forces and Observers camp in North Sinai in
March 2012 (Al-Wafd News, 2014).
Israel also became a more recurring target for the Sinai militant insurgency in the postrevolution period. By 2011, Egypt was supplying 40 percent of Israel’s natural gas through
pipelines in Sinai as part of the Gas Supply and Purchase Agreement between the two countries
(Bar-Eli, 2012). North Sinai militants bombed a gas pipeline for the first time on February 5,
2011 (Barnett, 2014). After the 13th gas pipeline bombing in April 2012, the Egyptian stateowned gas company canceled the deal and stopped exporting natural gas to Israel (“Egypt scraps
Israel gas supply deal,” 2012). When the new militant group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis publicly
announced itself in an online video released July 2012, it claimed responsibility for all 13
pipeline bombings in North Sinai that al-Qaeda’s leader al-Zawahiri had praised (Ansar Bayt alMaqdis, 2012). Upon its media debut, the group also claimed a couple of cross-border attacks on
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South Israel (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, 2014b). Another newly-formed group, Majlis Shura alMujahideen fi Aknaf Bayt al-Maqdis (The Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of
Jerusalem), released a video claiming responsibility for a cross-border attack that killed an Israeli
worker in June 2012 (Fursan Al-Balagh, 2012; Greenberg, 2012). The same group claimed four
rocket attacks on South Israel in the following months (START, 2018). Following the revolution,
the rising Sinai insurgency posed a greater threat to Israel.
Meanwhile, the Egyptian military began to increase its presence in North Sinai in the
post-revolution period. In response to attacks on security compounds, gas pipelines, and Israel,
the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces launched Operation Eagle in North Sinai in August
2011 (Eleiba, 2011). For the first time since the Camp David Accords, the military deployed
2500 soldiers and 250 armored personnel carriers in North Sinai with the goal of restoring
control and deterring militant groups (Deif, 2018). The Minister of Defense Mohamed Hussein
Tantawi later announced that the military ensured complete security in Sinai by October of 2011
(Pelham, 2012).
A major attack in North Sinai after Morsi came to power on June 30, 2012 went beyond
the prompting of an isolated security response. After about 35 militants attacked a Rafah security
checkpoint at the border, killing 16 military officers and soldiers on August 5, the military did
launch Operation Eagle II (Al-Badry, Abu Diraa, & Mubarak, 2012). The campaign aimed to
reinforce security checkpoints in Rafah, Sheikh Zuwayid, and al-Arish and restore security. A
military spokesman announced the results of the operation a month later, which included killing
33 militants, arresting 38, destroying 31 underground tunnels at the border, and seizing weapons
and vehicles that militants use in their attacks (“Military News Conference to Announce the
Results of the Sinai Operation,” 2012). Meanwhile, Morsi, along with senior military officials,
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visited North Sinai during the operation in the first presidential visit in decades. Morsi met with
the Bedouin tribes, promised development projects, and later sanctioned foreign investments in
the peninsula (Pelham, 2012). Further, he forced the retirement of the longstanding Minister of
Defense and the Army Chief of Staff and appointed Abdelfattah al-Sisi and Sedki Sobhi
respectively in their vacant positions.
Militant groups in Sinai apparently differed on whether to attack the Egyptian military
under Morsi’s rule. After the Rafah checkpoint attack, the militant groups Majlis Shura alMujahideen and al-Salafiyya al-Jihadiyya issued statements denying their responsibility for the
attack. Despite not commenting on the attack, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’ actions were the most
hostile. The group assassinated Bedouin leaders in Rafah who endorsed the military after
launching Operation Eagle II (Masrawy, 2013; Sabry, 2015). However, attacking the military
was still a turning point that no militant group would afford to publicly claim. Later in May
2013, militants kidnapped six Egyptian policemen and one army border guard in North Sinai.
But this time, the militants released them a week later after talks between the military and tribal
leaders (Abedine & Smith-Park, 2013). Despite these major incidents, Morsi’s year in power saw
only 11 attacks in total, seven of which targeted security forces in Sinai (“Al-Badil Announces
the Number of Terrorist Attacks in Sinai between January 2011 and January 2014,” 2014; AlBeheiry, 2017). The relative calmness in North Sinai throughout June 2013 hinted at potential
negotiations between the government and Bedouins (Gold, 2013).
3.6

Post-Morsi Period 2013-2017
On June 30, 2013, anti-Morsi mass protests took place in Egypt demanding the

President’s resignation after one year in power and calling for a new election. The military soon
released an audio statement on the next day that delivered a 48-hour ultimatum to Morsi to
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satisfy the public’s demands. Morsi defied the demand and stressed his legitimacy as the
country’s president in a televised speech. But after the end of the 48 hours on July 3, al-Sisi
announced the ouster of Morsi and the installation of an interim government with Chief Justice
of the Supreme Constitutional Court Adli Mansour as Acting President.
The number of attacks in North Sinai skyrocketed to over 200 in the five months after the
ouster of Morsi (TIMEP, 2017a). Attacks on the military and police facilities in North Sinai
killed at least 33 soldiers in the first month (Al-Quds Al-Arabi, 2013; Sabry, 2013). Five days
after the Egyptian security forces dispersed pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo on August 14 that had
killed over 600, North Sinai militants killed 25 soldiers in Rafah (N. Ali & Fakhry, 2014;
Alkhshali & Younes, 2013). Clashes and attacks in Sinai killed at least another 20 individuals in
the week to follow (Gold, 2013). The killing of five Sinai militants by an Israeli drone strike in
August also ignited Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’ highly intensified rhetoric deeming the Egyptian
government a traitor and a collaborator with Zionists (Sabry, 2015; The Guardian, 2013). Since
then, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has become more vocal, assassinated security officials, attempted to
assassinate the Minister of Interior, attacked military posts, shot down a military helicopter in
North Sinai, fired rockets at South Israel, and bombed the military intelligence command in
Ismailiya as well as the South Sinai, Cairo, and Daqahliya Security Directorates (Ansar Bayt alMaqdis, 2014b). By late 2013, the group explicitly reiterated that its fight was against the
Egyptian security forces and Israel (Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, 2014b).
Five months after President al-Sisi came to power, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (the peninsula’s
strongest militant group) announced its pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in
November 2014, and became Wilayat Sinai. The average number of attacks in North Sinai
surged from 12 per month in 2014 to at about one per day in 2015, 2016, and 2017, killing over
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2300 people over the three-year period (TIMEP, 2017a). Wilayat Sinai was the deadliest militant
group in Egypt during that period, claiming responsibility for almost 900 attacks (see Figure
3.2). After pledging allegiance to ISIS, the group mainly claimed responsibility for attacks inside
the Sinai Peninsula only, while the ISIS Egypt branch claimed responsibility for those on the
mainland.

Figure 3.2 Number of Wilayat Sinai’s claimed attacks 2015-2017. Source: TIMEP’s
Egypt Security Watch reports.

Wilayat Sinai underwent major tactical shifts over time in the peninsula. In the group’s
attacks in 2015, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) were the main weapon of choice with at
least 130 attacks (TIMEP, 2017b). The group’s most notable attack was the downing of the
Russian airliner in October of 2015. The use of firearms and snipers against the Egyptian
security forces were also prevalent throughout the same year (Al-Beheiry, 2017). The use of
IEDs surged in Wilayat Sinai’s attacks against Egyptian security forces in 2016, exceeding 220
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incidents in North Sinai (TIMEP, 2017b). Most importantly, Wilayat Sinai’s targets expanded
beyond security forces and foreign tourists to include local civilians in late 2016. The focus on
civilians in Wilayat Sinai’s attacks became clear soon following an Egyptian airstrike killed the
group’s leader Abu Duaa al-Ansari in August of 2016 (Calderwood, 2016). After Abu Hajar alHashemi replaced al-Ansari, attacks against Sufi Muslims and Christian Copts increased (AlNaba’, 2016). The group beheaded two Sufi men accused of practicing witchcraft, including a
100-year old cleric in November of 2016. Coinciding with two suicide attacks on Cairo churches
by the ISIS Egypt branch in December, Wilayat Sinai also started a systematic campaign
targeting Christian Copts in North Sinai (Said & Naguib, 2018).
The year 2017 emboldened a shift in both the group’s tactical operations and its
ideological underpinnings. In the first quarter, Wilayat Sinai claimed three attacks against
Christian Copts in al-Arish. By the end of February, around 250 Coptic Christians had already
fled their homes seeking refuge in Ismailiya (“Egypt’s Coptic Christians flee Sinai after deadly
attacks,” 2017; TIMEP, 2017a). Meanwhile, the ISIS Egypt branch continued its assault on
churches, killing almost 50 individuals during Palm Sunday service in Alexandria and Tanta
(Dentice, 2018). The use of inghimasi attacks, in which suicide fighters use small arms and
explosives until they die, also increased in the peninsula. The number of Wilayat Sinai’s suicide
operations in North Sinai jumped from three in 2016 to eight in 2017 (Gomaa, 2018). The shift
was arguably due to pressure from the Egyptian military, the increasing number of Palestinians
in Wilayat Sinai, and the change in leadership (Said & Naguib, 2018, p. 6). The attack on a
North Sinai Sufi mosque that killed over 300 worshippers during Friday prayer in November
illustrates the extent of permissible civilian targets for the Sinai insurgency by 2017. Although
Wilayat Sinai has not claimed responsibility for the attack, the Egyptian Attorney General’s

60

public statement asserted that the militants were carrying ISIS flags as they shot the worshippers
and bombed the mosque (Walsh & Youssef, 2017).
The new military strategy in North Sinai, however, signaled more constraints on the
Bedouins in the post-Morsi period. A strident curfew and a shoot to kill policy governed
residents of Rafah, Sheikh Zuwayid, and al-Arish since July 2013 (Abdullah, 2015; Mokhtar,
2016). The military started a forced eviction and mass home demolitions in Rafah in the same
month as part of an official plan to create a buffer zone to prevent smuggling weapons from
Gaza into Sinai. According to Human Rights Watch (2015), the campaign resulted in the eviction
of over 3000 Sinai Bedouin families by August 2015, who reportedly received neither adequate
compensation nor temporary housing. The military’s campaign resumed in late 2017, resulting in
the destruction of over 3000 homes and commercial buildings by May 2018 (Human Rights
Watch, 2018). The military’s counter-tunnel operations have also resulted in outrage due to
disruptions in the profitable smuggling industry (Nichols, 2013; Sabry, 2016). Further, bringing
memories of the State Security Investigations after the Taba bombings, the Second Field Army
command in Ismailiya and the 101 battalion in al-Arish have purportedly become notorious
among the Bedouins due to the military’s mass arrest campaign in North Sinai since 2013
(Sabry, 2015).
On the other hand, the Egyptian security forces also shifted their tactics in Sinai over
time. In 2015, security forces were mostly reactive, using traditional warfare tactics against the
Sinai militants (Said & Naguib, 2018). They also worked to create a buffer zone at the border
with Gaza. Coinciding with Wilayat Sinai’s increasing number of attacks in the first half of
2015, the military and police conducted at least 60 counterterrorism operations per month and
reportedly killed around 1400 in North Sinai between March and June 2015 (TIMEP, 2016b).
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Nevertheless.the militants were able to briefly take over parts of Sheikh Zuwayid on July 1, 2015
(Awad, 2016). In the afternoon, the military launched airstrikes that pushed the militants out of
the city and spoiled ISIS’s plan to control territory in North Sinai. Two months later, the military
launched the Martyr’s Right Operation, which reportedly killed over 500 alleged terrorists,
arrested about 600 suspects, and destroyed more than 450 IEDs in September 2015 (Tantawy,
2015). Despite reports of large numbers of casualties and arrests, Wilayat Sinai’s attacks
nevertheless increased between October and December 2015.
The Egyptian military gradually crippled the Sinai insurgency in 2016 and 2017. After
the number of Wilayat Sinai’s attacks surged in the first half of 2016, the military launched two
phases of the Martyr’s Right Operation in the same year, conducting almost 50 counterterrorism
operations (TIMEP, 2017b). Unlike the first phase, however, the military extended its operations
beyond just Al-Arish, Rafah, and Sheikh Zuwayid to include the Halal mountain in Central Sinai
and other hideouts (SIS, 2017). Moreover, the military extended its policy at the Rafah-Gaza
border to Al-Arish and Sheikh Zuwayid by displacing residents around key military locations
and government infrastructure (Said & Naguib, 2018). It also attempted to stifle Wilayat Sinai by
reportedly killing its leaders, including Abu Duaa al-Ansari and over 40 of his aides
(Calderwood, 2016). Whereas the number of Wilayat Sinai’s attacks dropped between mid-2016
and end of 2017, the Egyptian military continued to mount pressure on the group by tripling the
number of counterterrorism operations in 2017 (TIMEP, 2017a). Further, the Tarabin tribe
spearheaded an initiative in April 2017 to unite the Bedouins against Wilayat Sinai militants
(“Al-Tarabin Tribe Leads an Initiative to Unite Sinai Tribes to Face the Takfiris,” 2017). As a
result, al-Tarabin units fought alongside the Egyptian military in North Sinai, strengthening the
counterterrorism operations.
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3.7

Concluding Thoughts
This chapter laid out the situation context of the ongoing Sinai conflict between the

Egyptian state and ISIS in North Sinai. The Israeli occupation of Sinai set the stage for growing
suspicions against the Bedouins and differential economic policies in the North vis-à-vis the
South. The Egyptian rule over the peninsula upon liberation carried with it social alienation,
economic deprivation, a lack of educational opportunities, and underdevelopment to the North
Sinai Bedouins. The state’s crackdown on the North in the aftermath of the 2004-2006 Sinai
bombings violated the Bedouins’ human rights and further exacerbated their grievances, yet
simultaneously allowed them to benefit from illegal trade with Gaza. Hence, when the 2011
revolution erupted, it presented the ideal backdrop for a North Sinai-based militant insurgency to
emerge and flourish amid political turmoil. Ever since, militants have attacked the Egyptian
security forces in Sinai, who have responded in turn with several, multi-stage counterterrorism
operations. Nevertheless, the sophistication of the insurgency’s tactics, the severity of its attacks,
and the scope of its permissible targets have evolved over the years. Wilayat Sinai is the peak of
the insurgency and remains an ongoing threat to Egypt’s economy and national security.
4

PHOTOGRAPHIC OUTPUT AND MILITARY ACTIVITY

The digital media sphere has been a key site of contestation between Wilayat Sinai and the
Egyptian military. Wilayat Sinai’s predecessor, Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, previously posted videos
and standard written statements on web forums, but once the group pledged allegiance to ISIS,
its media operations evolved. Wilayat Sinai has produced hundreds of high-quality images, most
of which serve as components of photo reports and daily news briefs. It has also benefited from
ISIS’s official and unofficial distribution networks. Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output has
achieved featured visibility in the broader group’s Dabiq, Rumiyah, and al-Naba’ publications,
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as well as enhanced circulation on ISIS’s centralized web forums and social networking sites. On
the other hand, the military has utilized its official Facebook page as the main hub to disseminate
hundreds of photographs documenting its operations in North Sinai to millions of followers since
late 2012. The circulation of these images has moved beyond the millions of followers on
Facebook as the state and private-owned media use them as official documentations of onground events in Sinai. Both sides of the Sinai conflict developed photographic campaigns to
complement their military action over the past few years.
This chapter considers what, if any, relationships exist between the frequency of Wilayat
Sinai and the Egyptian military’s photographs and visual messaging strategies in the Sinai
conflict and the local and regional military context. It explores how changes in the photographic
outputs and use of scenic elements relate to the source, date, and nature of the local and regional
military events. Several contextual military factors emerge as key explanatory factors for the
changing photographic output and visual strategy. They include attacks by the militant group,
onset of counterterrorism military operations, completion of counterterrorism operations, loss of
leaders, and the introduction of participating local groups into the battlefield activities. For each
military contextual factor, the chapter first examines the shifts in the two photographic
campaigns using a quantitative analysis. The statistical tests pinpoint significant changes in the
campaigns that coincide with military events on the ground over the two-year period. A
qualitative analysis, however, further reveals the nature of the state and non-state actor’s visual
responses and identify other important campaign shifts that may not be statistically significant
per se.
Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military disseminated 1905 images of the Sinai conflict in
the 2016-2017 time frame of this study. Over the 24-month period, Wilayat Sinai disseminated a
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total of 800 Sinai-related images on ISIS’s official Telegram channel, while the Egyptian
military disseminated 1105 on its spokesperson’s Facebook page. A monthly break down of the
photographic output reveals that both the Egyptian military and Wilayat Sinai did change the
number of photographs they released over time (see Figure 4.1). Taken as a whole, however, the
two group’s outputs exhibited no linear relationship (r (22) = .20, p > .05).

Figure 4.1 Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s photographic outputs in
2016-2017.
4.1

Local Attacks by the Militant Group
When grouped together in one unit of analysis, the number of Wilayat Sinai’s claimed

attacks did not correspond to shifts in the photographic output of the ISIS province or the
Egyptian military in 2016 and 2017. No relationship existed between the group’s monthly attacks
and output (r (22) = .10, p > .05). Even when Wilayat Sinai’s claimed attacks dropped by almost
half from 2016 to 2017, its photographic output remained relatively the same. An independentsamples t-test revealed no significant difference in Wilayat Sinai images in the 2016 (M = 34.42,
SD = 31.13) and 2017 (M = 32.25, SD = 23.45) conditions (t (22) = .19, p > .05). Similarly, no
relationship existed between the group’s monthly attacks and the Egyptian military’s output (r
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(22) = -.18, p > .50). But as Wilayat Sinai’s attacks dropped from 2016 to 2017, the Egyptian
military’s photographic output increased. An independent-samples t-test revealed a significant
difference in the Egyptian military images in the 2016 (M = 25.25, SD = 16.42) and 2017 (M =
66.83, SD = 38.75) conditions (t (22) = -3.42, p < .05). At the broadest level, the frequency of
Wilayat Sinai’s claimed attacks by itself did not associate with either increases or decreases in
the group or the Egyptian military’s photographic outputs (see Figure 4.2).

Figure 4.2 Wilayat Sinai’s claimed attacks and the group and military’s photographic outputs in
2016-2017. Source for number of attacks: TIMEP’s Egypt Security Watch reports.
The number and nature of Wilayat Sinai’s claimed attacks, however, did correspond to a
tactical shift in one of the provincial group’s visual messaging strategies. The possible death
visual trope correlated with the claimed attacks (r (22) = .50, p < .05). The display of possible
death also dropped from 25 images in 2016 to 10 in 2017, coinciding with the simultaneous drop
in Wilayat Sinai’s attacks from 419 to 217. Almost all the possible death images in the first year
depicted Egyptian soldiers in the field positioned next to detonating IEDs. The shots hinted at the
possibility of fatal outcomes but provided no textual or visual confirmation of any deaths (see
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Figure 4.3). In 2017, however, not one image of possible death appeared in the context of IED
attacks. Instead, they mainly showed Egyptian soldiers at the crosshairs of snipers, running from
approaching car bombs, or suffering injury after firearm attacks. The content of possible death
images over the two-year period was specifically in alignment with the surge in Wilayat Sinai’s
IED attacks in 2016, after which the group shifted to suicide attacks and use of firearms in 2017
(Said & Naguib, 2018; TIMEP, 2017b). Thus, the possible death visual trope reflected the
group’s frequency of attacks and its changing weapon of choice over the study’s two-year
period.

Figure 4.3 The detonation of an IED south of Sheikh Zuwayid; disseminated March 2, 2016.
Although the overall quantitative analysis revealed no relationships between the attacks
and Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s outputs over the two-period, a closer look at major
attacks occurring in the same time period adds more nuance. Examining the Egyptian military
and Wilayat Sinai’s use of visual elements and tropes after the major attacks also provides a
deeper understanding of the visual battlefield of the media campaigns. A summary of the key
Sinai attacks appears in Figure 4.4.

67

Figure 4.4 Timeline of several key military attacks in North Sinai in 2016 and 2017.
Two of the major Wilayat Sinai attacks bore virtually no resemblance to noticeable
changes in photographic output or the visual messaging strategies in the competing online media
campaigns. The first was the al-Safa police checkpoint attack, which killed 15 policemen in
March 2016 (Official Page of Ministry of Interior, 2016). Immediately after the attack, Wilayat
Sinai released an 11-image news brief depicting the militants getting out of a pickup truck,
shooting at the checkpoint, and confiscating weapons and IDs. Despite the posting of the
extended news brief, the incident did not signal a significant shift in the total output of the
group’s March photographic campaign. While Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output did rise from
64 images in February to 89 in March 2016, the images constituted only eight percent (3 of 36)
of the images the group used to portray ongoing destruction in in March. The Egyptian military’s
images in the immediate aftermath of the al-Safa attack also remained relatively constant and did
not include any images showing the military’s retaliation for the attack.
The second attack that had no correspondence with a change in the visual media
campaigns was the Beer al-Abd military checkpoint attack in October 2016, which killed 12
security personnel (Official Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2016e). The next day, Wilayat
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Sinai released a four-image news brief showing Egyptian soldiers and flags at the checkpoint,
gunfire, and the body of a soldier on the ground. The four images were Wilayat Sinai’s only
depiction of an armed attack in October 2016 and did not signal a major shift in October’s
photographic campaign. Wilayat Sinai’s output had steadily increased between August and
November of 2016. In October, the provincial group distributed 24 images, in which the
inclusion of the four Beer al-Abd attack images did not make much difference. The Egyptian
military’s output in the immediate aftermath of the attack fell within the regular monthly ebbs
and flows that occurred from August to December of 2016. The military’s 10 images in October
displayed no military operations serving as retaliation for the attack. Instead, they showed
stationed security forces, a school opening, and confiscated explosive materials. Subsequently,
Wilayat Sinai’s major attacks in November 2016 onward gave a different picture.
4.1.1

Al-Sabil Checkpoint Attack

The attack on the al-Sabil military checkpoint in North Sinai did correspond to a shift in
Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output. The attack killed eight military personnel late in November
of 2016 (Official Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2016d). Wilayat Sinai released a 21-image
photo report on November 27 depicting the attack. This one photo report made up 60 percent of
the group’s November output, marking a surge from October and the highest point in the group’s
output since March 2016.
The attack also corresponded to a shift in Wilayat Sinai’s visual messaging strategy. The
provincial visual campaign presented the group as a devout, destructive, and lethal fighting force.
Three images in the al-Sabil attack photo report displayed militants pointing the index finger to
the heavens signaling monotheism (see Figure 4.5). The number of displays of this religious
symbol in the photo report alone was higher than in any month in 2016 and 2017. All six
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displays of ongoing destruction in November, up from three in October, appeared in this photo
report, showing the checkpoint in flames and an Egyptian tank under gunfire. Further, seven out
of all nine images displaying deaths in November were in the photo report, thus marking the
peak in the display of deaths in Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign in 2016-2017. These
images focused on the display of dead corpses of military personnel, who reportedly died in the
attack.

Figure 4.5 A militant making the monotheism gesture as he speaks to others before the
operation; disseminated November 27, 2016.

4.1.2

Al-Matafi Checkpoint Attack

Another attack on al-Matafi police checkpoint in North Sinai accompanied a subsequent
shift in Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output. The January 9, 2017 attack killed eight and injured
12. Perhaps because the attack targeted a police checkpoint, the military soon reinforced the alMatafi checkpoint among others in Sinai (Sakr, 2017). Wilayat Sinai released a 26-image news
brief on January 11 displaying the attack, starting with images of a car bomb, followed by the
militants carrying firearms and shooting at security forces, the destruction of an armored vehicle,
police building reportedly under the militants’ control, and a dead corpse of a policeman. This
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single news brief made up 70 percent of the group’s monthly output, marking the highest level
by Wilayat Sinai over 10 months.
The attack corresponded with a shift in Wilayat Sinai’s subsequent visual messaging
strategy. After the successful attack, the provincial group reinforced its visual identity as a
destructive and deadly fighting force. In January of 2017, Wilayat Sinai put out 12 images of
ongoing destruction, up from seven such images in December 2016. Ten of the twelve appeared
in the al-Matafi attack news brief, showing the explosions and fire at the checkpoint. The two
January images displaying dead bodies were also in this brief, reportedly showing the corpse of a
policeman. Further, the only display of possible death in the entire month was in this news brief,
reportedly showing a policeman under gunfire as he tried to escape.
The al-Matafi checkpoint attack also coincided with a shift in the Egyptian military’s
output. The military disseminated 29 images in January 2017, with 20 of these images distributed
after the al-Matafi attack. The images showed corpses, confiscated weaponry, and destroyed
hideouts. They also displayed the former Army Chief of Staff Major General Mahmoud Hijazy
visiting Egyptian special forces and the Minister of Immigration visiting the injured soldiers.
Perhaps as a result, January marked the highest output of Egyptian military’s images since April
2016.
The attack also corresponded with a slight shift the military’s visual messaging strategy.
After the occurrence of the al-Matafi attack, the military placed some greater emphasis on
presenting itself as a destructive fighting force against the militant insurgency. All three displays
of ongoing destruction in January, which constituted the largest number of such Egyptian
military images since September 2016, appeared after the al-Matafi attack. The examples of
ongoing destruction showed hideouts and motorcycles in flames.
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4.1.3

Military Checkpoint Attack Near Rafah

The attack on a military checkpoint in the south of Rafah corresponded with an increase
in Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output. The July 7, 2017 attack killed and injured 26 checkpoint
personnel (Official Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2017a). Two days later, Wilayat Sinai
released a 22-image news brief displaying the attack. The brief began with images showing a
suicide attack on the checkpoint and followed those photographs with ones of explosions,
militants running, gunfire, destruction, a soldier’s dead corpse, air jets dropping missiles, and
two militants praying after the attack. This brief made up Sinai Wilayat’s entire July output and
represented an increase from the 19 photographs the group distributed in June 2017.
The attack also coincided with a shift in the provincial group’s visual messaging strategy.
After the attack, Wilayat Sinai placed a greater emphasis on presenting itself as a destructive,
pious fighting force. The ISIS province displayed seven shots of ongoing destruction at the
checkpoint, up from six in June 2017, in one news brief distributed in July. Further, an image
showing the militants praying after the attack was one of only five displays of this act of worship
over the 2016-2017 time period.
The same Wilayat Sinai attack corresponded with a shift in the Egyptian military’s
photographic output. The military disseminated 55 images in July 2017, which came after only
distributing 36 images in the previous month. Despite no presence of images in the week after
the attack, the military’s output bounced back with 39 images in the last 15 days of July, making
up a full 71 percent of the military’s monthly output.
The attack on the military checkpoint south of Rafah also coincided with a shift in the
military’s visual messaging strategy. In the aftermath of the attack, the military underscored its
identity as a deadly fighting force. Later on the same day of the attack, the military disseminated
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seven images showing the corpses of five militants who had attacked the checkpoint. All seven
of the military’s July death images appeared as part of the same Facebook post showing the
attack aftermath. This post marked the second highest total of death images in the military’s
2016-2017 photographic campaign.
4.1.4

Beer Al-Abd Security Convoy Attack

The attack on a security convoy in Beer Al-Abd corresponded with a shift in Wilayat
Sinai’s photographic output. The September 11, 2017 attack killed 18 and injured six policemen
(Murad Higazy, 2017). Two days later, Wilayat Sinai disseminated a 26-image photo report
displaying the unfolding attack and aftermath. The photo report began by showing a militant
before he set out on a suicide attack. The subsequent shots showed a car bomb on the highway
next to four armored vehicles, explosions, militants shooting, policemen’s dead corpses, and
confiscated belongings. This photo report made up about half of Wilayat Sinai’s September 2017
output marking the highest point in the group’s photographic output in seven months. The output
represented a surge from the distribution of only one image in the previous month.
The Beer al-Abd attack also coincided with a shift in Wilayat Sinai’s visual messaging
strategy. The provincial group again highlighted itself as a destructive, deadly, and pious fighting
force. Reversing the complete absence of ongoing destruction shots in August of 2017, Wilayat
Sinai displayed 19 images of ongoing destruction in September, the month of the attack.
Eighteen of the 19 images appeared in the Beer al-Abd attack photo report showing explosions,
gunfire, and the police vehicles in flames. All seven death images distributed in September also
appeared in this photo report, marking the second highest display of deaths in Wilayat Sinai’s
2016-2017 photographic campaign. Further, the only image displaying the monotheism gesture
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in the month of the attack was in the Beer al-Abd photo report, showing a suicide attacker
pointing his index finger to the heavens before attacking the police.
4.1.5

Multiple Military Checkpoint Attacks in North Sinai

Multiple attacks on military checkpoints near al-Arish and Sheikh Zuwayid corresponded
with another shift in the level of Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output. Together, the three attacks
killed 12 personnel between October 13 and 15, 2017 (Official Page of Armed Forces
Spokesman, 2017f, 2017d). Wilayat Sinai disseminated two attack images on October 14 and a
related14-image news brief two days later. The first news brief showed two militants who carried
out a suicide attack in al-Arish. The second presented an array of images showing the Wilayat
Sinai militants marching, gunfire, rockets, explosions at the checkpoints, the beheading of a
soldier, a dead corpse, a checkpoint in flames, and the soldiers’ confiscated belongings.
Together, the two briefs made up over one-fifth of October’s output, marking a surge from 56
images in September to 78 in October. The increase also resulted in the highest output level in
Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign over a 19-month period.
The checkpoint attacks in Northern Sinai also corresponded with a slight shift in Wilayat
Sinai’s visual messaging strategy. The provincial group faced a public challenge of maintaining
its image as a destructive and deadly fighting force in the wake of the three attacks. Six of the 13
images displaying ongoing destruction from explosions, gunfire, and flames in October were in
the second news brief. One of the two death images distributed in October appeared in the same
brief showing a dead soldier in the aftermath of one of the attacks. However, the displays of
death and ongoing destruction in the group’s monthly photographic output dropped.
Similar to other major attacks on checkpoints, the multiple checkpoint attacks in al-Arish
and Sheikh Zuwayid corresponded with an increase in the level of the Egyptian military’s
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photographic output. In response to the attacks, the military disseminated 23 images in three
Facebook posts appearing on October 14 and 16, 2017. These posts made up 37 percent of the
military’s total October photographic output, marking a surge from 26 images in September to
62 in October.
These Northern Sinai checkpoint attacks also corresponded to a shift in the military’s
visual messaging strategy. The military presented itself as a lethal fighting force that could
effectively counter the militant forces. Out of 29 death images the military distributed in
October, 23 appeared in the three Facebook posts between October 14 and 16. These posts only
focused on the dead corpses of militants, marking the height of monthly death images in the
Egyptian military’s photographic campaign in 2016 and 2017.
In sum, Wilayat Sinai’s major attacks at the local front did not uniformly correspond to
shifts in the provincial group and the Egyptian military’s photographic campaigns. The type,
target, and death toll of the attacks, however, do not explain why some major attacks
corresponded with changes in output and messaging strategies, while others did not. All of the
perpetrators of the major attacks were a group of militants, all targeted Egyptian security forces
albeit military or police, and each attack resulted in approximately the same level of fatalities.
The notable remaining difference between the major attacks was the date of their occurrence.
The two attacks that did not correspond to changes in the photographic campaigns happened
prior to November in 2016; the attacks that did correspond with changes occurred thereafter.
What changed in November of 2016 that might account for the apparent shift in the role
of the major attacks? Wilayat Sinai’s attacks dropped to a low of 10 in November for the first
time in 2016, down from 47 in October 2016. The frequency of attacks never returned to the preNovember levels. The corresponding surges in Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output following

75

each major attack served to maintain a virtual presence in response to military pressure. The
increasing display of ongoing destruction, death, and religious symbols worked to reinforce a
spectacle that exaggerated the group’s prowess. The upticks in the Egyptian military’s output in
response, along with the displays of ongoing destruction and death, emphasized the military’s
ability to obliterate the insurgency in retaliation after a few of the major attacks.
4.2

Regional Attacks by the Militant Group
ISIS’s attacks in Iraq and Syria did not correspond to shifts in Wilayat Sinai or the

Egyptian military’s photographic campaigns in 2016-2017. According to START’s global
terrorism database (GTD), ISIS conducted 2653 attacks in Iraq and Syria in 2016 and 2017
(GTD, 2017, 2018b). Comparing the regional military activity with the localized visual
contestation in Sinai revealed no relationship between ISIS’s monthly attacks in Iraq and Syria
and Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output (r (22) = -.07, p > .05). As ISIS’s claimed attacks
slightly dropped from 1376 in 2016 to 1277 in 2017, Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output fell by
60 percent from 294 images to 119. Similarly, no relationship existed between ISIS’s monthly
attacks and the Egyptian military’s photographic output (r (22) = .02, p > .05). Meanwhile, the
number of attacks did not correspond to any shifts in visual elements or tropes on both sides. In
short, ISIS’s regional attacks did not interact with Wilayat Sinai and the military’s outputs and
visual messaging strategy (see Figure 4.6).
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Figure 4.6 ISIS’s attacks and Wilayat Sinai and the military’s photographic outputs in 2016 and
2017. Source for number of attacks: Global Terrorism Database.
A qualitative examination of the relationship further reinforces the results. First, an ISIS
suicide bomber carried out the deadliest attack for the group in Iraq over the two-year period,
killing nearly 400 in al-Karrada neighborhood in Baghdad on July 3, 2016 (Basu, 2017). Two
days later, Wilayat Sinai was disseminating its typical IED attack images at the time. The July
images did not exhibit any major shifts and the output was within the typical range of summer
2016. The Egyptian military’s output in July was also consistent with the following month, with
the recurring images of key figures visiting injured soldiers. ISIS’s deadliest attack in Iraq did
not correspond with any notable shifts in Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s photographic
campaigns.
Second, ISIS’s deadliest attack in Syria, which killed at least 120 members of the Syrian
regime forces in Palmyra on December 10, 2016 (“Islamic State militants return to Syria’s
ancient Palmyra ruins,” 2016), did not correspond with any major shifts either. The six images
Wilayat Sinai disseminated in the 21 days after the attack showed two martyred members of the
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group and one rocket attack. The only unusual thing about the images did not relate to ISIS in
Syria. The group put out an image of a martyred militant who had conducted an attack on a Cairo
church on December 11 that ISIS Egypt, not Wilayat Sinai, claimed. Following the Palmyra
attack, the Egyptian military also continued to disseminate its typical images showing the
destruction of tunnels, injured soldiers, and dead corpses of militants. None of the images on
both sides reflected, addressed, condemned or celebrated any ISIS attacks in Syria or Iraq.
Although the outputs of Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military declined in December 2016,
they were both within the typical range of the fourth quarter of 2016. Unlike the local attacks in
Sinai, ISIS’s regional attacks did not coincide with any changes in the Sinai visual contestation.
4.3

Onset and Completion of Local Military Operations
The Egyptian military’s claimed counterterrorism operations corresponded to shifts in

Wilayat Sinai and the military’s photographic outputs in at least one year. Although no
relationship existed between the Egyptian military’s monthly counterterrorism operations and
Wilayat Sinai’s output in 2016 and 2017 (r (22) = .06, p > .05), the two positively correlated in
the first 12 months (r (22) = .66, p < .05). For the most part, the shifts in counterterrorism
operations aligned with the group’s output in 2016, but did not sustain into 2017. A significant
correlation also occurred between the Egyptian military’s photographic output and its
counterterrorism operations in 2016-2017 (r (22) = .56, p < .01). As the military’s
counterterrorism operations increased from 46 in 2016 to 142 in 2017, its photographic output
also jumped from about 303 to 802 images. Hence, the relationship between the Egyptian
military’s claimed attacks and both the group and the military’s photographic outputs exhibited
some set patterns (see Figure 4.7).
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Figure 4.7 Monthly 2016-2017 Egyptian military’s counterterrorism ops and photographic
output levels. Source for claimed counterterrorism ops: TIMEP’s Egypt Security Watch reports.
The Egyptian military’s counterterrorism operations did correspond to shifts in the
military’s visual messaging strategy. The display of ongoing destruction in the military’s images,
for example, underwent tactical changes. Ongoing destruction images correlated with the
monthly operations (r (22) = .62, p < .01). The presence of fire and explosions also surged from
2016 to 2017, coinciding with the increase in the claimed counterterrorism operations. An
independent-samples t-test revealed a significant difference in the Egyptian military ongoing
destruction images in the 2016 (M = 1.97, SD = 2.75) and 2017 (M = 14.83, SD = 9.68)
conditions (t (22) = -4.45, p < .001). The display of ongoing destruction in the Egyptian
military’s photographs reflected the changing intensity of counterterrorism operations in Sinai.
The military’s counterterrorism operations further corresponded to a tactical shift in the
display of human beings in the photographic campaign. Images showing no humans at the scene
correlated with the counterterrorism operations (r (22) = .65, p < .01). The number of images
displaying no humans also spiked from 120 in 2016 to 428 in 2017 (40 versus 53 percent),
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coinciding with the surge in operations (see Table 4.1). A chi-square test of independence
revealed a significant difference in the exclusion of humans in 2016 and 2017, χ2 (1, N = 1105) =
16.82, p < .001). All these images showing no humans focused on the counterterrorism
operations and their immediate aftermath. For the most part, the Egyptian military limited the
photographic display of its increasing on-ground operations in 2017 to scenes of destruction,
tunnels, and confiscated illegal materials, rather than human engagement.
Table 4.1 Display of Human Beings in the Egyptian Military’s Photographs 2016-2017
2016

2017

Total

Human Beings

183

373

556

No Human Beings

120

429

549

Total

303

802

1105

The Egyptian military launched the Martyr’s Right operation as its major
counterterrorism offensive in September 2015. It added three more phases of the same operation
in 2016 and 2017, with no specified dates identifying the completion of each phase. Although the
quantitative analysis demonstrates significant correlations between the monthly operations and
both Wilayat Sinai and the military’s outputs, a closer look at the onset of the three major phases
provides more understanding regarding the potential interactions between the military activities
and the online photographic campaigns. Examining the visual messaging strategies at the
beginning of each phase also provides a better understanding of the grounds for the Sinai visual
contestation.
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4.3.1

Second Phase of the Martyr’s Right Operation

The onset of the second phase of the Martyr’s Right operation signaled a shift in Wilayat
Sinai’s photographic output. The military extended its second phase of the operation on January
3, 2016 (Official Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2016b). In the first week after the
announcement, Wilayat Sinai distributed 42 images, showing IED attacks, rocket launchings,
helicopters shootings, alleged spy executions, militants trainings, and reported aftermaths of the
Egyptian military’s airstrikes. The images posted in this week made up 44 percent of the group’s
output for January 2016 and marked the highest point in the two-year period with a total of 96
images. Viewed a bit more broadly, the first quarter of 2016 was the most productive for Wilayat
Sinai in its online photographic campaign.
The onset of the second phase of the Martyr’s Right operation also signaled a shift in
Wilayat Sinai’s visual messaging strategy. After the operation began, the provincial group placed
a greater emphasis on its identity as a destructive and devout fighting force. The display of
ongoing destruction images was at a peak in January with 42 images, 27 of which visualized the
immediate aftermath of IED attacks against the security forces in North Sinai. A total of 43
percent of all ongoing destruction images in 2016 and 2017 appeared in the first quarter only,
with 52 such images appearing in February and March. Further, the display of religious symbols
was at its highest point in January with nine images showing armed militants making the
monotheism gesture, a militant reading Qur’an during his break, a destroyed mosque, and a dusty
Qur’an after airstrikes.
The same phase of the operation corresponded to a shift in the Egyptian military’s output.
The military’s January output was the second highest in terms of monthly output in 2016.
January’s 49 Egyptian military images showed the confiscation of the militants’ weaponry and
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explosive materials, the destruction of drugs and vehicles, the discovery of underground store
houses, the Minister of International Cooperation visiting sites of Sinai development projects, the
Minister of Defense visiting injured soldiers, and top security officials present at the funeral of
an officer who died in operations. Viewed a bit more broadly, the first quarter of 2016 was the
most productive for the Egyptian military in its online photographic campaign in the first year.
The second phase of the Martyr’s Right operation also signaled a shift in the military’s
visual messaging strategy. The military presented itself as a war machine against the militants in
Sinai. It disseminated 31 images displaying no humans in both January and February, marking
the highest point of images erasing human engagement in 2016. In a 13-image post on January
21, for example, 12 images showed the confiscation of rockets, rifles, ammo, IEDs, electric
circuits, motorcycles, and black flags, but showed no humans at the various scenes of the
military operations.
4.3.2

Third Phase of the Martyr’s Right Operation

The onset of the third phase of the Martyr’s Right operation corresponded with another
shift in Wilayat Sinai’s output. The military announced the start of its third phase of the
operation on May 25, 2016 (Official Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2016c). For almost three
weeks after the announcement, Wilayat Sinai disseminated no images. From June 13 to 30,
Wilayat Sinai disseminated eight images showing two IED attacks on armored personnel carriers
and the confiscated belongings of policemen. Declining from 15 images distributed in May 2016,
the group’s output dropped by almost half in June.
The third phase of the Martyr’s Right operation also coincided with a shift in Wilayat
Sinai’s visual messaging strategy. The provincial group appeared to struggle in an effort to
maintain its identity as a destructive and deadly fighting force. The group’s June photographic
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campaign broke from its practices in earlier months by displaying no death or possible death
images. Further, only four images displayed ongoing destruction, down from six in May.
The same phase of the operation corresponded with a shift in the Egyptian military’s
photographic output. In first five days after the third phase began, the military put out 11 images
in four different posts showing tanks, armored vehicles, and soldiers on the battlefield, as well as
the Minister of Defense visiting the Second Field Army. The output increased temporarily,
before dropping from 26 images in May 2016 to 15 in June.
This phase also signaled a shift in the military’s visual messaging strategy. The military
deemphasized its image as destructive war machine, and instead presented its leadership as
infused with a caring attitude towards their soldiers. Only three of the May images showed
military’s tanks on the battlefield, a dead corpse of a militant, or confiscated rifles, books, and
cell phones. Dropping from the 17 images displaying no humans at the scene of on-ground
operations in May, not one image of a human appeared in June. Further, none of the images
displayed ongoing destruction in the immediate aftermath of the start of Phase III operations.
The remaining images in the military’s June output mainly displayed the Minister of Defense as
he visited the soldiers at military bases and at a hospital.
4.3.3

Fourth Phase of the Martyr’s Right Operation

The onset of the fourth phase of the Martyr’s Right operation corresponded with a sharp
shift in Wilayat Sinai’s output. Wilayat Sinai’s attack on a military checkpoint on July 7, 2017
was the deadliest of the 30 attacks the group claimed responsibility for in the same month.
Subsequently, the military soon announced a fourth phase of the Martyr’s Right operation on
July 17. For about a month and a half after its onset, Wilayat Sinai released only one image, thus
marking its lowest level of photographic output for the group in 2016-2017.
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Similarly, the fourth phase corresponded with a shift in Wilayat Sinai’s visual messaging
strategy. The disruption of the provincial group’s output apparently hindered its ability to
maintain the image of a destructive and deadly fighting force. Instead, the group attempted to
present its members as courageous in the face of military escalations. The only Wilayat Sinai
image appearing during this low point eulogized a martyr without disclosing how he died.
The fourth phase simultaneously corresponded to a sharp increase in the Egyptian
military’s photographic output. In contrast to the one image that Wilayat Sinai disseminated
between July 17 and September 2, the Egyptian military disseminated over 100 images,
displaying airstrikes, arrested suspects, destroyed hideouts, burnt drug plantations, newlydiscovered underground tunnels, and confiscated vehicles, weaponry, and other belongings. Four
of the military’s images specifically highlighted the targeting of Wilayat Sinai’s media
infrastructure, by reportedly displaying the group’s confiscated computers, cameras, scanners,
and photocopiers (see Figure 4.8).

Figure 4.8 Confiscated camera and computers; disseminated July 27, 2017.
The fourth phase also corresponded to a shift in the military’s visual messaging
strategies. With the onset of the fourth phase, the military presented itself as a destructive war
machine against the Sinai militancy. The display of ongoing destruction of tunnels, vehicles, and
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hideouts peaked with 41 images. Further, a total of 75 images emphasized the immediate
outcome of the Martyr’s Right operation, while excluding humans from the scene.
In sum, the Egyptian military’s counterterrorism operations corresponded in differential
ways with Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign over time. The temporary alignment between
increases in the military’s operations and increases in the provincial group’s output in 2016 may
well relate to the latter’s dissemination of ample images of roadside IED attacks dependent upon
the presence of military vehicles and personnel on the ground. This interaction explains the surge
in Wilayat Sinai’s output and displays of ongoing destruction with the onset of the second phase
of the operation as the number of IED attacks hit an all-time high in North Sinai with 74 different
incidents in the first quarter of 2016 (TIMEP, 2016b). With the decline in IED attacks in later
months, however, Wilayat Sinai’s output and displays of ongoing destruction dropped amid
intensified military pressure in the third and fourth phases of the operation. Such drops, along
with the declining displays of death and religious symbols, temporarily fractured the provincial
group’s spectacle.
The counterterrorism operations, however, had a much more consistent interaction with
the military’s increased use of its online photographic campaign. The alignment between the
monthly operations and photographic output was likely the result of the military’s efforts to
visually complement its on-ground actions to help set the narrative for the Sinai conflict. The
military’s dissemination of more images in the immediate aftermath of each of the three phases
of the Martyr’s Right operation in 2016 and 2017 reinforced the ability of the Egyptian military
to control the conflict. The increasing displays of ongoing destruction and caring leaders, along
with the exclusion of human engagement in the operations, bolstered a positive narrative in the
military’s online presence.
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4.4

Onset and Completion of Regional Military Operations
The escalation of military pressure on Mosul and Raqqa corresponded with a shift in the

Egyptian military’s photographic output, but not with Wilayat Sinai. The regional military
pressure on ISIS in both of its strongholds and main media centers increased dramatically with
the onset of the Mosul operation on October 17, 2016, followed by the Raqqa operation on
November 6. On the one hand, Wilayat Sinai’s output slightly dropped in the post-escalation
period. An independent-samples t-test, however, revealed no significant difference in Wilayat
Sinai images in the pre-escalation (M = 37.00, SD = 35.90) and post-escalation (M = 31.13, SD =
21.10) conditions (t (22) = .51, p > .05). The Egyptian military’s output, on the other hand,
doubled in the post-escalation period. An independent-samples t-test revealed a marginally
significant difference in the Egyptian military images in the pre-escalation (M = 28.78, SD =
17.44) and 2017 (M = 56.40, SD = 40.65) conditions (t (22) = -1.92, p = .07). At the broadest
level, the relationship between the regional military pressure and the military’s output exhibited a
set pattern.
The Mosul and Raqqa operations corresponded to a content shift in Wilayat Sinai’s visual
messaging strategy. The display of death in the group’s campaign almost tripled in the postescalation period (see Figure 4.9). But an independent-samples t-test revealed no significant
difference in the group’s death images in the pre-escalation (M = 1.11, SD = 1.27) and postescalation (M = 2.67, SD = 2.82) conditions (t (22) = -1.53, p > .05). Notwithstanding, the range
of permissible targets broadened in the post-escalation period with over 40 dead corpses of
military personnel, policemen, alleged spies, and al-Tarabin tribal fighters to Sufi clerics as well
as a Wilayat Sinai martyr.
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Figure 4.9 Wilayat Sinai’s Death Images in 2016-2017.

Meanwhile, the two major regional operations corresponded with a different shift in the
Egyptian military’s visual messaging strategy. The number of images displaying ongoing
destruction increased in the post-escalation period. An independent-samples t-test revealed a
significant difference in the Egyptian military ongoing destruction images in the pre-escalation
(M = 2.44, SD = 3.00) and post-escalation (M = 11.93, SD = 10.48) conditions (t (22) = 2.63, p < .05). A similar shift occurred from 2016 to 2017 amid the surge in the Egyptian
military’s counterterrorism operations.
Although the quantitative analysis revealed shifts in Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian
military’s photographic campaigns between the pre- and post-escalation periods, some had
already taken place in relation to other factors. Hence, a closer look at the visual messaging
strategies during the regional operations adds more nuance on the relationship between regional
military conditions and the Sinai visual contestation. Unlike the Egyptian military’s three phases,
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the east Mosul, west Mosul, and Raqqa operations had set dates marking the end of each and the
liberation of the respective city. This facilitates the identification of any output and visual
strategy shifts following the completion of each operation. Here, I pinpoint major regional
military operations and investigate their visual aftermath (see Figure 4.10).

Figure 4.10 The 2016-2017 timeline of the key major military operations in Iraq and Syria.

4.4.1

East Mosul Operation

The onset of the east Mosul operation corresponded with a shift in Wilayat Sinai’s
photographic output. The group’s output generally increased between October 2016 and January
2017, except for the month of December. Even with the drop to 21 images in December, the
output was more than in any other month in the third quarter of 2016.
The launch of the operation coincided with a shift in the provincial group’s visual
messaging strategy. Wilayat Sinai presented itself as a deadly and destructive fighting force that
stands on the side of the Sinai Muslims. One week after the operation started, Wilayat Sinai
disseminated an 11-image photo report showing destroyed buildings and fields that the group
claimed was a result of the Egyptian military’s airstrikes. This was the first time since January
2016 to put out such images that reportedly highlighted the outcome of the military’s airstrikes
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on Sinai residents. As the east Mosul operation continued and the Raqqa operation started in
November, Wilayat Sinai’s display of deaths reached the highest point in the two-year period
with nine images showing the dead corpses of two beheaded Sufi clerics, six soldiers, and one of
the group’s militants. The display of ongoing destruction also gradually increased from only
three in October 2016 to 12 in January 2017, showing gunfire, explosions, and artillery and
buildings in flames as part of Wilayat Sinai’s attacks.
The completion of the east Mosul operation corresponded with another shift in Wilayat
Sinai’s output. Upon the announcement of the full liberation of east Mosul in late January 2017,
the group’s output further leaped from 37 images in January to 64 in February, reaching the
highest point since March 2016. It also corresponded with a shift in the group’s visual messaging
strategy. Wilayat Sinai presented itself as a deadly and devout fighting force that is also capable
of organizing workshops and distributing media products on the ground. In less than a month
after the liberation, the group put out a total of 12 certain death images, compared to 20 in all of
2016. Five of the certain death images depicted several military personnel looking up to the
armed militants right before they shoot them and the confiscated pictures of about 20 others
whom Wilayat Sinai identified as dead. The remaining seven certain death images eulogized
seven Wilayat Sinai militants by depicting them with their weapons and/or cameras before death.
Another three possible death images in February depicted two Egyptian soldiers at the crosshairs
of the militants’ snipers and then falling, which hinted at the possibility of their death without
confirming it. In the meantime, Wilayat Sinai’s visualization of non-military activities appeared
for the first time in a couple of months. A total of 17 images in February depicted a first aid
workshop, the distribution of al-Naba’ newsletter, and a group of militants praying together.
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On the other hand, the fall of east Mosul coincided with a shift in the Egyptian military’s
output. The output leaped by over 500 percent in February 2017, reaching the peak of the twoyear period after the completion of the operation. A total of 153 images depicted various scenes
ranging from the Minister of Defense First Lieutenant General Sedki Sobhi and other figures
visiting the injured soldiers, the former military Chief of Staff Major General Mahmoud Hijazy
checking on the forces in military bases, and the military spokesperson Colonel Tamer al-Rifai in
Sinai to the aftermath of counterterrorism operations.
It also corresponded with a shift in the military’s visual messaging strategy. The military
presented itself as a destructive war machine and Sinai as a safe place for top security officials to
visit. The military spokesperson’s visit was his only public appearance in Sinai in 2016 and
2017. The five-image post on February 10, 2017 showed Colonel al-Rifai speaking with the
soldiers in the field, kissing the forehead of an old woman, and posing for pictures with kids and
military personnel. Meanwhile, the exclusion of human engagement in the operations peaked in
February, with 85 images. Out of the 21 images of destroyed tunnels, confiscated vehicles, and
burning hideouts that the military disseminated on February 26-28, for example, only two images
depicted soldiers at the scene. In addition, the display of ongoing destruction in February reached
the second highest point in the two-year period, with 27 images.
4.4.2

West Mosul Operation

The onset of the west Mosul operation corresponded with a major shift in Wilayat Sinai’s
photographic output. For nine days after the operation started on February 19, 2017, Wilayat
Sinai did not disseminate any images. Subsequently, the group’s output dropped by almost half
with a total of 35 images in March.

90

The launch of the operation also corresponded with shifts in the group’s visual messaging
strategy. Wilayat Sinai mainly presented itself as a devout group, but faced the challenge of
maintaining its image as a deadly and destructive fighting force. The display of religious
symbols increased from only one image showing militants praying in February to three images in
March, showing a militant calling for prayer and another reading Qur’an on the battlefield. But
the displays of deaths, impending deaths, and destruction all declined.
Simultaneously, the operation coincided with a shift in the Egyptian military’s
photographic output. Following the peak in February 2017, the military’s output dropped to 118
images in March. The images not only displayed the outcome of counterterrorism operations, but
also showed security officials in North Sinai, school openings, aid distribution and public figures
visiting injured soldiers.
It also corresponded with a shift in the military’s visual messaging strategy. The military
presented itself as a provider of social services and reinforced its image of Sinai as a safe place
for top security officials to visit. A 21-image post on March 9, 2017 showed military personnel
distributing food packages to civilians in North Sinai for the first time in 2016-2017. The
Egyptians flags were on the food packages, in the hands of civilians, and on the outfits of
military personnel. Moreover, a 5-image post on March 17 showed the Minister of Defense
walking in the streets of North Sinai alongside the Minister of Interior and other top security
officials, shaking hands with officers and soldiers, and speaking with civilians. This was the first
time the military put out images of both Ministers in North Sinai in seven months.
Later, the completion of the west Mosul operation corresponded with a major shift in
Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output. Upon Prime Minister Abadi’s declaration of victory over
ISIS in Mosul on July 10, 2017, Wilayat Sinai ceased to disseminate any photographs for 31
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days. After disseminating only one image on August 11, Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign
was dormant for another 22 days. The group’s lowest productivity point between July 10 and the
end of August did not necessarily equate to a lack of attacks in Sinai. After all, Wilayat Sinai
claimed a total of 35 attacks in July and August 2017, at least 12 of which came after the
liberation of west Mosul.
The fall of west Mosul also signaled a shift in the Egyptian military’s output. From an
average of one image per day in June 2017, the military’s output doubled in July. A total of 55
images focused mainly on the aftermath of counterterrorism operations, followed by strikes and
confiscated materials.
The liberation corresponded with a shift in the military’s visual messaging strategy. The
military again presented itself as destructive war machine. The Egyptian military excluded
human engagement in the operations in over half of July images. In a six-image post on July 21,
for example, five images depicted the destruction of IEDs and the airstrikes targeting militants’
hideouts with no humans at the scene. The display of ongoing destruction also increased from
seven images in June to 19 in July, showing hideouts, vehicles, drugs, and cigarettes on fire as
well as explosions resulting from airstrikes and destruction of IEDs.
4.4.3

Raqqa Operation

The onset of the Raqqa operation coincided with a shift in Wilayat Sinai’s photographic
output. Up from 24 images in October 2016, the military disseminated 35 images in November.
The shift was the same as the one that occurred during the east Mosul operation around the same
time. A closer look, however, reveals that Wilayat Sinai did not disseminate any images for
about two weeks after the start of the Raqqa operation on November 6. The surge in the
November output was mainly due to the 21-image photo report that the group disseminated on
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November 27 to visualize the al-Sabil military checkpoint attack. Hence, Wilayat Sinai’s output
temporarily dropped after the Raqqa operation began.
It also corresponded with a shift in the group’s visual messaging strategy. Wilayat Sinai
presented itself as a deadly force not only against security forces, but also against civilians. As
stated earlier, the death images peaked in November. In fact, the 9-image photo report on
November 18 showing the beheading of two Sufi clerics was the first thing Wilayat Sinai put out
after the Raqqa operation started.
The completion of the Raqqa operation coincided with a clear shift in Wilayat Sinai’s
output. October 2017 was the peak of the group’s output in 18 months, with a total of 78 images.
Upon the fall of Raqqa on October 20, Wilayat Sinai disseminated 31 images in just 11 days.
One of those images came out on the liberation day, after which the group ceased to disseminate
any images for a week, the longest silence in October. The remaining 30 images came in two
photo reports showing the green fields and the destruction in Sinai. Subsequently, the output
declined to only six images in November, a 92 percent drop from the previous month. As in the
aftermath of west Mosul’s liberation, Wilayat Sinai’s low productivity in November did not
necessarily equate with a lack of attacks as the group claimed 15 different attacks that month.
The fall of Raqqa also corresponded with a shift in the provincial group’s visual
messaging strategy. Wilayat Sinai failed to maintain its image as a deadly and destructive
fighting force. Instead, it emphasized the suffering of residents and the beautiful landscape in
North Sinai. A 13-image photo report on October 28 showed fruits hanging on the trees in a
field, which was the first display of Sinai green fields in 20 months. The other 17-image photo
report on October 29 showed scenes of destruction in Rafah and residents moving out of their
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homes, which the group claimed to be a result of the military’s actions. This second report was
also the first to depict such scenes of destruction in about a year.
On the other hand, the fall of Raqqa coincided with a different shift in the Egyptian
military’s output. In the 11 days following the liberation, the military disseminated 15 images
showing the aftermath of its operations. Subsequently, the military’s output in November 2017
reached the highest point in five months with a total of 79 images, mostly depicting the
counterterrorism operations, the destruction of drugs, and the military’s newly-appointed Chief
of Staff Major General Mohamed Fareed visiting the security forces in North Sinai.
The liberation also corresponded with a shift in the military’s visual messaging strategy.
The military presented itself as a deadly and destructive war machine against militants and Sinai
as a safe place for top security officials to visit. In the 11 days following the fall of Raqqa, the
military disseminated six images showing the dead corpses of armed militants, a number that
was higher than the overall dead images in most months. Subsequently, the display of ongoing
destruction peaked in November, with 32 images showing explosions from airstrikes and
vehicles, hideouts, and drugs on fire. Up from 14 in October, 54 images displayed no humans at
the scenes of the operations’ aftermath in November, making up 70 percent of the output that
month. Meanwhile, the military documented Major General Fareed’s visit in four of the images,
which were the first of a senior security official in North Sinai since March 2017.
Taken together, the regional military operations had differential interactions with Wilayat
Sinai’s photographic campaign. The provincial group increased its output amid escalating
military pressure on east Mosul and Raqqa. It strived to use its photographic output as an
alternative mode of resistance. The increasing displays of death and ongoing destruction served
to reinforce the group’s spectacle despite the mounting local and regional military pressure. But
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the full liberation of the two cities corresponded to two of the major drops in Wilayat Sinai’s
photographic campaign even though the group was still militarily active in Sinai. Such drops
may well relate to the disruption of ISIS’s media infrastructure with the fall of its two main
media centers. With the failure to maintain its displays of death and destruction, the regional
defeats came as a huge blow to Wilayat Sinai’s spectacular image.
For the Egyptian military, the regional operations played a different role. The onset of the
Mosul and Raqqa operations did not correspond to any major shifts in the military’s images. The
military’s photographic output reflected only its local operations on the ground. Nonetheless, the
output remarkably surged upon the fall of the two cities. Although the two spikes also coincided
with upticks in the number of military counterterrorism operations in Sinai, they may also
indicate coordination between Egypt and the global coalition to defeat ISIS concurrently in Iraq,
Syria, and Sinai in 2017. The increasing displays of deaths, ongoing destruction, security
officials in Sinai as well as the exclusion of human engagement bolstered the military’s online
presence by emphasizing its operational success.
4.5

Loss of Leaders at the Local Level
The Egyptian military claimed to have killed hundreds of militants in Sinai in 2016 and

2017. By February 2017, the chief of the military intelligence Major General Mohamed Farag alShahat put the number of militant deaths in Sinai at 500 since the launch of the Martyr’s Right
Operation in September 2015 (Al-Kadi & Shaalan, 2017). The number was much higher on the
military spokesperson’s official Facebook page. The total number of dead militants in 2016 and
2017 surpassed 800, according to the posts on his page. Although the spokesperson rarely cited
names of dead Wilayat Sinai members, he made an exception to publicize the death of two senior
leaders of the group.
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4.5.1

Abu Duaa Al-Ansari’s Death

The killing of Wilayat Sinai’s leader Abu Duaa al-Ansari corresponded with a temporary
shift in the militant group’s output. On August 4, 2016, the Egyptian military spokesperson
announced the killing of al-Ansari, the leader of the Wilayat Sinai group, and over 45 militants in
a series of airstrikes (Official Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2016a). The statement neither
specified the exact date of the operation nor al-Ansari’s real name. About 10 days before the
announcement, Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output stopped, culminating in the group having a
month-long period of invisibility between July 25 and August 24, 2016. For the entire month of
August, the group ceased to display photos of any of its claimed attacks with one exception. It
released five images on August 25, showing the execution of a guard working for the Ministry of
Interior in al-Arish. Three of the images displayed the guard’s impending death. These three
images relied on the certain death visual trope that confirms the loss of life in the surrounding
textual context of the photograph. The remaining two images showed the front and back of the
guard’s national ID as evidence of his involvement with the police. The killing of al-Ansari and
his associated group members corresponded to the lowest point of Wilayat Sinai’s 2016
photographic campaign.
The killing of al-Ansari also coincided with a shift in the Egyptian military’s visual
messaging strategy. After the reported killing, the military used more images to present itself as a
deadly and effective force against militants and to identify Sinai as a safe place for top security
officials to visit. The military moved beyond its steady rate of publicly claimed counterterrorism
operations in August 2016 by adding 10 images. The military reportedly released cockpit images
of the airstrikes, but then removed them (Dearden, 2016; TIMEP, 2016a). Two out of the ten
images focused on the outcomes of other operations, featuring destroyed explosive devices, a
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discovered tunnel, and a dead militant with an ISIS flag over his corpse. The remaining eight
images appeared on August 17 showing the Minister of Defense Sedki Sobhi and the Minister of
Interior Magdy Abdelghaffar in North Sinai checking on the security forces, handing gifts to
soldiers and officers, and posing for group pictures. These images were the first of their kind
since the two ministers met with the security forces in North Sinai in mid-May 2016.
4.5.2

Abu Anas Al-Ansari’s Death

The killing of senior leader Abu Anas al-Ansari corresponded with another shift in
Wilayat Sinai’s output. On April 2, 2017, the Egyptian military spokesperson announced that
Abu Anas al-Ansari was among 18 militants killed in airstrikes that had occurred on March 18.
The released announcement provided al-Ansari’s real name and described him as one of the
founders of the group (Official Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2017c). Out of 35 Wilayat
Sinai images in March 2017, only three came out after the date of the fatal airstrikes. For nine
days, the militant group released no images. It then distributed two images visualizing the
confiscated belongings of a policeman on March 28, followed by another image eulogizing one
of the group members on the 31st of the same month. Subsequently, the output dropped by half in
April to 17 images.
The killing of Abu Anas also coincided with a shift in the group’s visual messaging
strategy. After the leader’s loss of life, Wilayat Sinai presented itself as strict, devout, and deadly
fighting force. Of the 17 images the group released in April, 14 appeared in one photo report that
displayed a clear warning for Sinai residents siding with the Egyptian military. Seven images
showed militants distributing written warnings on the streets and reportedly accepting
individuals who had repented from collaborating with the Egyptian military in Sinai. The other
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seven highlighted the fate of those who did not repent. Using the certain death visual trope,
Wilayat Sinai showed the killing of four who had reportedly collaborated with the military.
The killing of Abu Anas further coincided with a shift in the Egyptian military’s output.
The military distributed 80 images in the three weeks following the airstrikes of March 18, 2017.
Although the airstrikes that killed Abu Anas did not appear in the photographic campaign, the
military did release a video on the same day showing eight different airstrikes in Sinai (Official
Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2017e). Out of the 80 images, 39 appeared between March
18 and 31 and showed underground tunnels, confiscated vehicles, burning drugs, militants’ dead
corpses, officials visiting injured soldiers, school openings, and the military’s martyrs.
Subsequently in the first week of April, the military put out a total of 41 images showing both
First Lieutenant General Sobhi visiting injured soldier and the immediate aftermath of the
counterterrorism operations in Sinai.
This incident also corresponded with a shift in the military’s visual messaging strategy.
Following the airstrikes that took the life of Abu Anas, the military worked to bolster its image
as an effective force, its individuals as heroes, and its leaders as caring. The military
disseminated 15 images on April 2 that reportedly recorded a military tour for journalists and TV
reporters in al-Halal mountain after the Egyptian military had regained full control. Most
notably, the only three certain death images of martyred officers that the military disseminated in
2016-2017 came in the week after the March 18 airstrikes. In addition, the military put out 12
images showing the Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, the Chief of Staff, and politicians
visiting injured soldiers, as well as the Minister of Education opening a school in Sinai.
Overall, the loss of key Wilayat Sinai leaders corresponded differentially in Sinai
battlefield of online visual contestation. The killing of the two local leaders and dozens of
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militants coincided with major drops in Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output. The large number
of reported deaths in these airstrikes rather than the loss of the leaders themselves, however, may
explain the disruption of Wilayat Sinai’s ability to shoot images to disseminate. Wilayat Sinai’s
visualization of warnings to local residents and retaliations against collaborators with the military
were apparent attempts to prevent such losses and disruptions in the future. Meanwhile, the loss
of the two leaders either maintained or boosted the military’s output. In the aftermath of these
successful operations, the increasing displays of military martyrs, top security officials, and tours
in central Sinai served to reinforce the military’s narrative of victory.
4.6

Loss of Leaders at the Regional Level
The Pentagon periodically released names of dead ISIS leaders in Iraq and Syria

throughout 2016 and 2017. The statements identified the coalition airstrikes as the main cause of
death for almost all leaders during that period. The targeted leaders for death included those in
ISIS’s military, financial, religious and media sectors (see Figure 4.11).

Figure 4.11 The 2016-2017 Timeline of reported ISIS leaders killed in Iraq and Syria.
Source: the U.S. Department of Defense’s Statements on Operation Inherent Resolve.
The reported loss of ISIS leaders in Iraq and Syria in 2016 neither hindered Wilayat Sinai
nor boosted the Egyptian military’s photographic campaigns. The 2016 killings of senior
commander Abu Omar al-Shishani in early March, spokesperson Abu Muhammad al-Adnani in

99

late August, head of media Abu Muhammad al-Furqan in early September, and media facilitator
Mahmoud al-Isawi in late December in Syria did not correspond with any declines in Wilayat
Sinai’s photographic output. In fact, the group’s output increased in line with the group’s typical
distribution patterns in March 2016, September 2016, and January 2017. The shifts in the
Egyptian military’s output was also in line with the downward trend from February to August of
2016 and the regular monthly ebbs and flows that occurred from September 2016 to January
2017.
Some of the 2017 killings of media, clerical, and financial leaders in Iraq and Syria also
did not hamper Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign. The provincial group disseminated more
images in May despite the death of ISIS media leaders Abu Ali al-Janubi and Abu Sayf al-Isawi
in mid-to-late April and Abu Khattab al-Rawi in mid-May. Even the death of the head of Amaq
media wing Rayan Meshaal, cleric Turki al-Bin Ali, and the top financier Fawaz al-Rawi
between late May and mid-June did not correspond with any major declines in Wilayat Sinai’s
output. Simultaneously, the military’s output briefly declined in June, before bouncing back in
the third quarter of 2017. Further, none of the images distributed by either Wilayat Sinai or the
Egyptian military addressed, mourned, or celebrated the death of ISIS leaders in Iraq and Syria.
Although the loss of ISIS leaders in the region did not generally correspond with substantial
shifts in the photographic output or messaging strategies in the online space of Sinai visual
contestation, two incidents served as exceptions.
4.6.1

Abu Sulauman Al-Iraqi’s Death

The killing of media leader Abu Sulayman al-Iraqi did coincide with a shift in Wilayat
Sinai’s photographic output. On July 27, 2017, the Pentagon announced the early July killing of
al-Iraqi in an airstrike near Mosul without specifying the exact date (Pentagon, 2017a). The
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statement described him as a senior media official who oversaw the production of ISIS media
products. Between June 30 and July 8, Wilayat Sinai did not put out any images. For the next
eight weeks, the group distributed only one 22-image news brief on July 9 that showed the attack
on a military checkpoint south of Rafah and one other image in August.
The killing of al-Iraqi also corresponded with a shift in the Egyptian military’s output.
The military dramatically increased its output from 36 in June before the loss of the media leader
to a total of 128 images in July and August. As the images showing death and ongoing
destruction focused visually on conditions on the ground in Sinai, the visual messaging strategies
appear motivated by local conditions rather than regional loss of leaders in the ISIS group.
4.6.2

Yusuf Demir’s Death

The killing of media leader Yusuf Demir corresponded with another shift in Wilayat
Sinai’s output. On November 14, 2017, the Pentagon announced the October 26th killing of
Demir near al-Qaim, Iraq (Pentagon, 2017b). The statement described Demir as a media official
who had links to ISIS’s networks in the Middle East. For about two weeks between October 29
and November 13, Wilayat Sinai did not disseminate any images. Having distributed 78 images
in October before Demir’s death, the group only put out six images in November.
In contrast, the ISIS media leader’s death corresponded with a sharp increase in the
Egyptian military’s output. The military reached one of its highest output points in the two-year
period with 79 images in November. None of these images, however, addressed the loss of
Demir or any other leader outside Egypt. The November shifts in the display of ongoing
destruction and top security officials in North Sinai in the military’s images instead reflected the
local on-ground conditions.
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Unlike apparent reactions to the deaths of local Wilayat Sinai leaders, the loss of regional
ISIS leaders did not play an equally important role in the online visual contestation space related
to events in Sinai. Although the loss of Abu Sulayman al-Iraqi and Yusuf Demir corresponded to
shifts in output, the majority of the other killings did not. The differences between the loss of alIraqi and Demir and the other regional leaders did not relate to the nature, location, or target of
the attacks. After all, the regional leaders usually died in airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. Among the
leaders whose death did not coincide with any shifts in the Sinai visual contestation were senior
media officials like al-Iraqi and Demir. The only difference was the date. The loss of the two
media leaders that did correspond to shifts in photographic output and strategy occurred in early
July and late November 2017, respectively. The two periods coincided with other factors on both
the local and regional fronts, such as the launch of the fourth phase of the Martyr’s Right
operation in Sinai and the full liberation of Mosul and Raqqa. Hence, the shifts in output
corresponding to the loss of al-Iraqi and Demir may have more to do with the disruption of
Wilayat Sinai’s media infrastructure and ISIS’s central media hubs that disseminate provincial
images online or to a conflation of other concurrent factors.
4.7

Introduction of Groups to the Local Battlefield
Al-Tarabin Bedouin tribe spearheaded an initiative to join the Egyptian military fight

against Wilayat Sinai militants in the North. In mid-April 2017, militants reportedly shot at a
truck that was smuggling cigarettes in North Sinai, which spurred clashes between Wilayat Sinai
and local tribal members (Sweilam, 2017). The local Bedouins then kidnapped three of the
group’s members, after which militants kidnapped tribal leaders (“Kidnappings lead to
heightened tensions between militants and North Sinai tribes,” 2017). Tensions further escalated
when a Wilayat Sinai suicide attacker detonated a car bomb at al-Tarabin tribal checkpoint in
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Rafah, killing at least four (Shams El-Din, 2017). As a result, al-Tarabin tribe declared war after
releasing a statement on April 29 that stressed its ability to forcefully respond to terrorists and
called on other North Sinai tribes to stand up and join the fight (see Figure 4.12).

Figure 4.12 The Timeline of key tensions between Wilayat Sinai and local tribes in April
2017.
4.7.1

Al-Tarabin Tribe Allies with the Military

The introduction of al-Tarabin tribe into the ongoing fight against Wilayat Sinai
corresponded with a shift in Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output. With the assistance of alTarabin tribesmen, the Egyptian military’s counterterrorism operations peaked in May 2017. In
response, Wilayat Sinai’s photographic output almost doubled to 33 images in May, 18 of which
showed the fight against al-Tarabin tribe and its destructive outcome.
The involvement of the al-Tarabin tribe also corresponded with a shift in Wilayat Sinai’s
visual messaging strategy. After the new alliance, Wilayat Sinai reinforced its identity not only
as a deadly and destructive fighting force against the security forces, but also against al-Tarabin
tribe. The display of images showing dead bodies in May was the highest in six months, showing
the corpses of two soldiers and five al-Tarabin tribal fighters. Further, images depicting ongoing
destruction increased, with seven images showing gunfire and explosions following the
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detonation of a car bomb at a joint military-tribal barricade and at a roadside IED on military
vehicles.
Al-Tarabin’s fight with Wilayat Sinai coincided with a shift in the Egyptian military’s
photographic output. The military’s output surged to 79 images in May 2017 from 69 the month
before. The images displayed the arrest of suspected militants, the seizure of weapons and
explosive materials, and the destruction of drug plantations, hideouts, and tunnels at the border.
Whereas the Egyptian military did not show images of al-Tarabin’s collaboration on the field per
se, its May photographs reflected the intensity of military operations by choosing not to show
other images of school openings, field visits, or aid distribution that were common in previous
months.
Al-Tarabin’s alliance with the Egyptian military also corresponded with a shift in the
military’s visual messaging strategy. After al-Tarabin become involved in the conflict, the
military showcased itself as a destructive war machine against the militants. Images displaying
ongoing destruction increased from 9 in April to 17 in May 2017. The destruction related images
showed explosions after airstrikes as well as motorcycles, hideouts, and drugs in flames. May
served as the month with the second highest point in the military’s photographic campaign in
terms of visualized exclusion of human engagement in the operations. A total of 58 images
featured no human beings, but rather focused solely on the direct outcome of the operations.
The introduction of local groups to the on-the-ground battlefield played an important role
in the online visual contestation space related to Sinai. Despite the surge in both Wilayat Sinai
and the Egyptian military’s outputs, the two sides in the conflict communicated different
messages. Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign sent a warning message by stressing on
retaliatory acts against tribal members who had collaborated with the Egyptian security forces.
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Meanwhile, the military’s photographic campaign communicated a message of victory and
dominance by emphasizing the positive outcomes of the counterterrorism operations. The
changing dynamics of the local battle may have the Sinai visual contestation, with both sides
using the engagement of al-Tarabin tribe as a pretext to bolster their conflicting messages.
4.8

Introduction of Groups to the Regional Battlefield
The major regional military operations involved different dynamics from those taking

place in the Sinai Peninsula. First, the Iraqi army launched the east Mosul operation in
coordination with several local groups on board from the very beginning. Armed shiite militias
and factions under the banner of the Popular Mobilization Front, the Kurdish Peshmerga fighters,
and Sunni tribal units were all part of the operation to liberate east Mosul (“The Participating
Sides in the Mosul Offensive,” 2016). Nonetheless, to avoid civil and sectarian strife, a political
agreement made prior to the onset of the east Mosul operation dictated that only the Iraqi army
would enter the city. The other local groups operated outside Mosul to encircle the city and cut
supply routes. Between the beginning of November 2016 and late January 2017, the Iraqi army
fought ISIS militants at the frontlines inside east Mosul (Bergen, 2017). The west Mosul
operation saw a similar pattern except for the Peshmerga fighters not taking part in it (S. Ali,
2017). By late February 2017, the Iraqi army and security forces entered west Mosul and fought
ISIS until they liberated the city in July. Hence, unlike the introduction of al-Tarabin fighters
into an ongoing fight in Sinai, the local Iraqi groups began the fight alongside the Iraqi army in
this major operation. Such an on-the-ground context prevents examination of the composition of
the opposing forces from an evolutionary perspective.
Second, the Raqqa operation did not involve a leading state military force like the
operations in Mosul or Sinai. The U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces was an alliance of
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different local groups, ranging from Arab and Kurdish to Turkman fighters prior to the onset of
the battle for Raqqa (Al-Hamed, 2016). The anti-ISIS alliance launched the operation to encircle
and eventually liberate Raqqa. With support from the international coalition, the Syrian
Democratic Forces successfully liberated the city after almost one year. Here, the local groups
were already the initiators of the military operation rather than newcomers joining the fight.
Again, this context does not allow for a comparable examination of the interaction between the
introduction of groups to the regional battlefield and the online space of Sinai visual
contestation.
4.9

Concluding Thoughts
This chapter demonstrates that competing sides battling online with photographs to

control the Sinai narrative in 2016-2017 were not simply responding to one another. In fact, no
consistent, identifiable patterns existed between Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s
photographic outputs when considered exclusively within the media context. Instead, the visual
battlefield closely interacted with military conditions happening on-the-ground. To examine
what relationship existed between Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s posted photographs
and the military contexts, the chapter identified five key factors that correspond with shifts in the
photographic output and visual messaging strategies—attacks by militant groups, onset and
completion of counterterrorism military operations, loss of leaders, and the introduction of local
group alliances with the state military forces.
In today’s mediated conflicts with militant groups, a focus on the local without the
regional context would distort our views of the relationship between photographic output and onground military conditions. Major attacks by the local militant group played a role in maintaining
Wilayat Sinai’s online presence. The onset of the Egyptian military’s counterterrorism operations
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coincided with disruptions of Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign. Further, the loss of local
leaders corresponded with drops in the local militant group’s output, while the introduction of a
participating local group into the battlefield activities coincided with a surge in the photographic
campaign. In the meantime, the completion of regional operations and the loss of two media
leaders in Iraq corresponded with major drops in Wilayat Sinai’s online presence.
The local and regional military contexts also interacted with the Egyptian military’s
photographic campaign. As local military pressure intensified in Sinai, the onset of
counterterrorism operations, the loss of Wilayat Sinai’s local leaders, and the introduction of a
local group into the Sinai battlefield all corresponded with upticks in the Egyptian military’s
photographic campaign. Meanwhile, the fall of Mosul and Raqqa coincided with major surges in
the Egyptian military’s output. The focus on the local and regional military conditions on the
ground is important to better understand visual contestations between militant groups that had
pledged allegiance to a regional force and state actors that are part of a broader, international
military coalition.
An accumulation of factors helps contextualize shifts in Wilayat Sinai’s photographic
output. For example, a surge in Wilayat Sinai’s output in May 2017 coincided with an
amalgamation of factors: the increase in the number of attacks by the local militant group, the
peak of the Egyptian military’s counterterrorism operations, and the engagement of al-Tarabin
tribe on the side of the military. When Wilayat Sinai disseminated only one image in almost two
months in the summer of 2017, the drop also corresponded to a conflation of factors: the killing
of an ISIS senior media leader near Mosul in early July, a deadly military checkpoint attack by
Wilayat Sinai on July 7 that sparked retaliation from the military, the full liberation of Mosul on
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July 10, and the onset of the Egyptian military’s fourth phase of the Martyr’s Right operation on
July 17.
A collection of on-the-ground events also helps contextualize shifts in the Egyptian
military’s photographic output. The surge in the military’s output in November 2017, for
example, corresponded to several factors: a couple of deadly attacks by Wilayat Sinai in midOctober, the uptick in the number of counterterrorism operations in Sinai, and the full liberation
of Raqqa. The drop in the military’s output in April 2017 also coincided with more than one
factor: the successful killing of one of the founders of Wilayat Sinai, the lack of major attacks,
and the escalating tensions between the provincial group and the local tribes. Hence, an exclusive
focus on the number of militant group attacks or military operations can eclipse other key factors
in the military-media nexus. Instead, a collective approach to analyzing on-ground events allows
state actors and researchers to identify the changing military dynamics and their corresponding
shifts in media.
Further, the visual messaging strategies are key to understanding the differential
interactions between the photographic campaigns and military context. Wilayat Sinai’s depiction
of ongoing destruction, for example, dropped as the group’s attacks declined in Sinai, the
weapon of choice shifted, and the local and regional military pressure increased. The provincial
group started to circulate more death images, however, after select major local attacks at times of
mounting pressure on Mosul and Raqqa. In the meantime, all the spikes in the Egyptian
military’s display of death were directly addressing and/or responding to Wilayat Sinai’s major
deadly attacks in North Sinai. The military’s depiction of ongoing destruction increased as the
local and regional military pressure intensified. After the fall of east Mosul and Raqqa, the
Egyptian military were disseminating images of top security officials safely visiting North Sinai.
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A quantitative approach that only counts the images would treat all output as equal. Thus,
examining the content using a set of relevant visual elements and tropes helps identify the
shifting visual strategies in the photographic campaigns in relation to military conditions.
Finally, the photographic format can yield a better understanding of the shifts in output.
The print media restrictions on the quantity of photographs on paper no longer apply to state and
non-state actors competing in the digital media battlefield. Both sides engaging in a visual
contestation can easily disseminate an entire photo album in one post on Telegram, Facebook, or
other platforms. Wilayat Sinai’s output of 22 images in July 2017, for example, was higher than
the group’s total photographic output in 11 other months included in the two-year period.
However, this previous statement would be misguiding without knowing they all made up one
photo report focusing on a single incident. Similarly, the Egyptian military often disseminated
multiple images per Facebook post, sometimes exceeding 20 images. By itself, counting the
monthly visual output can misrepresent the intensity of an actor’s photographic output in relation
to on-ground military conditions. Thus, examining the format can clarify the magnitude of online
photographic campaigns more accurately.
The Sinai case study conclusions presented here derive from some data limitations that
suggest caution moving forward. Counting ISIS’s attacks in Iraq and Syria posed a problem
because the available online datasets exhibit stark methodological differences. START’s global
terrorism database (GTD) draws from open-source materials— news articles, journals, books,
and legal documents— to provide longitudinal data on terrorism incidents per group, country,
and month between 1970 and 2017 (GTD, 2018a). Jane’s Terrorism and Insurgency Centre
(JTIC) also draws from open source materials, such as articles and government reports, to
provide an annual global attack index on the attacks per group and country since 2009 (JTIC,
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2018). JTIC’s publicly available data, however, does not provide a breakdown of the attacks per
month. Other organizations employ a less reliable methodology than GTD and JTIC. The
PeaceTech Lab NGO, for example, uses crowdsourced data from Wikipedia to map terrorism
incidents both per group and country since 2016 (PeaceTech Lab, 2018). The controversial
website The Religion of Peace (TROP) uses public news sources to provide a list of attacks since
2002, but the list neither specifies the perpetrator group nor includes incidents related to combat
(TORP, 2018). For the purpose of this chapter, I used the GTD dataset to extract ISIS’s attacks in
Iraq and Syria in 2016 and 2017. However, GTD counts the attacks that security officials believe
ISIS perpetrated even if the group did not claim responsibility. Such a methodology can skew the
data when compared against Wilayat Sinai’s claimed attacks. With the precise error rate from
these data sources unknowable, the conclusions here nonetheless suggest variables that deserve
consideration in debates about the media-military nexus.
Moreover, some aspects of the Egyptian military operations were also difficult to
ascertain. This chapter used the Egyptian military’s statements as the main source of information
on counterterrorism operations and loss of leaders. But, the military may have also conducted
covert operations in Sinai that did not count toward their publicly reported counterterrorism
operations. The military may have also killed more influential leaders in Wilayat Sinai, but not
publicized those results. Further, unlike ISIS in Iraq and Syria, Wilayat Sinai did not govern
cities in Sinai for the Egyptian military to liberate. Accordingly, the second, third, and fourth
phases of the Martyr’s Right operation did not have end dates to mark the liberation of land.
These factors made it impossible to investigate shifts in the visual contestation relating to the
completion of local operations or other unpublicized developments on the ground.
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This chapter took a first step in examining the relationship between competing
photographic campaigns and a range of local and regional military factors in times of conflict.
Future studies can apply this approach to other conflicts to understand visual contestation beyond
the Sinai Peninsula. In addition, the chapter used a case study that involves two main players: the
state and one militant group. Other conflicts, however, may involve more than two competitors
on the military and media battlefields. Researchers can build on this approach to examine the
visual contestations among multiple actors and utilize time series analysis as an indicator of
shifts over time.
5

VISUAL FRAMES

Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s media efforts indicate a willingness on each side to
exert control over its image content. Using their photographers and online platforms, the two
communicators can create, emphasize, and ignore different messages about Sinai. To assess the
content of the two photographic campaigns, this chapter examines how the militant group and
the military constructed their own visual messaging frames in 2016 and 2017. Then, it provides
an overview of how the individual frames in each campaign work together to present a unique
picture of the Sinai conflict. The chapter concludes with a discussion of how the opposing visual
frames interacted with each other and how the study’s findings contribute to previous research
examining images of militant groups and state actors in times of conflict.
5.1

Wilayat Sinai’s Photographic Campaign
Wilayat Sinai presented 800 online images in 2016 and 2017. At the bottom of each

image, the superimposed caption described and highlighted various aspects of both the displayed
scene and the conflict at large. The Wilayat Sinai logo on the bottom right of each image
consistently identified the source of the images. The full array of posted images fell into two
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main categories: military and non-military activities. The military images made up two-thirds of
Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign, while the non-military images constituted the remaining
one-third of the dataset (see Figure 5.1).

Figure 5.1 Wilayat Sinai’s Visual Content Frames in 2016 and 2017.
5.1.1

Military Images

The military images focused on Wilayat Sinai’s use of force. They comprised four visual
frames: combat, battlefield aftermath, martyrdom, and military training (see Figure 5.2). The
combat visual frame involved the actions on the battlefront. The battle aftermath visual frame
focused on the fighting outcomes. The martyrdom and military training visual frames highlighted
the militants’ physical and spiritual preparations before the actual battles.
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Figure 5.2 Wilayat Sinai’s Military Visual Frames in 2016 and 2017.
Combat
Combat was the most recurring visual frame in Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign.
Combat images made up over 70 percent of the group’s distributed military-related photographs
in 2016 and 2017. These images depicted the group’s ability to use various means to attack the
Egyptian security forces in Sinai and, to a lesser extent, to target Israel across the border. The
types of military actions in the combat frame included IED attacks, suicide bombings, groupbased militant assaults, sniper shots, rocket attacks, and assassinations. Wilayat Sinai generally
portrayed the armed militants engaged in both individual and group actions, the Egyptian
soldiers and vehicles as targets of the attacks, and the ongoing destruction and impending death
of those targets as recurring battlefield features. The photo captions of the images in the combat
frame offered a theological justification for the attacks by labeling the militants as caliphate
soldiers, the Egyptian security forces as apostates, and Israelis as the Jewish enemy.
Photographs of roadside IED attacks constituted the most frequent attack form that Wilayat Sinai
displayed in its combat visual frame. Frequently, the images depicted the group’s ability to target
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the security forces without engaging in direct confrontation. A total of 141 images, or 37 percent
of all combat images, showed the detonation of IEDs on Egyptian armored vehicles, tanks,
personnel carriers, minesweepers, Humvees, and foot soldiers. The images often appeared in
news briefs and photo reports that were solely focused on this type of attack. However, each
image did not always constitute a unique incident. Instead, Wilayat Sinai covered every IED
attack with a visual sequence of at least two images. A news brief displaying three images posted
on March 4, 2016, for example, detailed an IED attack against a vehicle that the group described
as belonging to “the apostate military.”1 The brief started with an image of a military vehicle
carrying several soldiers on a highway. It followed up by displaying an image of an explosion
that engulfed the vehicle, and then concluded with a shot of the explosion intensifying around the
vehicle on fire (see Figure 5.3).

Figure 5.3 The detonation of an IED in central Sinai; disseminated March 4, 2016.
The images of IED attacks emphasized impending death and destruction of the enemy.
Wilayat Sinai implied that its explosions were causing the deaths of the Egyptian soldiers. The
IED-related combat images comprised sixty percent of the possible death images where neither
the textual nor visual context confirmed the fate of these soldiers in the group’s entire

Wilayat Sinai’s captions are superimposed on the images. No URLs to cite for the news briefs
and photo reports since they appear in encrypted channels on Telegram.
1

114

photographic campaign. Fires and explosions added to the spectacle, as 43 percent of the
ongoing destruction images in the group’s photographic campaign showed an IED attack in
progress. Wilayat Sinai militants were always missing from the displayed scene of the IED
attacks, suggesting that fighters could safely watch the targets from a distance as the explosive
devices detonated. The visual frame juxtaposed the vulnerability of the military in Sinai with the
militants’ ability to covertly and safely attack its enemies.
Aside from IED attacks, the remaining types of combat actions often appeared in tandem.
The non-IED attack images diversified the means through which Wilayat Sinai attacked its
adversaries. A total of 243 images, or 63 percent of all combat images unrelated to IED attacks,
showed suicide bombings, group attacks, sniper shots, and rocket attacks. Many news briefs and
photo reports combined these actions to characterize Wilayat Sinai’s offensive and defensive
operations. A 29-image news brief posted on January 14, 2016, for example, mixed group attack
actions with sniper and rocket attacks to block what the group called an offensive operation by
“the Egyptian apostate military.” Another 22-image photo report posted on July 9, 2017
combined group assaults and suicide attacks at a military checkpoint south of Rafah.
The non-IED attack images often added a human element to the displayed spectacle.
Militants often appeared on the frontlines as they confronted Egyptian security forces (see Figure
5.4). Other non-IED attack images emphasized death as a likely outcome for adversaries,
comprising over one-third of the entirety of the photographic campaign’s cache of possible death
images. One image in a 14-image photo report posted on May 22, 2016, for example, showed
gunfire and a soldier in the crosshairs of a sniper attack to imply his death without confirming it.
The images also stressed destruction as another fateful outcome awaiting Wilayat Sinai’s
opponents. Forty percent of all displays of ongoing destruction in the group’s entire 2016-2017
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photographic campaign appeared in the non-IED attack images. By way of illustration, two
images posted on February 22, 2017 showed two flaming Katyusha rockets in the air aimed at
what the group labeled “the settlements of the Jews.” The collective fusion of these different
types of attacks reinforced Wilayat Sinai’s strength in the conflict.

Figure 5.4 Militants attacking al-Matafi checkpoint; disseminated January 11, 2017.
The images appearing in the combat frame relate to two of Entman’s general framing
categories. The photo captions defined the problem as the existence of apostates and Jews in and
around the Islamic caliphate in Sinai. Wilayat Sinai’s combat images also identified the
treatment recommendation as entering the battlefield to fight, kill, and destroy the Egyptian
security forces and Israel by every means possible, including IEDs, rocket launchers, AK47s,
snipers, and suicide attacks, among others.
Battle Aftermath
The battle aftermath visual frame was also prominent in Wilayat Sinai’s photographic
campaign. The aftermath images made up over one-fifth of the group’s military images in 2016
and 2017. They presented Wilayat Sinai as victorious militarily against the Egyptian security
forces and their collaborators. The group exhibited confiscated military belongings, armored
vehicles in flames, and soldiers and tribal fighters’ casualties. As with the combat visual frame,
the photo captions highlighted a theological justification for the attacks, attributing the losses of
the apostates to victories of the mujahidin and soldiers of the caliphate.
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The battle aftermath images suggested that Wilayat Sinai’s combative action had already
and would continue to result in a standard costly outcome for the group’s opponents. The group
highlighted its war spoils, showing 49 images that displayed the acquisition of the opponents’
weaponry, vehicles, and personal belongings. Four images posted on May 13, 2017, for example,
depicted five pickup trucks, rifles, pistols,
identification cards, and cell phones that the
group claimed to have confiscated from
apostate, pro-government, al-Tarabin
fighters (see Figure 5.5). Presumed death
exhibiting implements of violence and
destruction recurred in two-thirds of the

Figure 5.5 Confiscated weaponry and personal
belongings; disseminated May 13, 2017.

battle aftermath images. One of the images in a photo report posted on November 27, 2016
reportedly showed a military tank on fire fleeing the battlefield. In other images Wilayat Sinai
presented death as the definitive outcome awaiting its enemies. Fifteen images show dead
corpses. Three of the images in a photo report posted on September 13, 2017 combined the
destructive and fatal outcomes of the group’s attacks by showing dead corpses of policemen on
the road as flames engulfed the police armored vehicles displayed in the background. The war
booty and death images in the aftermath frame combined to emphasize the superiority of Wilayat
Sinai in battle.
The images appearing in the battle aftermath frame relate to two of Entman’s framing
categories. The photo captions redefine the problem by expanding the pool of the Islamic
caliphate in Sinai’s apostates to include rebellious tribes, such as al-Tarabin. The provincial
group’s battle aftermath images also added another treatment recommendation, namely to kill the
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Egyptian security forces and al-Tarabin tribal fighters, as well as confiscate their artillery and
personal belongings.
Martyrdom
The martyrdom visual frame appeared in only 23 of the military images. The martyrdom
images eulogized the group’s fighters, suicide attackers, and media operatives who died while
defending the caliphate. Wilayat Sinai portrayed its martyrs holding weapons, carrying media
equipment, and displaying religious symbols. The photo captions stressed the spirit of
camaraderie among members by labeling every individual a brother, often hailing the individual
as part of broader movement labeled “The Martyrs’ Caravan.” The captions also rendered
martyrdom a goal and a way of pleasing God by always including the prayer “May Allah Accept
Him.”
Wilayat Sinai elevated the status of its group members who appeared in its martyrdom
images. In 82 percent of its martyrdom images, the group celebrated most of the martyrs by
highlighting only one individual per photograph. In sharp contrast to its depictions of the
Egyptian soldiers and al-Tarabin fighters’ casualties, the group always presented its martyrs as
alive and in a position of strength. Twenty-two of the martyrdom images used the certain death
visual trope where accompanying text confirms the pictured individual’s subsequent death. The
group posted one exception to that pattern on November 27, 2016. The image showed the clean
face of a bearded young man laying down in peaceful repose; its caption clarified his death and
hailed him as “the martyr of the raid.” Wilayat Sinai showed the martyrs with rifles in their
hands or next to them in 16 images and displayed religious identity symbols in three. When
eulogizing a suicide bomber who attacked a church, for example, Wilayat Sinai showed a
masked individual in military fatigues facing the camera, holding a rifle in his left hand, and

118

making the monotheism gesture with his right hand. The image displayed strength and
religiosity. Nonetheless, the group did not reserve this level of praise for its fighters only. Three
martyrdom images also displayed the group’s media martyrs holding their production gear before
their deaths (see Figure 5.6). Together, the martyrdom images stressed the individuals’ sacrifice,
strength, and moral superiority.

Figure 5.6 Two martyred media operatives; disseminated February 8, 2017.

The images appearing in the martyrdom frame relate to two of Entman’s framing
categories. The images and captions presented piety, brotherhood, and sacrifice as moral ground
for the group and its members. The frame also highlighted fighting on both the military and
media battlefields as an honorable treatment for the problems at hand.
Military Training
Appearing in only 15 images, military training was the least prevalent visual frame that
Wilayat Sinai distributed. The frame depicted the physical and tactical preparedness of militants
for future battles. The group showed the militants wearing facial masks and holding their
weapons while they trained. Photo captions described the militants training in its camps as the
soldiers or lions of the caliphate.
Unlike the focus on individual sacrifice present in the group’s martyrdom images, the
military training visual frame emphasized group efforts. Almost all training images showed the
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militants working together in the combat scene. The one exception displayed a militant flying in
the air during the course of doing a backflip. A 14-image photo report posted on February 6,
2016, for example, celebrated the graduation of a new cohort from a Wilayat Sinai training
camp. All masked militants appeared in groups while exercising and boxing, as well as
participating in weapons training, military drills, and simulated securing of buildings (see Figure
5.7). The militants always held their weapons unless they were exercising. The military training
images emphasized the group’s ability to organize training camps in Sinai and the results of the
training were that the militants emerged with the joint discipline and strength to carry out
effective combat operations.

Figure 5.7 Militants training; disseminated February 6, 2016.

The images appearing in the military training frame relate to only one of Entman’s
framing categories. The images recommended group efforts as a treatment recommendation for
successfully defending the proclaimed caliphate. It also pointed to physical and tactical
preparedness prior to combat operations on the frontlines as part of the appropriate treatment.
5.1.2

Non-Military Images

Wilayat Sinai’s non-military images focused on the life in Sinai away from the
battlefield. They revealed five visual frames: law enforcement, victimhood of Sinai Muslims, In-
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group lifestyle, Sinai landscape, and healthcare (see Figure 5.8). The law enforcement visual
frame focused on the maintenance of order. The victimhood of Sinai Muslims visual frame
highlighted the consequences of the Egyptian military actions on the Sinai citizenry. The ingroup lifestyle frame involved the activities members chose to perform in their spare time. The
Sinai landscape frame depicted the land, while the healthcare provision frame featured an
independent social service available to care for the sick and injured in the province.

Figure 5.8 Wilayat Sinai’s Non-Military Visual Frames in 2016 and 2017.
Law Enforcement
The law enforcement visual frame was the most recurring type Wilayat Sinai used in its
non-military images. Law enforcement images made up about half of the non-military images.
These images depicted the provincial group’s ability to maintain order and implement
punishments in Sinai through shari’a law. To display its law enforcement capabilities, Wilayat
Sinai showed the death or impending death of soldiers and collaborators, as well as the
destruction of outlawed materials, such as drugs and cigarettes. The photo captions utilized in the
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law enforcement frame laid out the crimes (e.g., espionage, sorcery, and advocating Sufism),
described the acts of punishment as implementations of the rulings of Allah, and presented
Wilayat Sinai’s representatives on the streets as the Islamic Police and men of hisba (moral
policing).
In many of the law enforcement images, Wilayat Sinai stressed that capital punishments
awaited individuals working with the Egyptian security forces, spying for the Israeli Mossad, or
practicing Sufi Islam in Sinai. Such executions appeared in 74 (55 percent) of the law
enforcement visual frame images. As in the group’s strategy of presenting IED attacks in visual
image sequence, the group displayed most executions in at least two consecutive images. A
three-image news brief posted on January 4, 2016, for example, showed the execution of two
blindfolded individuals that the group labeled “spies for the Egyptian apostate military.” The
news brief started with an image of the two individuals in orange jumpsuits kneeling on one side
of the road with two armed militants behind them. The second image in the sequence showed the
two militants lifting their rifles up toward the back heads of the two individuals. The final image
displayed both hostages lying dead in their own blood.
The execution images emphasized death as the unescapable consequence for crossing
Wilayat Sinai’s normative behavioral expectations. Unlike the favorable image of the group’s
own fallen fighters in the martyrdom visual frame, Wilayat Sinai depicted all of the
photographed hostages as helpless, whether they were about to die or laid breathless in their own
blood. In 59 certain death images with accompanying textual confirmations of the deaths of the
photo subjects, the provincial group displayed civilians who had collaborated with the military,
police guards, al-Tarabin tribal members, and Sufi clerics with a militant ready to shoot or severe
their heads. Dead corpses appeared in the remaining 15 images, reinforcing the fate of Wilayat
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Sinai’s enemies. Further, Wilayat Sinai stressed the weakness of its foes by displaying the
hostages in orange and red prison jumpsuits in 28 images. For example, a nine-image photo
report posted on November 18, 2016 depicted the beheading of two clerics, a punishment that the
group described as “the implementation of the shari’a ruling on two soothsayers.” Twenty
militants first stood in the desert with one of them reading aloud from a document the photo
caption identified as the shari’a ruling. The remaining images broke down the beheading of the
clerics into two paired three-shot sequences. First, a masked militant dressed in black held up a
sword next to the blindfolded cleric kneeling in an orange jumpsuit with his chin fixed on a
wooden log. In the following shot, blood spilled as the head flew in midair on its way to falling
to the ground. The final shot displayed the dead corpse of the cleric laying on the ground. The
gore and ultraviolence in the execution images presented the group as the unwavering dispenser
of the most severe punishments available under shari’a law.
Beyond the display of execution images, Wilayat Sinai focused its law enforcement
frame on moral policing efforts. The images depicted preventive actions designed to protect the
community from vice and punishment. The photographs mostly appeared in photo reports
displaying a wide range of moral enforcement efforts. A 10-image report posted on June 14,
2017, for example, showed hisba men in their standard brown uniforms standing at checkpoints
confiscating “sorcery-related” objects, burning packs of cigarettes, advising an old man to repent
from “polytheistic Sufi thought,” destroying tombstones to prevent the worship of graves, and
monitoring a shop’s food products to ensure freshness (see Figure 5.9).
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Figure 5.9 Hisba man overseeing the burning of cigarettes; disseminated June 14, 2017.

The moral policing images also emphasized Wilayat Sinai’s action plan for dealing with
threats to the community. In 20 images, the group depicted confiscation and burning of
contraband as the consequence for drug and cigarette possession. In another thirteen images,
Wilayat Sinai showed its militants handling security threats by checking identification papers
and arresting suspects at checkpoints. Perhaps most importantly, Wilayat Sinai used 17 images to
emphasize the group’s willingness to spare citizens from executions if they repent. A 21-image
photo report posted on September 26, 2017, for example, displayed both execution and moral
policing shots. The report began with multiple images of masked militants distributing by hand a
document calling on pedestrians and drivers to stay away from security forces. The next
photographs showed individuals who the captions claimed were spies who had repented sitting
and listening to the militants (see Figure 5.10). The report ended with 10 execution images of
individuals who apparently had not repented. Taken together, the moral policing images served
as a counterbalance to the gore of executions by showing other law enforcement actions aimed at
protecting rather than punishing the community.
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Figure 5.10 A group of spies who repented; disseminated September 26, 2017.

The images appearing in the law enforcement frame relate to three of Entman’s
categories. The photo captions emphasized that the causal explanations for apostasy and
polytheism involved any ties to the Egyptian security forces and the practice of Sufi Islam.
Recommended treatments for safeguarding the community included executions and the
destruction of forbidden contraband. Finally, law enforcement images underscored the moral
responsibility of Wilayat Sinai to apply shari’a law and protect the community from vice and
treason.
Victimhood of Sinai Muslims
Victimhood of Sinai Muslims constituted the second most recurring visual frame in
Wilayat Sinai’s non-military images. A total of 43 images focused on the misery of civilians
resulting from the Egyptian military’s airstrikes and the Rafah eviction policy. To emphasize
citizen grievances, Wilayat Sinai exhibited the destruction of houses and religious shrines. The
photo captions attributed these damaging acts to the Egyptian military, while labeling the
action’s victims as Muslims.
The victimhood images emphasized the consequences of the Egyptian military’s actions
in North Sinai. Wilayat Sinai implied the death or eviction of residents by excluding all humans
from 40 of the victimhood images. Instead, the images displayed the aftermath of military
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airstrikes and house demolitions. An 11-image photo report posted on October 24, 2016, for
example, showed only destroyed houses and plantations with no residents in the vicinities. The
group described the scenes as the outcome of “the Egyptian apostate military’s airstrikes on the
properties and houses of Muslims.” The only three images that displayed humans appeared in a
photo report posted on October 2017 that showed the tragic loss of residents due to Rafah
evictions near the border. All three involved children at the scene. One showed a man and a boy
searching through the rubble of a destroyed building as a woman and a little girl watched from a
distance (see Figure 5.11). The others showed children watching their families as they packed up
belongings in anticipation of leaving their homes. All five pictures of mosques anywhere in
Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign related to the victimhood frame, as each appeared in a
state of destruction. The victimhood visual frame presented Muslim civilians as the military’s
main target.

Figure 5.11 A destroyed house in Rafah; disseminated October 29, 2017.

The images appearing in the victimhood of Sinai Muslims visual frame relate to two of
Entman’s categories. The photos with accompanying captions emphasized that the causal
explanations for apostasy involved resident evictions, house demolitions, and destruction of
Muslim lands. The images further presented these acts by the Egyptian military as morally
outrageous.
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In-group Lifestyle
The in-group lifestyle frame encompassed 39 of Wilayat Sinai’s non-military images.
The images depicted the daily lives of the group members in their spare time after they had
finished fighting or training for the day. To display their habits, Wilayat Sinai showed the
militants cooking, eating, reading, practicing their religion, and holding their weapons. The
photo captions described the photo subjects as soldiers of the caliphate striving in the path of
God.
The lifestyle images emphasized the spirit of camaraderie present among Wilayat Sinai
members. The militants shared different activities, ranging from eating and praying to watching
videos. Two images posted in September 2016, for example, showed the group members as they
hugged one another and prepared food as part of their feast celebration. Even in the more relaxed
lifestyle images, Wilayat Sinai underscored the preparedness of its group members by showing
21 images that displayed their weapons. Highlighting the lifestyle as Islamic, eight images
depicted the group members making the monotheism gesture, praying, or reading the Qur’an (see
Figure 5.12). Moreover, the lifestyle visual frame highlighted alternative media sources that the
group members consumed. Fourteen images showed individuals reading al-Naba’ newsletter or
watching provincial video releases. A two-image news brief posted in September 2017 showed
several group members watching a new video on a laptop that al-Barqa province in Libya had
released earlier. Wilayat Sinai further reinforced the connectedness to ISIS by showing the group
members raising ISIS’s black flag in three images. Together, the visual frame depicted the life of
Wilayat Sinai members as one that involved sharing with and caring for the other.
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Figure 5.12 A militant reading Qur’an during his break; disseminated March 5, 2017.
The images appearing in the in-group lifestyle visual frame relate to one of Entman’s
categories. The images defined the moral ground for Wilayat Sinai and its members.
Specifically, the photographs stressed piety, a spirit of camaraderie, preparedness, and
connectedness to one mission as the moral obligations of group members.
Sinai Landscape
The Sinai landscape frame encompassed 29 of Wilayat Sinai’s non-military images. The
images depicted the serenity and pristine nature of the natural lands in Sinai. The accompanying
photo captions identified Sinai as the location, specified the names of the displayed fruits, and
linked the scene to the Islamic faith. A 13-image photo report posted on February 28, 2016, for
example, showed the dew on plants after rainfall, green fields, and water streams. Wilayat Sinai
used a pertinent Qur’anic verse, “When We send down upon it rain, it quivers and swells and
grows [something] of every beautiful kind,” as the headline for the same report. Another 13image photo report posted on October 28, 2017 displayed Sinai’s different fruits handing from
the trees, including pomegranates, peaches, apples, figs, mangos, grapes, and dates. The images
visualized the beauty of Sinai in stark contrast with the more recurring and familiar scenes of
fighting and destruction.
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The images appearing in the Sinai landscape visual frame relate to one of Entman’s
categories. The images emphasized the moral obligation to preserve and protect the sacred land
of Sinai by reverting to a natural, picturesque state of the Sinai land. The fruits displayed the rich
potential of the embodied lands.
Healthcare
The healthcare frame encompassed 23 of Wilayat Sinai’s non-military images. These
images depicted the provincial group’s ability to establish clinics and treat patients. Wilayat
Sinai showed its medical facilities, equipment, and training workshops to demonstrate the
group’s capacity to provide adequate healthcare. The photo captions described the nature of the
medical activity and incorporated a religious component into the health mission. For example, a
10-image photo report posted on March 27, 2016 showed medical equipment, medicine, herbs, a
blood specimen, and a blood pressure meter in a health clinic. Wilayat Sinai headlined the photo
report through the use the Qur’anic verse “And when I am ill, it is He who cures me” and
described the location as one of the mujahidin’s health clinics inside the province. The other 13image photo report posted on February 4, 2017 displayed a first aid workshop for Wilayat Sinai
members depicting lectures, written pamphlets, CPR training, setting fractured bones, and
carrying the injured (see Figure 5.13). The images highlighted the group’s efforts to sidestep the
existing government-run healthcare facilities and establish an alternative system.
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Figure 5.13 A First Aid Workshop; disseminated February 4, 2017.
The images appearing in the healthcare visual frame relate to one of Entman’s categories.
The pictured healthcare scenes provided a solution for illnesses and injuries. By doing so,
Wilayat Sinai added its healthcare facilities and services as another facet of the treatment
recommendation for the ongoing conflict.
In sum, Wilayat Sinai’s visual frames exhibited all of Entman’s four framing categories
(see Table 5.1). The group identified the presence of apostates, spies, and the Jews as a problem.
The oppression of Sinai Muslims and the collusion with security forces were the underlying
causal interpretations of apostasy. Wilayat Sinai recommended training, fighting apostates and
spies, conducting suicide operations, confiscating the opponents’ belongings, executing spies and
polytheists, and providing healthcare as the treatment recommendations needed to end the Sinai
conflict. Morally, Wilayat Sinai juxtaposed its own notions of piety, camaraderie, and protection
of the community with their enemies’ airstrikes and evictions of Muslims in Sinai. Together the
sum of all categories presented Wilayat Sinai as the only side in the conflict that could preserve
the religion and fight oppression.
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Table 5.1 Wilayat Sinai’s Framing Categories in 2016-2017
Framing Category

Visual Frame

Message

Problem Definition

Combat

Apostates and Jews in and around Sinai

Battle Aftermath

Spies helping the apostates

Victimhood of Sinai
Muslims

Egyptian security forces apostates evict
Muslims and destroy their homes

Law Enforcement

Individual Muslims act as apostates and
spies help them

Combat

Fight and destroy the apostates and
spies

Battle Aftermath

Confiscate enemy artillery and
belongings

Martyrdom

Conduct suicide operations
Fight in the media battlefield

Military Training

Work together and prepare for battle

Law Enforcement

Execute spies and polytheists
Destroy forbidden materials

Healthcare

Provide healthcare services

Martyrdom

Wilayat Sinai members are pious and
willing to sacrifice their lives for their
cause

Militant Lifestyle

Group members are brothers who share
one mission

Sinai Landscape

The group is morally obligated to
protect the sacred land of Sinai

Law Enforcement

The group will apply shari’a law to
protect Sinai from vice and treason

Victimhood of Sinai
Muslims

The Egyptian military lacks morality as
it oppresses Sinai Muslims

Causal
Interpretation

Treatment
Recommendation

Moral Evaluation

*Results emerged from an analysis of both the photos and captions
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5.2

The Egyptian Military’s Photographic Campaign
The Egyptian military presented 1105 images in 2016 and 2017. Superimposed captions

only appeared on 20 of the military’s images to describe the scene. The images also carried no
logos or identifiers of the source. Instead, the military relied on longer Facebook posts, with an
average of 166 words per post, to contextualize the scene, the military’s role, and the broader
conflict. The pool of images encompassed two main categories: military and non-military. The
military images made up 56 percent of the Egyptian military’s photographic campaign, while
non-military images constituted the remaining 44 percent (see Figure 5.14).

Figure 5.14 The Egyptian Military’s Visual Frames in 2016 and 2017.
5.2.1

Military Images

The images showing the Egyptian military’s use of force comprised three visual frames:
combat, battle aftermath, and martyrdom (see Figure 5.15). The combat visual frame displayed
military actions on the Sinai battlefront. The battle aftermath visual frame focused on the
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outcomes of the military’s combative action. The martyrdom visual frames eulogized fallen
soldiers who gave their lives fighting the militants of the Wilayat Sinai.

Figure 5.15 The Egyptian Military’s Military Visual Frames in 2016 and 2017.
Battle Aftermath
The battle aftermath visual frame was the most recurring in the Egyptian military’s
photographic campaign. The 555 aftermath images made almost 90 percent of the military
images. Complementing the combat images, the aftermath visual frame focused on the success of
the counterterrorism operations in Sinai. The military exhibited Wilayat Sinai’s burned vehicles
and hideouts, confiscated weapons and flags, and dead or arrested militants. Only three aftermath
images had captions, and each of these labeled the militants as takfiris or excommunicators,
while the Facebook posts focused on the military’s efforts to combat terrorism in Sinai.
The aftermath images emphasized various positive outcomes of the military’s operations
in Sinai. Unlike the combat images, the Egyptian military mostly excluded the human element
from the scene, with 343 images focusing solely on property damage or military gains.
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Highlighting its destructive power, the military showed the destruction of militants’ hideouts,
caves and vehicles in 158 images. Out of eight images posted on April 26, 2017, for example,
five showed hideouts in flames and explosions after the Egyptian military “[destroyed] a large
amount of explosive materials used by the takfiri elements” in North Sinai (Official Page of
Armed Forces Spokesman, 2017b) (see Figure 5.16). Two hundred images also stressed the
military’s ability to seize the militants’ weapons, IEDs, explosive materials, computers, cameras,
vehicles, clothes, and money. The ISIS black flags, which appeared only in the battle aftermath
visual frame, indicated the identity of the owners of these lost belongings. Generally, the images
presented the military as an unseen war machine whose destructive power was manifest.

Figure 5.16 Destroying hideouts; disseminated April 26, 2017.

The military focused on the capture and death of militants in the remaining 212 images
that displayed human beings. Seventy-five of the photographs depicted the captured militants as
helpless with their hands tied behind the backs. One of the images uploaded on September 8,
2017 showed two blindfolded individuals on their knees, with the Facebook post describing them
as “two very dangerous takfiris” whom the military captured in central Sinai (Official Page of
Armed Forces Spokesman, 2017j). Further, the military highlighted the fatal outcome of the
counterterrorism operations by showing 74 images of the militants’ dead corpses. Collectively,
the images presented arrest and death as the fates awaiting the militants.
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The images in the battle aftermath visual frame relate to two of Entman’s categories. The
posts and photo captions mainly defined the problem as the presence of takfiri terrorists in Sinai.
The aftermath images identified the property destruction, seizure of weapons, and the capture
and killing of militants as the treatment recommendations.
Combat
The combat visual frame encompassed only 65, or 10 percent, of the military images. The
images depicted the Egyptian military as the powerful adversary in the Sinai conflict. To
emphasize dominance, the Egyptian military showed its soldiers taking part in counterterrorism
operations on the ground and jets bombing the militants from the air. Only one combat image
had a caption, which labeled the militants as takfiris, while the Facebook posts identified the
military’s mission as combatting terroristic activity in Sinai.
The combat images emphasized the military’s control in Sinai. They depicted the
Egyptian soldiers on the ground in 45 percent of the photographs displaying the combat frame.
The soldiers were riding in tanks and Humvees, holding their weapons, walking together, and
checking caves. A two-image post on May 30, 2016, for example, showed Egyptian soldiers
riding in armored vehicles and aiming at some distant objects. The caption of the operation
reported that the soldiers killed 16 of the “dangerous terrorist elements” in North Sinai (Official
Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2016f) (see Figure 5.17). In contrast, the military generally
excluded displays of the militants in the battlefield. Their only appearance was in the context of a
foiled militant attack the military had stopped by killing the assailant. In the meantime the
Egyptian air force was a major player in the combat images. The military displayed its airstrikes
in more than half of its combat images. Thirty-three images shoed the Egyptian air jets flying
over Sinai and targeting specific buildings and vehicles. With the focus on soldiers, weapons,
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tanks, air jets, and missiles, the images worked in tandem to imply that militants faced a
presumption of death from the omnipresent and invincible Egyptian military forces.

Figure 5.17 Egyptian soldiers on the frontline; disseminated May 30, 2016.
The images in the combat visual frame relate to two of Entman’s categories. The posts
and photo captions highlighted attacks against the military as the causal interpretation for the
threats in Sinai. The treatment recommendations for fighting the militants in Sinai included both
airstrikes and ground battles.
Martyrdom
Comprising only four images, the martyrdom visual frame was the least prevalent within
the Egyptian military’s photographic campaign. The images eulogized the military officers who
died in the line of duty fighting terrorism in Sinai. The Egyptian military either showed its
martyrs individually prior to their deaths or displayed their funeral services. None of the
martyrdom images had captions, but the Facebook posts praised the officers and celebrated their
life stories.
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Figure 5.18 Colonel Ahmed Al-Dardiry; disseminated March 22, 2017.
The Egyptian military emphasized the officers’ patriotism and piety in the martyrdom
images. It featured three of the officers in full military fatigues. One image posted on March 22,
2017, for example, depicted Colonel Ahmed al-Dardiry with the Egyptian flag in the background
(see Figure 5.18). The 550-word Facebook post described him as “one of the heroes of the
Armed Forces who presented an extraordinary example in sacrifice…so that his soldiers can
live” (Official Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2017g). The post then explained the details on
his background, personal life, and final moments in North Sinai, as well as his desire for his son
to read the Qur’an. Other posts stressed the martyrs’ devoutness and their past practices of
prayer. On the other hand, the military eulogized a fourth martyr by displaying dozens of top
security officials, including the Minister of Defense and the Army Chief of Staff, as they walked
in his funeral. The accompanying Facebook post provided the necessary information to
understand the scene, by indicating the funeral was for Colonel Ahmed Bayoumy who had died a
day earlier in North Sinai. The martyrdom images served as obituaries that memorialized the
fallen heroes.
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The images in the martyrdom visual frame relate to two of Entman’s categories. The
written text highlighted the deaths of military officers as a causal interpretation of the militants’
takfiri ideology and terroristic activity in Sinai. The images and the Facebook posts also
presented sacrifice and religiosity as a moral ground for the Egyptian military, its personnel, and
the Martyr’s Right operation.
5.2.2

Non-Military Images

Non-military images focused on the Egyptian military’s efforts beyond the battlefield.
They comprised three visual frames: law enforcement, public figure visits, and service (see
Figure 5.19). The law enforcement visual frame involved images of the activities to maintain
order in Sinai. The public figures visits frame focused on the appreciation of soldiers taking part
in the counterterrorism operations. The service provision frames highlighted Wilayat Sinai’s aid
and development initiatives.

Figure 5.19 The Egyptian Military’s Non-Military Visual Frames in 2016 and
2017.
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Law Enforcement
Law enforcement was the most recurring visual frame appearing among the non-military
images, making up 252 images (50 percent) of the non-military images. To emphasize the
effectiveness of its crackdown on illegal activities in Sinai, the military showed drugs and
underground tunnels. A total of 16 images had photo captions that laid out the features of the
tunnels in Rafah, while the Facebook posts reiterated the military’s mission to eradicate
terrorism, disrupt the illegal trade with Gaza, and secure Sinai.
Three types of law enforcement activities appeared in the photographs. First, 126 images
showed the underground tunnels the military discovered in Rafah. Five images posted on
February 6, 2016, for example, depicted the discovery steps involved in finding the tunnels,
starting with the detection of its ceiling, the digging of an opening, and the eventual unveiling of
the parameters of the underground facilities (see Figure 5.20). Second, the military used 109
images to showcase its crackdown on drugs and the illegal smuggling of cigarettes. In an eightimage Facebook post on November 5, 2017, five images showed the confiscation of drugs at
checkpoints and the destruction of drug plantations in central Sinai. Like the battle aftermath
visual frame, the military’s law enforcement frame mainly excluded humans from the scenes of
drugs and tunnels, showing them only 30 percent of the time. Third, seventeen images in the law
enforcement frame showed the military securing the international events in South Sinai. Humans
appeared in every image showing the African Trade Investment Forum, high-level meetings of
the African Ministers of Defense in Sharm El Sheikh, and the country flags of the visiting
delegations. The law enforcement juxtaposed the pervasiveness of illegal activities in North
Sinai with the safety of the South.

139

Figure 5.20 Discovering a tunnel in Rafah; disseminated February 6, 2016.
The images in the law enforcement visual frame relate to two of Entman’s categories.
The written text and the images defined a problem, namely the existence of underground tunnels,
drugs, and smuggled cigarettes in North Sinai. The recommended treatments to this problem
were the discovery of tunnels, the confiscation of illegal materials, and the deployment of more
forces.
Visits by Public Figures
Another recurring visual frame among the non-military images was public figure visits.
The 177 public figure visit images made up over one-third of the non-military images. These
images focused on the visits by top security officials and other public figures to the soldiers in
the field in Sinai or in hospitals. None of the images had photo captions, but the Facebook posts
named the visitors and praised the soldiers, labeling them as the heroes of the armed forces for
fighting terrorism in Sinai.
The Egyptian military emphasized the country’s appreciation for the soldiers and their
sacrifices in Sinai. Praising those who had suffered injuries in Sinai, the military distributed 133
images showing top security officials, as well as politicians, actors, media persons, and clerics
visiting, talking with, and exchanging smiles with Egyptian soldiers in hospitals. A 10-image
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Facebook post on April 30, 2016, for example, displayed Minister of Defense Sedki Sobhi next
to the hospital beds of 10 soldiers, shaking their hands, patting them on the shoulders, and
kissing their foreheads. White sheets of paper hanging behind the soldiers’ beds indicated the
nature, date, and exact location of their injuries sustained in Sinai battles (see Figure 5.21).
Forty-four images in the visits frame also showed top security officials on battlefield visits
interacting with the soldiers and honoring their efforts. A six-image Facebook post on February
12, 2016 showed Minister of Defense Sedki Sobhi and Minister of Interior Magdi Abdelghaffar
with the soldiers in North Sinai shaking their hands and handing them gifts, while the
corresponding Facebook post described the soldiers as “Egypt’s heroes” (Official Page of Armed
Forces Spokesman, 2016g). In both the hospital and field visit photographs, Sedki Sobhi and the
Egyptian flag were the most recurring symbols, appearing in over half of the images. The images
stressed on the military’s patriotism and the leaders’ constant interaction with both injured and
healthy soldiers serving in combat.

Figure 5.21 The Minister of Defense in a hospital visit; disseminated April 30, 2016.
The images in the visits by public figures visual frame relate to one of Entman’s
categories. The images and Facebook posts presented the soldiers’ injuries and sacrifices as
indicators of the moral responsibility the military personnel held toward their country. The
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scenes of hospital and field visits also underscored the leadership’s moral responsibility toward
the soldiers who fought terrorism in Sinai.
Service Provision
The service provision visual frame encompassed 52 (11 percent) of the non-military
images. These images focused on the government’s efforts to develop Sinai and its citizenry. To
emphasize these efforts, the military mainly showed its soldiers giving out food and leaders
opening schools. None of the images had photo captions, but the Facebook posts provided the
location, identified the participating officials, and labeled all activities part of an ongoing project
to develop the Sinai Peninsula.

Figure 5.22 Food distribution in Al-Rawda; disseminated December 5, 2017.

The service provision images highlighted two main military-sponsored initiatives in
Sinai. First, the military distributed 27 images to depict its personnel distributing food packages
to the people of Sinai. Scenes of aid distribution often displayed elderly men, women, and
children waiting or holding their packages of food. Two images posted on December 5, 2017, for
example, showed a military officer handing packages to civilians in al-Rawda village, where
militants had bombed a mosque two weeks earlier (see Figure 5.22). Second, the military
distributed 15 images to highlight the construction of new schools and religious centers. A threeimage Facebook post on March 31, 2017 showed the Minister of Education Tarek Shawky, the
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military commander of the unified leadership east of the Canal Mohamed Abdel Illah, and the
governors of North and South Sinai opening a school and a social unit in Sinai. Images of the
Minister of International Cooperation’s visits to a development project and of military personnel
donating money to a Sinai public bank in support of the development projects also appeared, but
less frequently. Throughout the photographs displaying these initiatives, the military used the
Egyptian flag as a prominent symbol. In 34 images, the flag appeared on school building walls,
military fatigue patches and food packages, as well as in the hands of those civilians receiving
aid. The images reinforced the military’s engagement in Sinai’s humanitarian and developmental
initiatives.
The images in the services provision visual frame relate to two of Entman’s categories.
The images and Facebook posts presented the initiatives to develop education and provide aid to
citizens as necessary treatment recommendations to complement the counterterrorism military
operations. Additionally, the images visualized these actions and interactions with the Sinai
residents as a moral responsibility of the Egyptian military.
The Egyptian military’s visual frames exhibited all of Entman’s four framing categories
(see Table 5.2). The military identified the presence of takfiri terrorists, contraband tunnels, and
illegal drugs and cigarettes in Sinai as a problem. It highlighted the attacks against the military
and the killing of officers as causal interpretations for the spread of takfiri ideology. Hence, the
appropriate treatment recommendations for the Sinai conflict included fighting and killing the
militants, destroying their property, confiscating their weapons, discovering tunnels, burning
drugs and cigarettes, opening schools, and providing food to civilians .The Egyptian military
emphasized its moral superiority by underscoring the sacrifices of its patriotic, pious troops,
exhibiting appreciation for such acts, and manifesting the leadership’s efforts to help the Sinai
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residents. Together, Entman’s categories in the Sinai context presented the Egyptian military as
the sole protector of the nation against terrorism and extremist ideologies and a willing
participant in the development of the territory’s citizenry.
Table 5.2 The Egyptian Military’s Framing Categories in 2016-2017
Framing Category

Visual Frame

Message

Problem Definition

Battle Aftermath

Takfiris and terrorists in Sinai

Law Enforcement

Tunnels and illegal drugs and cigarettes
in Sinai

Combat

Attacking the military makes one a
terrorist

Martyrdom

Excommunicating and apostatizing
officers makes one a takfiri

Combat

Fight the militants

Battle Aftermath

Kill militants, destroy their property,
and seize their weapons

Law Enforcement

Discover tunnels, confiscate illegal
drugs and cigarettes, and deploy more
forces

Services Provision

Open schools and provide aid

Martyrdom

The military personnel are pious and
patriotic

Visits by Public Figures

Officers and soldiers fight for their
country and the military appreciates
their sacrifices

Services Provision

The military develops Sinai

Causal Interpretation

Treatment
Recommendation

Moral Evaluation

*Results emerged from an analysis of both the photos and captions
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5.3

The Visual Framing War
Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s visual frames implemented three interaction

strategies: competition, negation, and expansion. At times, the two sides directly competed over
the same visual frames to claim superiority and power. At others, they negated the messaging in
the opposing visual frames by presenting different ones that claim to undermine the credibility of
the opponent. Each side also expanded beyond the scope of the opponent’s visual frames by
constructing unique scenes presenting their perspectives.
One key area where Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military competed was in the display
of battle combat. Wilayat Sinai mainly defined the battle through sequential scenes of combative
action that implied motion on the ground. They showed IED attacks, suicide missions, group
operations, and assassinations that the militants carried out on the battlefront as they fought
security forces. The military instead defined the battle mostly by displaying scenes of the
destructive aftermath of precision airstrikes and counterterrorism operations. The images rarely
exhibited ground actions in progress or the soldiers’ involvement on the frontlines. By doing so,
the military presented static pictures of battle in Sinai that, when compared to dynamic scenes,
are less likely to stimulate brain activity (Proverbio, Riva, & Zani, 2009) or influence attitudes
(Cian, Krishna, & Elder, 2014). Showing the fight in process and highlighting the fighters’
actions on the battlefield is likely to engage the viewer and trump the focus on destroyed objects
in the aftermath.
Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military also competed over the portrayal of martyrs. The
militant group treated its fallen soldiers as religious actors by showing the militants reading the
Qur’an and making the monotheism gesture as they posed for the camera. The superimposed
captions reinforced the message, describing them as martyrs who had died striving in the path of

145

God. The military instead relied on national symbols to identify those who died fighting for its
side of the cause, such as the Egyptian flag and the military uniform. The Facebook texts
bolstered the message by hailing the fallen officers as defenders of the nation, while also
describing them as practicing Muslims. With no depictions of religious symbols, however,
patriotism visually dominated the military’s portrayal of martyrs. This competition drew a sharp
contrast between the motivational goals of the fighters. Wilayat Sinai attempted to appeal to
those wanting to fight in support of their faith against the state; the Egyptian military reached out
to a much wider audience supporting or willing to protect the country against terrorism while
upholding their religious ties.
Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military also competed over the appropriate framework
for law enforcement. Both sides displayed crackdowns on drugs and cigarettes. The militant
group used the captions to describe the contraband items as impurities forbidden under shari’a
law. The military instead used Facebook text to describe drug plantations and smuggled
substances in Sinai as illegal. It further highlighted the threat emanating from breaches to the
Rafah-Gaza border through the recurring displays of underground tunnels. The competition here
drew a sharp contrast between the different motives for law enforcement. Wilayat Sinai
presented its actions as moral; the Egyptian military highlighted its activities as legal. In short,
the displayed motivations reinforced the conflict as one between the Islamic shari’a and state
laws.
Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military also competed over perceived capacity to offer
social services to the Sinai populations. The militant group limited its depicted services to
healthcare for its fighters displayed in scenes of a clinic and a first aid workshop. The military,
by contrast, presented a wide array of services the Egyptian state provided to its residents. These
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included food aid distribution, schools, religious centers, and other development projects. The
Egyptian military highlighted the state’s comparatively higher level of competence over the
militant group as a provider of social services for those in need of food, education, and jobs.
Beyond directly competing over visual frames, Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military
also negated each other’s frames. Wilayat Sinai, for example, negated the Egyptian military’s
depiction of the outcomes of its Sinai conflict operations. The military presented visual frames
emphasizing how its precision airstrikes effectively targeted terrorists, its school projects helped
Sinai residents, and its crackdown on underground tunnels secured the border. The militant
group negated such claims by presenting the airstrikes as having turned civilian houses,
mosques, plantations, and schools into devastating scenes of the rubble. It further displayed that
outcome of the military’s plan of action to destroy the underground tunnels and create a buffer
zone between Rafah and Gaza as children fleeing with their families from homes near the border.
Wilayat Sinai’s alternative outcomes attempted to discredit the state and undermine its credibility
using images of innocence and destruction that are likely to personify injustice (Wells, 2007) and
prompt support for a forceful response (Vail III & Arndt, J., Motyl, M. Pyszczynski, 2012).
The Egyptian military, by contrast, negated the presentation of Wilayat Sinai’s fighting
power featured in the militant group’s combat images. In response to Wilayat Sinai’s emphasis
on scenes of militants’ engagement in attacks that it deemed successful, the Egyptian military
used part of its battle aftermath images to redefine the power dynamics in the Sinai conflict. It
presented scenes of arrest, death, and destruction of militants as the actual outcomes of militants’
attacks. The humiliating appearances of militants in shackles or in their own blood further
magnified the punishment that the military implemented for law breakers. The Egyptian
military’s alternative picture attempted to debunk Wilayat Sinai’s claims of success on the
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battlefield using negative images that are more likely to grab attention (Pfau et al., 2008) and
enhance recall (Newhagen & Reeves, 1992).
Having directly engaged Egyptian military’s framing of the conflict through competition
and negation, Wilayat Sinai went further to expand beyond the scope of the military’s visual
frames. The focus of the group’s effort was on displaying life in Sinai. The militant group
utilized the in-group lifestyle to emphasize the camaraderie and piety present among the Sinai
militants. The images showed militants praying, eating, and living together. The Sinai landscape
also highlighted the beauty of the sacred land through images of green fields, water streams, and
fruit trees. Such images of a spiritual, moral, and egalitarian lifestyle that was close to nature
occurred only in the militant group’s photographic campaign.
The Egyptian military likewise expanded beyond the scope of the militant group’s visual
frames to display the interactions between leadership and troops. The military utilized its visits
frame to emphasize a father-son relationship between the military leaders and its soldiers. The
images mostly showed top security officials, such as First Lieutenant General Sedki Sobhi and
Major Generals Magdi Abdelghaffar and Mahmoud Hijazy, standing by the soldiers’ beds in
hospitals and next to them in the field in Sinai. Such images displaying a morally responsible
leadership that honored, directed, and worked together with its subordinates occurred only in the
military’s photographic campaign.
The interaction strategies revealed the nature of state and non-state actors’ messaging
approaches in conflict. Competition was the main strategy evident in Wilayat Sinai and the
Egyptian military’s counter-messages. Each side used the military, law enforcement, and social
services frames in over 80 percent of the images. Negation was another strategy manifest in the
two groups’ counter-messages. The militant group highlighted victimhood in five percent of its
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images; the state emphasized humiliation of militants in 13 percent of it images. Meanwhile,
expansion was the only strategy in the alternative messages on both sides. The militant group
exclusively endorsed the militant lifestyle and landscape in almost nine percent of its images; the
state instead promoted leadership and societal unity in 16 percent of its images. The
incorporation of counter- and alternative messaging reveals that neither approach is unique to
anti-extremism or counterterrorism media campaigns. Instead militant groups like Wilayat Sinai
rely on the two approaches as much as state actors for competition, negation, and expansion. In
short, counter- and alternative messaging approaches can operate in tandem within state and nonstate actors’ media campaigns.
5.4

Concluding Thoughts
This chapter demonstrates how militant groups and state actors frame their photographic

campaigns differently during times of conflict. Focusing on the Sinai conflict in 2016-2017, an
inductive, grounded theory approach generated context-specific visual frames that Wilayat Sinai
and the Egyptian military had constructed. The militant group and the state were generally more
reliant on the visual frames pertaining to military action, such as combat and battle aftermath.
However, other non-military activities such as law enforcement, social services, and visits to the
soldiers made their way into the photographic campaigns,
The formats of surrounding text in the Sinai conflict presented an additional function of
photo captions in the digital space. Wilayat Sinai used superimposed photo captions as framing
devices and the provincial logo as its visual identifier on each of its 800 images. The militant
group used the captions to tell a story (Green & Dill, 2013), contextualize the scene (Birdsell &
Groarke, 1996), and reinforce the visual frames (Parry, 2010). The superimposed captions also
allowed the visual frames to retain meaning as the images digitally circulate as individual media
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products across platforms. The Egyptian military, on the other hand, relied on the Facebook
posts as static framing devices to perform the typical functions of photo captions. But with no
superimposed captions or logo in almost all the 1105 images, the association wasn’t as
immediate for the viewer and the meaning was more difficult to decipher. The meaning would be
less clear as the images themselves circulate with no surrounding text. In visual contestations,
superimposing the caption on the image can allow the visual frame to transcend its initial context
and the lack thereof can result in the loss of meaning in the cluttered digital space.
The contesting visual frames in Sinai exhibited similarities and differences with image
distribution in previous conflicts. Wilayat Sinai’s visual frames mostly aligned with previous
analyses of ISIS images (e.g., Wignell et al., 2017; Winkler et al., 2016; Winkler, Damanhoury,
Dicker, & Lemieux, 2018; Winter, 2018). Like these earlier studies, the militant group
emphasized its attacks in combat and battle aftermaths, highlighted state-building efforts with a
particular focus on law enforcement, the Sinai landscape, and healthcare, displayed religious
symbols and bonding icons in its martyrs and the everyday life of its communities, and utilized
the about to die visual trope in almost all its military images. Nonetheless, Wilayat Sinai’s
photographic campaign strategies also diverged from those of other military groups that previous
research has identified. For example, Sinai’s provincial militant group omitted the display of
group leaders and civilian casualties which served as key features in images of Hamas and the
Syrian opposition (Seo, 2014; Seo & Ebrahim, 2016). Instead, the group stressed the victimhood
of the Sinai residents through images of house demolitions and residents fleeing their homes.
Wilayat Sinai’s avoidance of leader depictions along with the incorporation of victimhood may
well be a means to demonstrate stark differences from the Egyptian military’s recurrent displays
of top security officials.
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The Egyptian military’s visual frames mostly aligned with analyses of state actors’
images in the past three decades (e.g., Chouliaraki, 2013; Holiday et al., 2015; Ohl, 2015;
Sontag, 2003). Like the findings of these earlier studies, the military used images to focus on the
war machine in scenes of artillery and airstrikes rather than soldiers on the battlefield, the state’s
humanitarian aid and social services, and the unified community as exemplified by visits from
security officials, members of parliament, journalists, actors, and clerics to wounded soldiers.
The only exception from these earlier studies of state actors, however, was in the portrayal of
death. In Sinai, the military did not censor death like other states, but rather frequently
incorporated graphic images of the enemies’ corpses on the battlefield. The Egyptian military’s
incorporation of death may well be a reflection of Wilayat Sinai’s humiliating depictions of
soldiers and civilians as well as a response to the deadly attacks during that period.
Most importantly, the chapter demonstrates that understanding the media battlefield
requires an examination of contested visual frames. Entman’s four framing associations serve as
recurrent areas of stasis that allow for insightful comparison of the visual frames of militant
groups and state actors. This study found that Wilayat Sinai’s visual frames work in tandem to
communicate a coherent localized story that identified apostasy as a problem, oppressing Sinai
residents as the problem’s cause, protecting the community as a moral responsibility, and
fighting the Egyptian state and its collaborators as the main treatment. Meanwhile, the Egyptian
military’s visual frames created a much broader story that presented terrorism as a problem,
attacking the military forces as the problem’s cause, defending the country as a moral
responsibility, and fighting terrorists as the main treatment. Comparing the similarities and
differences between the visual frames of militant groups and state actors helps understand the
messages operating within the conflict.
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The second level of analysis important to a full understanding of how the visual frames
function in the contested online environment involves a close examination of the interactions that
exist between state and non-state actors. This analysis of Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military
revealed that the visual interactions involved competition, negation, and expansion strategies.
The militant group and the state competed over the framing of similar messages, such as the
nature of combative action, martyrdom, and the ability to provide services. Each side used its
own images to negate the other’s framing of messages. Wilayat Sinai negated the military’s
framing of precision airstrikes by emphasizing civilian targets. The military negated Wilayat
Sinai’s framing of combative action by highlighting the death and arrest of militants. They also
expanded beyond the direct visual confrontation by leveraging their relative moral positions
through unique messages like camaraderie, beauty, and responsible leadership. Examining the
three interaction strategies helps further explicate how the state and non-state actors conduct the
image war.
Future studies can apply the same visual framing approach to both photographs and
videos in other conflicts. Visual messaging strategies may very well differ from one case study to
another. Hence, studies should extract the applicable visual elements they need to examine from
the surrounding context and the relevant existing literature. Finally, other conflicts may generate
additional or different modes of interactions between the opponents’ visual frames. As a result,
researchers can build on competition, negation, and expansion to develop a broader framework
for visual framing interactions in conflict.
6

APPLICATION OF VISUAL SEMIOTICS

The sophisticated media operations on both sides of the Sinai conflict suggest that strategic
factors may well have governed the visual semiotic choices of the competing media campaigns.
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ISIS’s internal documents reveal that a central media office provides the local provinces with a
semiotic guidebook on how to compose photographs and generate meaning (CTC, 2018; Milton,
2018), while the Egyptian military had a full Department of Morale Affairs in charge of
psychological operations and media production. To assess if and how the media operations on
the two sides of the conflict utilize visual semiotics in purposeful ways, this chapter examines
how the militant group and the Egyptian military used these elements to depict human subjects in
the photographs in their media campaigns during 2016-2017.
This chapter begins by providing a quantitative overview of the human subjects displayed
in the photographic media campaigns of Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military. Then, it
focuses on each of the five semiotic categories, mining previous research for the potential effects
of the element on Western viewers, examining how the media apparatuses of Wilayat Sinai and
the Egyptian military employed the element in their respective campaigns, and analyzing how
the two approaches interacted with one another. Finally, it concludes with a discussion of how
the Sinai conflict introduces applications of visual semiotics that align with or diverge from
Western approaches and of how future studies should direct their efforts moving forward.
6.1

Human Subjects in the Sinai Visual Conflict
Wilayat Sinai portrayed human characters in 515 images or 64 percent of its total

photographic output in 2016-2017. The displayed character types included militants (identified
members of Wilayat Sinai group), Egyptian soldiers (military conscripts, officers, and police
guards), state collaborators (civilians and other tribal members who interacted, assisted, and
worked with the Egyptian security forces), and ordinary civilians (those standing in, passing by,
and driving through Sinai streets) (see Figure 6.1). Seventy-nine percent of the images portraying
humans displayed only one character type. Twenty-one percent showed more than one character
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type. The militants were the only character type present in 267 images (52 percent). The
Egyptian soldiers were the sole character type in 113 images (22 percent). State collaborators
were the only character type in 15 images (3 percent), while other civilian characters were the
only character type in 12 images (2 percent).

Figure 6.1 Display of Human Characters in Wilayat Sinai’s Photographic Campaign in 20162017.

The Egyptian military portrayed human characters in 556 images or 50 percent of its total
output in 2016-2017. The character types included Egyptian soldiers (military conscripts and
officers from first lieutenants to brigadier-generals), leaders (the Army Chief of Staff and
Ministers of Defense and Interior), Wilayat Sinai militants (all identified members of Wilayat
Sinai), and civilians (see Figure 6.2). Character types appeared together in 43 percent of the
images, while the other 57 percent focused on one type. The Egyptian soldiers were the only
character type displayed in 148 images (26.6 percent). The leaders were the sole character type
in only 9 images (1.6 percent). The militants were the only type presented in 109 images (19.6
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percent). Civilians alone (i.e., government officials, members of parliament, journalists, religious
clergy, and Sinai residents) appeared in 53 images (9.5 percent).

Figure 6.2 Display of Human Characters in the Egyptian Military’s Photographic Campaign in
2016-2017.
The Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s photographic campaigns exhibited
different levels of emphasis based on the displayed character types. Each group emphasized its
own members as the most frequent human photo subjects. Yet leaders, for example, constituted a
unique, recurrent character type that only appeared in the military images. The two groups also
differed in their relative emphasis on opponents and supporters in the Sinai conflict. In Wilayat
Sinai’s human photographs, the Egyptian soldiers and state collaborators were prominent,
making up 40 percent of the images, while supporters were hardly present. In the Egyptian
military’s human photographs, on the other hand, the militants were the least visible character
type with civilian supporters appearing more frequently. In sum, the militant group depicted the
Sinai conflict as one involving a large group of militants fighting security forces and the civilians
helping them; the military presented a large pool of soldiers backed by their leaders and the
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public as they fought a small group of militants. The full import of the differences, however,
becomes more understandable with an examination of how each visual semiotics intersected with
the character types.
6.2

Viewer Distance
Studies of visual semiotics in the western context typically utilize viewer distance to

suggest a perceived relationship between the photo subject and the viewer. At a social/public
distance, the viewer has more difficulty recognizing the faces of the photo subjects (Lampinen,
Neuschatz, & Cling, 2012), is more likely to perceive the photo subject as a stranger or other (E.
T. Hall, 1966; Jewitt & Oyama, 2008), and is less threatened by the photo subjects’ hostile
actions (Stamps, 2011). At an intimate/personal distance, the viewer can identify the photo
subjects’ faces (Wagenaar & Van Der Schrier, 1996), recognize their emotions in some cases
(Gerhardsson, Högman, & Fischer, 2015; Hjarvard, 2000), and foster a perceived closer
relationship with them (J. Cohen, 2001; Koga-Browes, 2013). American political leaders, for
example, are more likely to appear at a close-to-medium distance on the covers of American
magazines than their foreign leader counterparts (Kang & Heo, 2006). Immigrants, on the other
hand, are more likely to appear at a long distance in Spanish and Greek newspapers than citizens
of the respective countries (Batziou, 2011; Silva et al., 2017).
6.2.1

Social/Public Distance

Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military displayed no significant difference in the use of
social/public distance to portray human subjects in their respective media campaigns (46 versus
42 percent respectively), χ2 (1, N = 1071) = 1.53, p > .05. The human characters appeared more
than four feet away from the viewer in 237 of the militant group’s images and in 235 of the
military’s images. Both groups shared an interest in providing a wide view of Sinai that
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positioned human photo subjects as recurrent part of the scenes. Disaggregation of the
photographs by character types, however, revealed important differences between the two
campaigns.
Wilayat Sinai often used social/public distance to depict its militants, particularly those
engaged in combat or law enforcement activities. The battlefield images showed the militants at
a distance, shooting, firing rockets, and attacking security checkpoints. Picturing an attack on alSafa checkpoint in March 2016, for example, five images showed several militants at a public
distance jumping out of a pickup truck and firing at the checkpoint (see Figure 6.3). Meanwhile,
the 2016-2017 images also displayed militants from afar distributing warning documents to
civilians, confiscating drugs and cigarettes, burning the forbidden materials in public for people
to see, and preparing to execute state collaborators and Sufi clerics. The social/public distance
emphasized that the group was serving as a trustworthy guardian of the community, both in its
handling of the internal and external threats facing those living in Sinai.

Figure 6.3 Militants attacking al-Safa checkpoint; disseminated March 20, 2016.

Wilayat Sinai also used social/public distance to depict Egyptian soldiers displayed in
images of combat and its aftermath. Wilayat Sinai’s photographic campaign showed distant
Egyptian soldiers only as targets and nonthreatening opponents, rather than as the agents of
action like their militant counterparts. The Egyptian soldiers stood passively unaware of snipers
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targeting them, walked or drove onto explosives unknowingly, fell on the ground or ran in
response to militia attacks, and rushed to carry away their injured. Forty-one images snapped
from a social/public distance, for example, showed IED attacks and their destructive aftermath
for Egyptian soldiers. Taken as a whole, Wilayat Sinai’s use of social/public distance
emphasized the impotence of the Egyptian soldiers when they faced Wilayat Sinai militants on
the battlefield.
By contrast, the Egyptian military used social/public distance to depict its soldiers
competing successfully in photographs of combat, battlefield aftermath, and law enforcement
activities. The photographs of the battlefield showed distant Egyptian soldiers lining up before
operations, riding armored vehicles, entering caves, posing alongside confiscated belongings,
and standing next to burning vehicles and hideouts. Picturing the aftermath of a counterterrorism
operation on April 2, 2017, for example, four images showed the soldiers in long shots after they
had confiscated explosive materials, computers, and vehicles in North Sinai (see Figure 6.4).
Meanwhile, the Egyptian soldiers also appeared at a distance destroying drug plantations,
confiscating contraband cigarettes, and filling the streets to secure international events in Sharm
El Sheikh. The social/public distance emphasized the strength of the Egyptian soldiers by
showing both the broad scope and positive outcomes of the state’s Sinai operations.

Figure 6.4 Soldiers next to a confiscated vehicle; disseminated April 2, 2017.
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The Egyptian military also used social/public distance to depict Wilayat Sinai militants
along with local civilians in photographs of the battle aftermath and in law enforcement scenes.
Unlike Egyptian military campaign photographs of soldiers who always appeared powerful and
victorious, the same group’s shots of militants showed them under arrest on a distant battlefield.
A long shot posted on September 8, 2017, for example, showed two individuals kneeling in the
desert with their hands tied behind them and faces blurred after their arrests in central Sinai (see
Figure 6.5). The Facebook post identified both men as “very dangerous takfiris
[excommunicators or ones who declare others disbelievers]” (Official Page of Armed Forces
Spokesman, 2017j). Meanwhile, the distant shots of dead militants showed them in humiliating
states with their blood spilling, their weapons next to their bodies, and/or their vehicles burning
in the nearby surroundings. Some law enforcement images displayed civilians under arrest for
engaging in smuggling activity from a long distance. Two long shots posted on November 12,
2017, for example, showed two blindfolded individuals with blurry faces and hands tied upon
arrest along with their confiscated vehicles at a checkpoint. The Facebook post described them as
drug and cigarette smugglers (Official Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2017h). Together, the
social/public distance shots emphasized the eventual fate of separation from the rest of the Sinai
community that awaited captured militants and smugglers.

Figure 6.5 Two militants under arrest; disseminated September 8, 2017.

159

6.2.2

Intimate/Personal Distance

Wilayat Sinai was significantly more likely than the Egyptian military to use photographs
shot at an intimate/personal distance (34 versus 21 percent respectively), χ2 (1, N = 1071) = 22.66, p
< .001. The human characters appeared less than four feet away from the viewer in 173 of the
militant group’s images, but in only 115 of the military’s images. Based on western conceptions
of the element’s impact on viewers, the differential level of emphasis suggests that the militant
group placed more emphasis on creating a closer and more personal relationship with the viewer.
Considering the context of the media blackout in Sinai, however, the strategy could also relate to
the militant group’s desire to present the on-the-ground situation to its viewers in Sinai and
beyond.

Figure 6.6 A martyred militant; disseminated January 28, 2017.

Wilayat Sinai used intimate/personal distance mainly to depict its own militants pictured
in combat and pre-battle scenes. The images focusing on the battlefield showed engaged
militants as they assembled rockets and fired gunshots at the distant, invisible enemies.
Photographs snapped away from the battlefield showed militants standing or sitting at a close-tomedium distance holding weapons, cameras, or the Qur’an (see Figure 6.6). In these eulogy
photographs, the immediate textual context identified the militants as martyrs who had died
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subsequently in attacks or suicide operations. Out of 23 eulogy images in the group’s campaign,
18 depicted martyrs at a close distance. The patterned use of intimate/personal distance to show
depicted Wilayat Sinai militants and martyrs suggested that viewer should feel a close personal
relationship to those willing to fight and die for the group’s cause.
Wilayat Sinai also used intimate/personal distance to depict Egyptian soldiers and state
collaborators in shots of battlefield aftermath and executions. The use of close distances in
photographed post-battle scenes showed Egyptian soldiers and tribal fighters only as dead
corpses or as images shown on confiscated photo identification cards with accompanying visual
and textual contexts confirming their death and defeat. Visualizing the aftermath of an attack on
a security convoy in Beer al-Abd in September 2017, for example, two images showed dead
Egyptian soldiers on the ground with burnt skin, torn clothes, and bloody bodies. Images
displaying law enforcement scenes utilized close shots to show Egyptian soldiers, tribal fighters,
and other state collaborators immediately before, during, and after their executions. The image
sequences presented AK47s, pistols, and knives as the weapons of choice in these graphic
scenes. Out of 50 death images in the group’s entire photographic campaign, 33 depicted the
militants’ enemies at a close distance. This patterned use of intimate/personal distance
highlighted the gruesome fates that awaited Egyptian soldiers and collaborators working to
combat Wilayat Sinai’s forces.
The Egyptian military, by contrast, used intimate/personal distance to depict Wilayat
Sinai militants in the aftermath of the Sinai combat operations. The bulk of images with close
views showed militants lying dead in stained fatigues with shattered heads and severed body
parts. The only close-up shots of live militants displayed the photo subjects kneeling after their
arrests. A total of 16 close-to-medium shots posted on October 16, 2017, for example, showed
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disconfigured bodies of over a dozen militants on the ground with burns on the skin and blood all
over their bodies. In those graphic scenes, the immediate textual context identified the dead
individuals as terrorists and takfiris who had attempted to carry out attacks in Sinai. Out of 74
death images in the military’s campaign, 45 depicted the militants at close distance. The
intimate/personal distance emphasized the consequences that enemies of the state can expect in
Sinai by bringing details of their death and arrest in closer view.
The Egyptian military also used intimate/personal distance to depict top security officials
interacting with the injured soldiers lying in hospital bed or with the conscripts in the Sinai
barracks. Four close-to-medium shots posted on January 26, 2016, for example, showed the
Minister of Defense Sedki Sobhi shaking hands, patting shoulders, and kissing the injured
soldiers (see Figure 6.7). The intimate/personal distance worked to humanize the two character
types by positioning the Egyptian soldier as vulnerable in some respects and the officers as
leaders who genuinely care and have concern for the men under their commands.

Figure 6.7 Minister of Defense Sedki Sobhi visiting injured soldiers; disseminated January 26,
2016.

Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s use of viewer distance in the Sinai conflict
aligns with existing western frameworks of expected visual semiotic outcomes. Each side
utilized social/public distance to push its enemies away from the viewer and depict them as the
nonthreatening other. The Sinai conflict’s approach appears consistent with previous studies
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conducted in Western cultures showing that social/public distance disconnects viewers and photo
subjects. It also echoes the findings of earlier studies documenting that viewers perceive distant
photo subjects as less threatening.
Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military also rely on images in ways that appear to
capitalize on western expectations for the use of intimate/personal distance. Both deployed closer
views as a defining feature of the militant group’s martyrs and the military’s injured soldiers that
western studies suggest heightens the sense of closeness that viewers feel with the photo
subjects. Perceived close relationships with each group’s most revered warriors who had put
their lives on the line may go further to help legitimize the cause and inspire supporters. Moving
beyond the application of the technique to rank-and-file soldiers, the Egyptian military also used
intimate/personal distance to legitimize its top commanders, a feature absent in Wilayat Sinai’s
campaign, perhaps as a means of protecting them from Egypt’s counterterrorism efforts.
Nonetheless, the use of viewer distance in the photographs in the Sinai media conflict
also suggests an expanded approach for understanding proxemics in conflict. Identifying
additional uses of viewer distance to photo subjects in nonwestern contexts can suggest
differential cross-cultural interpretations of the same visual semiotic element requiring
experimental investigation. Neither Wilayat Sinai nor the Egyptian military in their media
campaigns limited their application of social/public distance to image depictions of the other.
They also utilized social/public distance to highlight the strength and success of their own
members as they worked together to safeguard the Sinai community. At least in the Egyptian
context, long distance shots in photographic campaigns can broaden the scope of the fighting
group’s own efforts and suggest their omnipresent strength in combatting the group’s current or
future enemies.
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Moreover, Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military expanded the implied messaging
incorporated in the non-western use of intimate/personal distance. Dozens of these shots in the
Wilayat Sinai and Egyptian military campaigns brought the photo subject closer to the viewer
when lying dead, facing execution, or kneeling upon arrest. Neither the militant group nor the
military appeared to be suggesting intimacy and friendship between the viewer and the enemy
characters per se. Instead, they restricted their proximity to the viewer to humiliating and dire
situations to identify with the fear that these enemy individuals portray. In the Egyptian context,
close-to-medium shots can also serve as a warning sign by magnifying the possibility of
retaliation against the enemy in times of conflict.
6.3

Camera Angle
Studies of visual semiotics in the western context typically utilize camera angles to

convey relative levels of symbolic power. A high camera angle pointing downward can present
photo subjects as weak (Mandell & Shaw, 1973), passive (Kraft, 1986), and less significant
(Zettl, 2003). At extreme height, the bird eye’s view can even depersonalize the human bodies
underneath (Amad, 2012). A low camera angle pointing upward can prompt positive assessments
of the photo subject’s authority (Greer, Hardin, & Homan, 2009; Tiemens, 1970), dominance
(Mandell & Shaw, 1973), boldness (Kraft, 1986), and influence (W. Huang, Olson, & Olson,
2002). The Associated Press, for example, was more likely to use a high camera angle in its
portrayals of Afghani women under the Taliban regime until its defeat at the hands of the U.S.led coalition (S. Fahmy, 2004). When showing objects (rather than human subjects) in a scene,
high or low camera angles do not usually carry the same connotations (Meyers-Levy &
Peracchio, 1992); viewers prefer looking down at them for practical reasons, such as checking
out their most salient parts (Sammartino & Palmer, 2012).
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6.3.1

High Camera Angle

The use of high camera angles to portray human subjects was not significantly different
in the media campaigns of Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military (21 versus 26 percent
respectively), χ2 (1, N = 1071) = 3.53, p > .05. The high camera angle featured human characters
from elevated positions in 110 of the militant group’s images and in 146 of the military’s images.
The two groups shared the same approach by providing the viewer a chance to perceptually
demean selected character types in their images.
Wilayat Sinai used high camera angles to depict Egyptian soldiers and state collaborators
in photographs of battlefield aftermath, combat, and executions. The post-battle images used
high camera angles to show Egyptian soldiers lying dead in their own blood, under attack, or
with their images on display in confiscated identification card photographs. Three high angle
shots posted on November 4, 2016, for example, displayed headshots of a military brigadiergeneral on three different identification cards, with accompanying captions confirming his
assassination in al-Arish. Shots of public executions used high camera angles to show dead
Egyptian soldiers and state collaborators lying on the ground or the same character types
kneeling or lying on their stomach as they faced impending death. Out of 50 death images in the
militant group’s campaign, 36 depicted the enemies from a high angle. The high angle shots
emphasized the humiliation of the dead Egyptian soldiers and collaborators by positioning the
viewer to look down at their bodies.
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Figure 6.8 The distribution of al-Naba’ newsletter; disseminated February 7, 2017.

At times, Wilayat Sinai also used high camera angles to depict its own militants engaging
in tasks in their barracks, in the aftermath of battles, and during medical activities. In images of
the barracks and the battlefield, the camera positioned the viewer to look down at the militants’
hands as they held food, the Qur’an, copies of the ISIS’s al-Naba’ newsletter, and confiscated
weapons or belongings. Three high angle shots on February 7, 2017, for example, displayed
ISIS’s newsletter in the hands of militants as they held, read, and distributed it within Sinai (see
Figure 6.8). Photographs used high angle shots of clinics and medical workshops to show
viewers the hands of militants as they held medical equipment and medicine, or as they
conducted first aid training workshops on prone fellow militants. The high angle shots shared
details of Wilayat Sinai militants’ lifestyle by offering a top view of the most salient parts of
objects they use in daily activities.
As in the case of Wilayat Sinai’s media campaign, the Egyptian military also used high
camera angles to depict its enemies. The militants were, by far, the main character type displayed
in high angle shots, predominantly those to do with the aftermath of battles. The camera
positioned viewers to look down at the militants as they laid dead on the ground in the aftermath
of military operations or as they knelt blindfolded after their arrests. Two high angle images
posted on March 23, 2017, for example, displayed the bloody dead corpses of six militants with
their faces either facing the ground or covered by their own clothes. The Facebook post
described the context of the displayed scene as the outcome of a counterterrorism operation
against takfiri terrorists in central Sinai (Official Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2017i). Out
of 74 death images in the military’s campaign, 71 positioned the viewer to look down at the
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enemies that served as photo subjects. The high angle shots emphasized the humiliation that the
defeated militants suffered in battles with the Egyptian military.

Figure 6.9 Soldiers discovering a weaponry storage unit; disseminated February 11, 2017.

The military also used high camera angles to depict its own soldiers engaged in tasks
mostly during the aftermath of battlefield operations or during law enforcement campaigns. In
the post-battle images, images utilizing high camera angles showed Egyptian soldiers
confiscating weapons from caves, standing next to explosive materials, or clearing hideouts.
Four high-angle shots posted on February 11, 2017, for example, showed soldiers inside an
underground weapon storage facility retrieving rifles, rockets, ammo, and explosive materials
(see Figure 6.9). Other photographs deploying high camera angles showed Egyptian soldiers as
they confiscated drugs and contraband or as they destroyed underground tunnels. The high angle
shots shared details of the security threats that Egyptian soldiers were handling in Sinai by
positioning the viewer to look down at and scrutinize illegal objects.
6.3.2

Low Camera Angle

Wilayat Sinai was significantly more likely to use low camera angle shots than the
Egyptian military in its photographs of human subjects (10 versus 4 percent respectively), χ2 (1, N =
1071) = 18.01, p < .001. Photographs using low camera angles pointing upward toward the
human characters in 52 of the militant group’s images, but only in 20 of the military’s images.
The differential level of emphasis suggests Wilayat Sinai’s heightened interest in exaggerating
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the power of the photographed human subjects in its campaign, perhaps in an attempt to bridge
the wide strength gap it faced in the Sinai conflict as compared to Egypt’s armed forces.

Figure 6.10 Militants targeting jets; disseminated February 11, 2017.

Wilayat Sinai relied exclusively on low camera angle shots to depict its own militants.
The application of this semiotic technique mainly appeared in photographs shot in combat
settings, but also occurred in shots of fighters preparing for battle or those focusing on law
enforcement activities. Photographs of pre-battle preparations and battlefield operations utilized
low camera angles to look up at the militants as they mounted anti-aircraft guns, fired gunshots,
launched rockets, surveilled Egyptian security forces, engaged in military exercises, marched to
battle, posed with their gear on top of pickup trucks, and called for prayer. Five low angle shots
on February 11, 2017, for example, featured militants, in what the group described as an antiaircraft brigade that was targeting enemy jets (see Figure 6.10). In photographs of executions, the
low camera angles situated the viewer to look up at the militants as they were shooting and
beheading state collaborators and Egyptian soldiers. The low angle shots emphasized the
militants’ dominance by positioning them above all other photo subjects and the viewer.
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Figure 6.11 The Army Field of Staff visiting soldiers; disseminated February 23, 2017.

Similarly, the Egyptian military used low camera angle to depict its own personnel in
photographs of combat, other counterterrorism operations, battlefield aftermath, and interactions
with leaders. With the exception of two low angle shots showing blindfolded, arrested suspects
kneeling in front of their confiscated vehicles, the Egyptian soldiers and leaders were the only
character types in all the remaining low angle shots. Photographs of the counterterrorism
operations used low camera angle to position the viewer to look up at the Egyptian soldiers
burning hideouts on the ground, firing missiles from air force jets, and searching mountain caves.
Two low angle shots posted on February 17, 2017, for example, displayed soldiers on the Halal
Mountain in central Sinai clearing hideouts of weapons, explosive devices, and motorcycles. In
other images not related to counterterrorism operations, the low camera angles situated the
viewer to look up to top security leaders as they visited soldiers in the barracks or in hospitals
(see Figure 6.11). Low angle shots emphasized the strength of the Egyptian military personnel
and leaders by always positioning the viewer to look up at them.
The application of camera angles in the Sinai conflict closely aligned with visual semiotic
study findings documented in western contexts. Each side utilized the photographs shot with
high camera angles to imply the weakness and insignificance of dead enemies it had killed in
combat operations and opponents it had arrested. In fact, the use of high camera angles was a
defining feature associated with death images of enemy on both sides of the Sinai conflict. In
contrast, the two groups used low camera angles to signify boldness, authority, and power by
situating viewers to look up at their own fighters and leaders. Even when the militant group and

169

the military showed their own fighters in some of the high angle shots, the images did not
suggest their weakness, but rather exhibited a choice to focus viewer attention on select objects
(e.g., Qur’an, food, and enemy belongings, etc.). In short, Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian
military used camera angles to bolster the image of their fighters, demean their enemies, and
highlight objects the groups wanted to emphasize in their photographic campaigns.
6.4

Facial Expressions
Studies of visual semiotics in the western context typically explore facial expressions as a

signifier of human emotions. Images displaying photo subjects’ negative facial expressions have
prompted viewer assumptions that the displayed photo subjects are afraid (Öhman & Dimberg,
1978), skeptical, (Forgas & East, 2008), do not affiliate with the viewer (Hess, Blairy, & Kleck,
2000), and lack the ability to dominate their situational contexts (Knutson, 1996). By contrast,
the display of photo subjects’ positive facial expressions generally implies positive intentions
(Schmidt & Cohn, 2001), familiarity (Baudouin, Gilibert, Sansone, & Tiberghien, 2000),
genuineness (Hess, Beaupré, & Cheung, 2002), high affiliation (Hess et al., 2000), and
dominance (Knutson, 1996). Some British tabloid newspapers with conservative political
leanings, for example, used photo subject’s positive facial expressions to depict joyous coalition
soldiers with local civilians in Iraq after the fall of Saddam to help frame the 2003 invasion as a
liberation (K. Parry, 2011).
6.4.1

Negative Facial Expressions

Wilayat Sinai was more likely to use negative facial expressions with its photographed
human subjects than the Egyptian military (2 versus .2 percent respectively), χ2 (1, N = 1071) =
10.31, p > .01. Negative facial expressions were almost nonexistent in the military’s campaign,
as only one image showed the burnt face of a dead militant staring with his mouth wide open.
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The militant group used negative facial expressions a bit more frequently in 12 of its distributed
images. The different level of emphasis suggests the militant group’s interest in showing the
emotional distress of some human photo subjects. By doing so, it can instill fear by presenting
individuals’ allegiance to the Egyptian government as a precursor to their negative emotional
states.
Wilayat Sinai used negative facial expressions only to depict Egyptian soldiers and state
collaborators prior to or during their executions. The negative facial expressions conveyed
feelings of devastation and anguish on the faces of hostages in their final life moments. Three
images posted on September 26, 2017, for example, displayed sadness and bewilderment on the
faces of three civilian hostages that the photo captions described as apostates and collaborators
with the security forces (see Figure 6.12). The subsequent images in the same photo report
showed the militants carrying out their brutal shooting and beheading punishments. Negative
facial expressions emphasized the emotional breakdowns of Egyptian soldiers and state
collaborators as they neared death due to their acts opposing Wilayat Sinai.

Figure 6.12 An old man before being shot in the head; disseminated September 26, 2017.

6.4.2

Positive Facial Expressions

The Egyptian military was more likely to use positive facial expressions than Wilayat
Sinai in photographs incorporating human subjects (26 versus 3 percent respectively), χ2 (1, N =
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1071) = 119.14, p < .001. Smiling faces appeared in 146 of the military’s images, but in only 13
of the militant group’s images. The different level of emphasis indicates the Egyptian military
had a higher interest in showing the positive emotions of human photo subjects in its campaign.
Wilayat Sinai used positive facial expressions to depict its own militants prior to their
participation in deadly attacks against the state. In their campaign photographs, smiling militants
stood at the ready to conduct operations for the group in Sinai. The accompanying text confirmed
their subsequent martyrdom. An image posted on September 13, 2017, for example displayed a
smiling suicide attacker as he stood by his concealed car bomb. He pointed his index finger to
the heavens before setting out to attack a security convoy in Beer al-Abd (see Figure 6.13). The
following images in the same photo report depicted the destructive aftermath of his attack and
the human losses that the police suffered as a result of his martyrdom. Out of 23 eulogy images
in the group’s campaign, almost half depicted smiling martyrs. Positive facial expressions
recorded the happiness that accompanied the individual’s selection for the martyrdom operation
and validated the choice to sacrifice their lives in an attack on the Egyptian security forces in
Sinai.

Figure 6.13 A martyred militant before a suicide bomb attack; disseminated September 13, 2017.

Likewise, the Egyptian military used positive facial expressions to depict its own
personnel in the group’s distributed images. The Egyptian soldiers and leaders were, by far, the
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main character types displayed with positive facial expressions. Photographs of hospital visits
showed joyous faces of injured soldiers and their leaders as they met and talked with one
another. Eight images posted on April 30, 2016, for example, showed First Lieutenant General
Sedki Sobhi exchanging smiles with soldiers lying on hospital beds who had suffered burns and
broken limbs in defense of Sinai. In images of the soldiers’ barracks, the Minister of Defense,
Minister of Interior, or the Army Chief of Staff also appeared positive as they shook hands with
the soldiers, handed them gifts, and posed for group pictures. The positive facial expressions
emphasized the unity and the positive intentions of the Egyptian military personnel to protect
Sinai despite any setbacks.

Figure 6.14 A man holding a food package; disseminated March 9, 2017.

The Egyptian military also used positive facial expressions to depict its civilian
supporters and beneficiaries present in both the hospitals and on the streets of Sinai. Photographs
shot in hospitals showed actors, journalists, members of parliament, and religious clerics visiting
and exchanging smiles with the injured soldiers. An image posted on October 6, 2017, for
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example, showed a journalist handing a gift to a soldier on a wheelchair after he had lost both of
his legs in Sinai battlefield operations. Images of Sinai’s streets displayed residents happily
shaking hands with military leaders and cheerfully receiving aid from soldiers. Six images posted
on March 9, 2017, for example, showed smiling men and children posing happily for the camera
after receiving food packages from the military (See Figure 6.14). The positive facial expressions
emphasized affiliation of Egyptian civilians with their state by presenting favorable emotional
outcomes of solidarity with the soldiers and the military’s humanitarian operations.
The displayed facial expressions in photographs distributed during the Sinai conflict
closely aligned with previous visual semiotics research findings conducted in western contexts.
Wilayat Sinai used negative facial expressions to stimulate skepticism and suggest the low
dominance of its enemies. The group displayed agony of individual Egyptian soldiers and state
collaborators perhaps as a weapon to instill fear in viewers. The military, instead, depicted many
of the militants as dead or under arrest without displaying photo subjects with negative facial
expressions, perhaps to further detach them from the viewer by stripping away any emotional
cues. In the competing media campaigns, both sides used smiling faces to emphasize the
genuineness and positive intentions of their own fighters and martyrs. The Egyptian military also
displayed positive facial expressions to suggest familiarity and a high degree of affiliation
between its top leaders and loyal civilians. In sum, the militant group portrayed the two opposing
forces as harboring dichotomous emotional states, while the state avoided negative emotions by
focusing only on the happiness of its personnel and supporters.
6.5

Eye Contact
Studies of visual semiotics in the western context typically utilize various types of eye

contact to connect with viewers and to bolster positive character traits of photo subjects. Images
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displaying an individual looking directly at the camera attract heightened levels of viewer
attention (Senju, Hasegawa, & Tojo, 2005; von Grunau & Anston, 1995). They also present the
photo subject as credible (Hemsley & Doob, 1978; Neal & Brodsky, 2008), attractive/favorable
(Ewing, Rhodes, & Pellicano, 2010; Palanica & Itier, 2012), competent (Amalfitano & Kalt,
1977; J. W. Tankard, 1970), and potent (Brooks, Church, & Fraser, 1986). Moreover, the direct
gaze can convey an imaginary demand on the viewer that is dependent on the surrounding
context (Kress & van Leeuwen, 1996). Avoidance of eye contact can emphasize otherness
(Batziou, 2011), withdrawal (Tang & Schmeichel, 2015) and social anxiety of the photo subject
(Larsen & Shackelford, 1996). Recent al-Qaeda videos, for example, showed leaders looking
directly at the camera as they called supporters to action (Martin, 2011), while some European
newspapers show comparatively more immigrants avoiding eye contact in shots of them in their
new host countries (Batziou, 2011).
6.5.1

Direct Eye Contact

Wilayat Sinai was significantly more likely to incorporate human subjects with direct eye
contact than the military in images of the Sinai conflict (8 versus 2 percent respectively), χ2 (1, N =
1071) = 20.66, p < .001. Human photo subjects looked directly at the camera in 41 of the militant
group’s images; they did so in only nine of the military’s images. The differential usage of the
direct gaze demonstrates the militant group’s heightened interest in establishing a higher level of
interaction with viewers and stronger sense of nonverbal dialogue between the selected human
photo subjects and viewers.
Wilayat Sinai used photographs incorporating direct eye contact when it depicted its own
militants preparing to enter into battlefield operations. Mainly, the pictured militants appeared
prior to their own operations targeting the Egyptian state in Sinai. Texts accompanying the
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images with direct eye contact characterized the militant photo subjects as martyrs who had
conducted suicide attacks and operations. Two images posted on October 14, 2017, for example,
displayed two muscular militants dressed in fatigues holding rifles and wearing masks that
covered their faces completely except for their eyes looking directly at the viewer. The two
accompanying captions identified the individuals as suicide attackers undertaking a martyrdom
operation designed to strike a military battalion in al-Arish. Out of all 23 eulogy images in the
militant group’s campaign, 17 showed the militants looking directly into the camera. The direct
eye contact emphasized the powerful status of those vowing to martyr themselves for the group’s
cause.

Figure 6.15 A middle-aged man before being shot; disseminated September 13, 2016.

Wilayat Sinai also used direct eye contact when depicting Egyptian soldiers and state
collaborators during times of battle and executions. The battlefield images displayed images of
Egyptian soldiers appearing on the front of confiscated identification cards looking directly at the
viewer. Although the soldiers were not physically present, the captured identification
photographs in the militants’ hands cued their defeat on the battlefield. Two images posted on
June 17, 2016, for example, displayed the face of one soldier on his identification card looking
straight at the viewer. The card appeared next to the soldier’s pistol, credit card, and portable
power bank, while the accompanying caption indicated his assassination in al-Arish. Out of the
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13 images of confiscated identification cards in the militant group’s campaign, 11 showed the
Egyptian soldiers and officers looking directly into the camera. In Wilayat Sinai’s images of
public executions, the camera positioned the viewer to look state collaborators in the eyes as they
awaited their punishments (see Figure 6.15). The subsequent images in the photo reports always
revealed the gruesome details of the executions, with accompanying captions charging the
individuals with espionage and apostasy. The direct eye contact emphasized the vulnerability of
the captured enemies and prophesized a similar fate for others choosing to oppose Wilayat Sinai.
The Egyptian military used direct eye contact when depicting its own personnel
appearing in old personal photographs, as well as on the streets of Sinai, in hospitals, and in the
soldiers’ barracks. With the exception of one image of a kneeling drug smuggler looking directly
at the viewer upon arrest, Egyptian soldiers and leaders were the remaining photo subjects
featured in direct eye contact shots. These images positioned the viewer to look directly into the
eyes of officers before they died in battle, soldiers who distributed food packages to Sinai
residents, injured soldiers on their hospital beds surrounded by visitors, and soldiers posing with
their leaders in the field. Three direct eye contact images posted in March 2017, for example,
displayed three martyred officers with Facebook posts describing them as heroes (e.g., Official
Page of Armed Forces Spokesman, 2017g). The three photographs included a “selfie” shot and
were the only instances where the military portrayed its martyred officers in the campaign (see
Figure 6.16). The direct eye contact emphasized the competence and favorability of the military
personnel who sacrificed their lives to secure Sinai and help its residents.
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Figure 6.16 A martyred officer; disseminated March 24, 2017.

In sum, each side in the Sinai conflict used direct eye contact to emphasize the high status
of its fighters and create a connection with the viewer in ways in line with the findings of studies
conducted in the western context. Direct eye contact functioned as a defining feature in the
martyrs’ photographs that both sides distributed. The militant group portrayed its martyrs as
potent and credible, typically before they headed off to the battlefield to die. The direct gaze
highlighted intentionality that demanded praise for the martyrdom act. Although the Egyptian
military showed its three martyrs looking to the viewer, the images lacked a similar premartyrdom visual context. Instead, the military shared personal photographs from the soldiers’
past that emphasized its martyrs as favorable photo subjects who arguably justified retaliation for
the Wilayat Sinai’s killings.
The militant group and the military’s patterned usage of eye contact in their Sinai conflict
photographs, however, did suggest additional uses of the semiotic tool. Both groups utilized
direct eye contact to depict enemies and smugglers looking directly at the viewer as they faced
punishment. Rather than limited to the positive traits earlier findings of studies conducted in the
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Western context, direct eye contact in the Egyptian context can serve as a warning sign for
viewers considering the formation of connections with the humiliated other.
Furthermore, the Sinai conflict presented a setting where western findings related to eye
contact avoidance may not apply. Both Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military avoided
deploying the display of direct eye contact in the vast majority of their images. This avoidance,
however, did not necessarily present the human photo subjects as socially anxious or as an
exemplar of the other. In fact, both campaigns displayed this visual semiotic element across all
character types, including fighters, supporters, and enemies. The military, for example, blurred or
covered the faces of many soldiers, militants, and smugglers in the field, which can limit the
viewer interaction with all the different characters, including its own personnel. Protecting and
avoiding the distraction of fighters on the battlefield may also explain the lacking eye contact in
the recurring combat images on both sides. In the Sinai visual contestation, avoidance of eye
contact functioned as the norm to suggest the photo subjects’ full engagement in the conflict and
conceal their identities for security purposes.
6.6

Subjective Shots
Studies of visual semiotics in the western context typically associate subjective shots with

attempts to identify with the viewer. The point-of-view (POV) shot is a cinematic technique that
subjectively narrates the scene from the perspective of the main character (Branigan, 1984;
Herbert Zettl, 2013). POV shots serve to merge the viewer with the character in action (Fabe,
2014; Lombard & Ditton, 1997), increase presence (Cummins et al., 2012), and stimulate more
enjoyment (Lombard, Reich, Grabe, Bracken, & Ditton, 2000). For example, first-person-shooter
games incorporate the POV technique to attract and entertain young men by immersing them in
the protagonist’s action (Brooker, 2009; Call, Voorhees, & Whitlock, 2012; Denisova & Cairns,
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2015; Jansz & Tanis, 2007). The over-the-shoulder (OTS) shot is another subjective camera
technique that positions the viewer to look over the shoulder of the character in the scene
(Brown, 2012; Lombard & Ditton, 1997). Despite less reliance on subjectivity than POV shots,
OTS shots can provide a more stable view of “the direct spatial relation” between the subject and
other objects in the scene (Branigan, 1984, p. 110). The OTS shot is also common in video
games to allow the player to follow the main avatar, see what it is doing, and know where it is
heading (Nitsche, 2008). Complementing POV and OTS shots with added character reaction
shots can further promote viewer identification (Ortiz & Moya, 2015; Rose, 2001).
6.6.1

Point-of-View and Over-the-Shoulder Shots in Human Photographs

Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s used subjective shots of human subjects in
different ways during the Sinai conflict. The militant group was significantly more likely to use
POV shots than the military (5 versus 1 percent respectively), χ2 (1, N = 1071) = 20.63, p < .001.
The images showed scenes from the photograph’s human subject’s own point of view in 24 of
the militant group’s images; only three of the military’s images did so. Wilayat Sinai was also
more likely to use OTS shots than the Egyptian military (8 versus .2 percent respectively), χ2 (1, N
= 1071) = 44.13, p < .001. The image was shot from above the shoulder of the photographed
human subjects in 42 of the militant group’s images. The OTS element, however, was almost
non-existent in the military’s campaign. The one and only photograph showed the destruction of
a hideout from over the shoulder of a soldier as he stood in a field talking into a handheld
transceiver. The comparative emphasis that the two sides placed on subjective shots is suggestive
about Wilayat Sinai’s focused interest in highly engaging viewers in its photographed scenes.
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Figure 6.17 A militant firing inside a checkpoint; disseminated January 11, 2017.

Wilayat Sinai used POV shots only when depicting its own militants engaged in combat
against the state. The battlefield photographs positioned the viewer to take on the militant’s role
of attacking security forces, conducting checkpoint shootings, sniping targets, killing soldiers,
and burning vehicles. Picturing an attack on al-Matafi checkpoint in January 2017, for example,
seven POV shots presented the assault from the militants’ visual perspectives as they held their
rifles, shot a soldier in the back, took over a checkpoint, and stood victoriously over the rubble
(see Figure 6.17). Other images in the same photo report served as reaction shots that confirmed
the identity of the militants. The POV shots in the Wilayat Sinai media campaign virtually
engaged the viewer in belligerent action against state forces by using a semiotic element to create
a viewer “presence” in the scene acting on behalf of the militants.
Wilayat Sinai also used OTS shots when depicting its own militants engaged in combat
or as they appeared in their barracks. With the exception of one OTS shot behind a man
repenting to Wilayat Sinai for collaborating with security forces, militants were the only
character type displayed in all the remaining OTS shots. The battlefield images placed the viewer
over the shoulder of a militant shooting at distant targets, launching rockets, and pointing antiaircraft guns at jets in the skies. Images away from the battlefield positioned viewers to imagine
themselves peering over the shoulder of militants standing in the desert at sunset, distributing
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ISIS publications, watching videos, cooking food, boiling water, or reading Qur’an. Two OTS
shots posted on February 7, 2017, for example, placed the viewer in a position to join a sitting
militant in the process of reading al-Naba’ newsletter (see Figure 6.18). The OTS shots engaged
the viewer in both the fight and the leisure activities by visually “embedding” them within the
Wilayat Sinai’s militants.

Figure 6.18 A militant reading al-Naba’ newsletter; disseminated February 7, 2017.

The Egyptian military, by contrast, used POV shots only when depicting its own soldiers’
engaged in Sinai’s law enforcement campaigns. The photograph visually placed the viewer in a
position to assume the Egyptian soldier’s role of holding a rifle or a torch to clear underground
tunnels or of standing over the opening of a storage unit housing contraband explosives
discovered in North Sinai (see Figure 6.19). The POV shots encouraged the viewers to imagine
themselves involved in the military counterterrorism operations by giving them rare access to
sites associated with security threats in Sinai.
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Figure 6.19 A soldier checking an underground tunnel; disseminated February 21, 2017.

6.6.2

Beyond Human Photographs

The two groups’ media campaigns also utilized subjective shots in images that showed no
human characters. Although the images omitted the visual presence of human photo subjects or
body parts altogether, the POV technique nevertheless implied the presence of human characters
at the scene closely monitoring an impending destructive act against hidden human targets.
Across all the nonhuman photographs, no significant difference existed between Wilayat Sinai
and the Egyptian military’s use of POV shots (4 versus 4 percent), χ2 (1, N = 833) = .29, p > .05.
The use of the implied character types appeared in 12 of the militant group’s images and 19 of
the military’s images. The two groups shared the same approach, allowing viewers to fill in the
missing details regarding the unseen human characters.
Wilayat Sinai used POV shots to depict many of its IED attacks. Neither the militant nor
any other character type appeared in these combat scenes. The images, however, positioned
viewers to imagine themselves taking on the role of a militant conducting surveillance, marking,
or waiting for Egyptian military vehicles to progress toward roadside IEDs. The subsequent,
associated shots always displayed explosions and fire surrounding the targeted vehicles. Three
POV shots posted on May 22, 2017, for example, presented a moving military armored vehicle
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and a personnel carrier at the center of red target markers before the detonation of IEDs in North
Sinai. These POV shots positioned the viewer to safely witness the hidden strength of Wilayat
Sinai, to recognize the vulnerability of the group’s enemies, and to recognize the ways of
contributing safely to the fighting effort.
The Egyptian military, by contrast, used POV shots to depict the airstrikes it conducted
within the boundaries of Sinai. No Egyptian soldiers or any other character type appeared in
these combat scenes. The aerial photographs, however, did position the viewer to imagine their
participation as a fighter pilot in the military’s air force. Collectively, the POV shots placed the
viewer in the position to adjust the scope’s crosshairs, strike the targets, and watch the immediate
aftermath from the cockpit. Two POV shots posted on November 16, 2017, for example,
recorded airstrikes on weapon storehouses and four-wheel drive vehicles in North Sinai without
including human photo subjects in the photographic frame (see Figure 6.20). Out of 33 images of
airstrikes in the Egyptian military’s campaign, 19 used this type of subjective shots. The POV
shots invited viewers to imagine participating in the destruction of Wilayat Sinai by offering a
rare view from inside the military’s fighter jets in action.

Figure 6.20 Airstrikes in North Sinai; disseminated November 16, 2017.

The application of subjective shots in the Sinai conflict closely aligned with the findings
related to existing semiotic frameworks conducted in western contexts. Each side used POV
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shots to create a perceptual alliance between the group and viewer. Each “placed” the viewer
within battlefield scenes where a victorious outcome seemed assured. Photographs of military
airstrikes, in particular, used POV shots as a defining visual strategy to encourage viewer
participation in the operations. Unlike the Egyptian military, Wilayat Sinai used OTS shots to
prompt identification with its militants as they performed mundane activities characteristic of
community life. The militant group likely shared these aspects of social life within Sinai to
demonstrate its ability to challenge the state as well as the Egyptian military. In one of its
images, the militant group even utilized the OTS technique to prompt identification with an
enemy as he shifted allegiance from the Egyptian state to Wilayat Sinai. Emphasizing such
transitional moments as the group accepted more people on its side can open a new potential
allegiance for the viewer to think about.
6.7

The Visual Semiotics War
While both sides in the Sinai conflict deployed the same semiotic tools to convey their

intended messages, each side applied them differently to create unique visions of militants,
soldiers, collaborators, leaders, and civilians. The visual semiotic war between Wilayat Sinai and
the Egyptian military involved three interactive strategies for portraying human characters:
competition, alignment, and expansion. At times, the two sides competed over the use of visual
semiotics to depict a differential protagonist and antagonist. At others, they used the visual
semiotics in ways that aligned with one another to similarly treat a given character type. Each
side also expanded their use of visual semiotics beyond the depiction of human subjects to
heighten engagement of the viewer’s imagination.
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6.7.1

Competitive Approaches to the Sinai Conflict

Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military competed over the depiction of the antagonist.
The militant group defined the Egyptian soldiers and their collaborators as the opposing
characters facing defeat in the Sinai conflict. It used intimate/personal distance, high camera
angles, negative facial expressions, and direct eye contact to emphasize the humiliation of the
opponent. This visual semiotic constellation encouraged viewers to watch the dead or the
antagonist who was about to die up close, look down at his body as he laid or knelt on the
ground, recognize his anguish, and look directly into his eyes before death. Wilayat Sinai’s
approach conveyed the emotional breakdown of the antagonist, identified the militants as the
superior force in the Sinai conflict, and prompted fear in viewers considering opposing the
group. The Egyptian military, instead, identified the militants as the antagonist they would meet
defeat in Sinai. It featured the humiliation of the dead and arrested militants using
intimate/personal distance and high camera angles. This visual semiotic constellation positioned
viewers to look down at the dead and captured militants lying or kneeling on the ground at a
close distance. The semiotic approach encouraged viewers to evaluate the militants’ power
negatively and reinforced such a conclusion by utilizing proximity to focus viewers’ attention on
the military’s warning against thinking otherwise. Applied in the context of arrest photographs,
however, the military’s semiotic constellation omitted the use of negative facial expressions and
direct eye contact, factors that could have further intensified the group’s warning through
heightened viewer connection and emotional recognition.
Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military also competed over the depiction of the
protagonist. The militant group presented its own members as the heroes of the Sinai conflict. It
used intimate/personal distance, positive facial expressions, and direct eye contact to humanize
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the protagonist. The constellation of semiotic elements positioned viewers to have a seemingly
close relationship with the militant and empathize with him before he undertook his martyrdom
operation. The militant group displayed the martyrs as happy and potent fighters for the group.
The martyrs often emerged as the human face of the group to inspire the group’s supporters to
join the militants’ cause. By contrast, the military deemed its own personnel as the protagonist
best positioned to protect Sinai. It used intimate/personal distance, positive facial expressions,
and direct eye contact to humanize its soldiers, officers, and leaders. The military’s media
campaign provided viewers a look at the protagonist’s eyes and his smile from a close distance.
Unlike the militant group, the Egyptian military mostly applied this particular semiotic
constellation to photographs featuring injured soldiers accompanied by leaders who visited them
in hospitals. The approach suggested a close, imagined relationship to evoke empathy for
soldiers facing death in Sinai and for the leaders who care for them in ways that might stimulate
more support for a greater military response against Wilayat Sinai. In images of the battlefield,
however, the military’s constellation of personalized semiotic elements disappeared, perhaps in
order to present the soldiers as parts of a larger assemblage focused on destroying the enemy and
securing Sinai.
Another key area over which Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military competed in their
image campaigns was in the display of the protagonist’s strength. The militant group used low
camera angles and subjective shots to display warriors in action on the battlefield. The images
positioned the viewer to look up to or be level with the protagonist as he attacked the Egyptian
security forces in Sinai. Exclusive to the militants’ media campaign in the Sinai conflict, this
semiotic strategy encouraged positive evaluations of group’s power and viewer identification
with Wilayat Sinai against the state. The first-person-shooter POV and OTS techniques in the
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group’s battlefield images were also notable examples of using new technologies (e.g., GoPro
cameras) in popular culture to construct similar scenes. By contrast, the Egyptian military used a
combined strategy of low camera angles and subjective shots to display a different protagonist.
The images placed the viewer in a position to look up to military personnel or to navigate the onthe-ground scene from the fighters’ perspective. The visual semiotic strategy suggested the
relative power position of the military and encouraged viewer identification with the forces as
they participated in the counterterrorism operations. Nonetheless, the military was much less
reliant on this strategy than the militant group. The few subjective shots in the military’s media
campaign hardly even depicted combative actions. Such a choice may well indicate the military’s
unwillingness to disseminate images that could reveal details of its operations. Notwithstanding
these cautionary perspectives, the relative absence of the POV and OTS techniques may have
also inhibited the ability of the military’s photographic campaign to engage viewers in the online
space as it competed with the choices of Wilayat Sinai.
Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military finally competed over the display of the
protagonist’s activities. The militant group used high camera angles, intimate/personal distance,
OTS shots to introduce its activities away from the battlefield, such as reading, watching videos,
and cooking. This semiotic constellation positioned the viewer to look down at objects related to
daily life from the militants’ perspectives in the barracks. Accordingly, the images placed the
viewer in a comfortable position to survey the salient parts of the object which, if acceptable
might reinforce viewer identification and create closer perceived relationships with the
protagonist. Engaging the viewers in these activities behind the frontlines could also function as
a form of visual entertainment to some curious about the militants’ lives outside of combat.
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By contrast, the Egyptian military used high camera angles and intimate/personal
distance to focus only on a narrow set of the protagonist’s activities. The images positioned the
viewer to get closer to and look down at particular soldier activities in the field, such as clearing
underground storage units and confiscating illegal materials. By using this semiotic strategy, the
military presented the objects associated with security threats in Sinai at a comfortable height for
exploration, while still encouraging the viewer to imagine their close relationship with the
soldiers. The military’s media campaign, however, lacked subjective OTS shots in its displays of
the protagonist’s activities. Further, the military focused only on activities that were part of its
law enforcement campaigns and avoided depictions of the soldiers’ social life. The avoidance of
OTS shots to reveal military and social activities is likely a byproduct of the level of secrecy the
military typically imposes on the life of its soldiers. As a result, the military presented the
activities through shots maintaining the spectatorship role of the viewers without necessarily
encouraging their involvement.
6.7.2

Alignment Approaches to the Sinai Conflict

Besides directly competing over human character types and activities in their visual
media campaigns, Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military aligned in their display of one
character type: civilians. The militant group defined civilians who collaborated with the security
forces or practiced Sufi Islam in Sinai as spies and/or apostates punishable under their version of
shari’a law. It used intimate/personal distance, high camera angles, negative facial expressions,
and direct eye contact to emphasize the humiliation of those citizens in death and in the process
leading up to it. The visual semiotic constellation positioned viewers to look down at the
supporting character lying or kneeling on the ground at a close distance, look him in the eye, and
recognize his desperation in the run up to his execution. Wilayat Sinai encouraged viewers to
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imagine having a connection with the civilian facing punishment, recognize their relative
impotence in relation to the militant forces, and develop a desire to avoid similar levels of
emotional distress in their own lives. Together, the semiotic constellation used in relation to
photographed civilians arguably posed a death threat to the viewer and sent a stern warning to
those who would violate the group’s expected norms of behavior in Sinai.
The military’s media campaign, by contrast, identified civilians who smuggled drugs,
cigarettes, or other suspicious materials in Sinai as criminals who deserved the state’s
punishment. It featured the humiliation of the arrested civilians through the combined use of
intimate/personal distance, high camera angles, and direct eye contact. The images typically
positioned the viewers to watch nearby citizens kneeling on the ground who looked the viewer in
the eye. The semiotic constellation emphasized the civilian’s weak position and prompted viewer
identification with the defendant in ways to deter future instances of similar illegal activities. The
Egyptian military’s arrest warning, however, was less poignant than the one the militants offered.
Due to the group’s frequent blurring the face of the arrested civilian, the shots restricted the
viewer’s ability to connect and interact with the individual undergoing punishment.
6.7.3

Expansion Approaches to the Sinai Conflict

Having directly interacted with the opposing group’s media campaigns through strategies
of competition and alignment, Wilayat Sinai went further to expand the application of visual
semiotic constellations to imagined human subjects outside of the photographic frames. The
militant group used POV shots and social/public distance to display vehicular targets on the
verge of exploding in IED attacks. Through the use of overlaid red arrows, the constellation
positioned the viewer to follow distant, approaching vehicles from the perspective of someone
standing immediately outside of the frame. The double absence of human photo subjects in these
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images—observer and vehicle driver—encouraged the viewer to simultaneously imagine his role
as a protagonist marking his target and the role of the antagonist driving the targeted vehicle.
Involving the viewer in the meaning-making process may well reinforce the image of the
militants as the dominant character type capable of destroying Egyptian soldiers on the ground in
ways that also offer steps of empowerment to viewers.
The Egyptian military further engaged in expansion strategies by using POV shots, bird
eye’s view, and public distance to display its airstrikes on storage facilities and vehicular targets
in Sinai. The semiotic constellation allowed the viewer to look down at the distant targets
through the fire scope of an air force jet. The military encouraged viewer identification with an
imagined pilot operating outside of the photographic frame engaged in the targeting of the
militants’ infrastructure. The strategy of deploying double absence again appeared here, as the
images encouraged viewers to assign the role of the protagonist to an unseen fighter pilot in the
cockpit and the role of a hidden militant inside the building or vehicle under attack. The scenes
conveyed the military’s dominance over the Sinai airspace and invited viewers to experience the
pilots’ ability to annihilate militants using airstrikes. At the same time, they portrayed the
devastating consequences awaiting those choosing to join Wilayat Sinai.
6.8

Concluding Thoughts
This chapter demonstrates how militant groups and state actors utilize visual semiotics to

facilitate the message strategies of their media campaigns during times of conflict. Focusing on
the Sinai conflict in 2016-2017, Wilayat Sinai featured human photo subjects more often than the
Egyptian military. The militant group was also more reliant on intimate/personal distance, low
camera angles, negative facial expressions, direct eye contact, and subjective shots to depict the
militants, collaborators, and citizens in Sinai. The relative high use of visual semiotics may
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reflect ISIS’s attempts to imitate visual techniques prominent in western entertainment media to
bolster its online messages. By contrast, the Egyptian military campaign relies more heavily on
positive facial expressions in its distributed photographs to perhaps humanize its image as a
fighting power in Sinai by emphasizing the unity among its ranks in hospitals and the positive
outcomes of its humanitarian operations.
The use of visual semiotics in the Sinai conflict exposes the different ways that such tools
function in nonwestern contexts. Rather than function predictably as a means of creating
perceived close relationships, intimate/personal distance in the media campaigns in the Sinai
conflict served as a means of highlighting graphic warnings to viewers to avoid identification
with the photo subject. Rather than working to depict others and strangers, the social/public
distance served as a space to emphasize the unity of the protagonists acting as a collective.
Rather than suggesting power, credibility, and/or attractiveness, the direct eye contact in the
Sinai media campaigns was often a key site of human vulnerability. The new functions worked
in tandem to set a negative example of the opponent and amplify his punishment, while
demonstrating the power of the communicating group.
Although the assumed connotations of existing western semiotics frameworks often
applied to the Sinai visual conflict, many on the ground factors arguably contributed to the
emergence of new strategic applications of semiotic constellations in state and non-state actors’
photographs. The strained relations between Sinai residents and the government since the
security crackdown in 2004, the military’s incorporation of destructive airstrikes in the peninsula
in recent years, and the increased pressure on Wilayat Sinai in 2016-2017 may explain the
militant group’s choice to use proxemics and eye contact to emphasize brutal retaliations for its
followers to celebrate and its enemies to fear. The isolation of Sinai residents from mainland
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Egypt, the stereotypical image of Bedouins as traitors and drug dealers, and the deadly attacks
that Wilayat Sinai has conducted against security forces, civilians, and religious minorities may
have all encouraged the military to apply proxemics in ways that can exaggerate its ability to
dominate the Sinai field and kill the outlaws.
The chapter also demonstrates that understanding the contested online environment
benefits from an examination of the interactions between the constellations of state and non-state
actors’ use of visual semiotics. This exploration of Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military’s
photographic campaigns revealed that the existence of visual semiotic interactions involving
competition, alignment, and expansion strategies. However, these interactive approaches varied
according to character type. Through competition, the militant group and the state transformed
the opponent’s protagonist character into an antagonist. They limited the character types
qualifying for favorable semiotic treatment to their own individual members. Through alignment,
the two reinforced the rigid friend-foe-dichotomy by humiliating additional human subjects who
fail to abide by the groups’ respective guidelines. Through expansion, both campaigns
introduced unique destructive methods that unseen protagonists can effectively deploy against
hidden enemies. Together, the three strategies helped emphasize clear delineations between
opposing characters in conflict. By erasing any mediated middle ground between representatives
of the established state and its challenger, visual semiotic wars can exacerbate localized clashes
of ideology.
Future studies of visual semiotics can reveal nuanced constellations operative in crosscultural conflicts. Because the assumptions of visual semiotics in western studies do not
necessarily apply to all contexts, this area of study requires further testing. Researchers can use
content analysis to determine the comparative level of reliance on visual semiotics and the range
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of human character types across different communicators. The addition of a mixed-methods
approach, however, could further understandings of how audiences interpret the semiotic
contestations in more depth. A qualitative inductive analysis can help generate new or alternative
semiotic constellations and assess the character types that qualify for unique treatments across
different local and regional settings. Studies can also examine competition, alignment, and
expansion as interactive strategies and explore new ones in order to develop a broader
framework of visual semiotic interactions in conflict.
7

CONCLUSION

Today’s media landscape inhibits states from exercising an absolute monopoly over public
communication and fully censoring opposing media content. The online environment allows
non-state militant actors to create hubs for media dissemination, relocate message distribution
sites during crackdowns, and maintain a direct line of contact with supporter networks. Such
capabilities enable militant groups to advocate their own alternative ideologies and present
content that further challenges states in the digital sphere.
This study demonstrates the value of comparatively examining the competing visual
component of state and non-state actors’ media campaigns. A focus on one side’s media efforts
in a conflict only gauges an isolated visual campaign and misses the rich interactive potentials of
the online battlefield. However, examining the visual conflict between the two opposing forces
exposes the inherent similarities and differences in their media campaigns, identifies competing
messaging tactics to reach the audience, and detects their principal interactive strategies available
for engagement with the other side.
The critical nature of the Sinai conflict at the local, regional, and international levels
serves as an excellent exemplar for understanding visual contestation in the digital environment.
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Besides its religious status in the three Abrahamic faiths and its geopolitical significance for
world peace, Sinai is a cornerstone in the expansionist ideology of Islamist militant groups in the
Arab world. Bordering Gaza and Israel, it is a sought-after place for militants claiming to fight
for the liberation of the third holiest site in Islam eastward in Jerusalem. Sinai has and continues
to serve as a strategic supply line and entry point for North Africa by militant groups operating in
the Levant, Iraq, and/or Yemen wishing to expand the fight westward. The decades of social
alienation, economic deprivation, and underdevelopment in large parts of the peninsula, coupled
with the lacking security presence at the border areas and the Sinai Bedouins’ strong ties of
kinship across the border, further position the site as an ideal location for Egyptian and foreign
militants seeking to destabilize the most populous country in the Middle East. Hence, Sinai has
emerged as a key focus of ISIS, particularly after the group lost most of its occupied territory in
Syria and Iraq by the end of 2017. With Wilayat Sinai as its provincial arm on the ground, ISIS
militants regrouped in the peninsula, fought the Egyptian military, and posed a threat to the
entire region that continues today. Complementing the military conflict on the ground, Wilayat
Sinai and the Egyptian military have engaged in a war of images in recent years that show how
state and non-state actors compete visually for audiences in a cluttered online environment.
This study creates an interactive model of online visual contestation by state and nonstate actors based on the research process examining the media campaign experiences of Wilayat
Sinai and the Egyptian military in 2016-2017. The model is a visual representation of how
contemporary media battles have and are likely to continue to be fought between asymmetric
forces in the online terrain. It emphasizes that visual images of non-state militant actors do not
exist in a vacuum. It situates the visual contestation itself as part of the overall context. It further
highlights the visual characteristics defining the state and non-state actor’s opposing media
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campaigns. Most importantly, the model underscores several types of visual interactions that can
occur between the two media campaigns (see Figure 7.1). In so doing, it recognizes the critical
role that context, content, and form play in understanding how image contestations result in
multiple types of interactions.

Figure 7.1 The Interactive Model of Visual Contestation by State and Non-State
Actors.

7.1

Situational Context
The model’s depiction of situational context provides a broader view of the conflict

within which the state and non-state actors’ images operate. The context interacts with the image
campaigns on both sides of the conflict in two complementary ways. First, conditions on the
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ground can influence viewer interpretations of the opposing visual campaigns. Lack of economic
opportunities in a conflict zone, for example, can influence how the audience understands the
state’s portrayals of new projects or a non-state actor’s displays of social services. Second, the
visual media campaigns can focus viewer attention and help define portions of the reality by
limiting what the viewers see in the photographic frames. The selection of particular scenes to
depict and others to ignore redefines the context itself in the online environment. The model
emphasizes six contextual factors that helped explain the competition between state and nonstate actors: military, political, human rights, economic, social, and geographic.
7.1.1

Military

The military context, in particular, is key to understanding visual contestations between
state and non-state actors in conflict. Five military elements related to changes in the visual
media campaigns: the onset of state military operations, the completion of state military
operations, the militants’ attacks, the participation by local groups on either side of the
battlefield, and the loss of top leaders. These factors intersected with the Sinai conflict images in
various ways. The onset of local counterterrorism operations was the most impactful on the
Egyptian military’s photographic campaign. It corresponded with consistent shifts in output,
content, and form that emphasized success on the ground. Upon the launch of the second phase
of the Martyr’s Right operation, for example, the military reached its highest productivity of
image production in 2016, shifted to a reliance on battle aftermath images often displaying no
human characters, and adopted a repeated use of long, wide angle shots of destruction. The loss
of local leaders, by contrast, had the most crippling effect on the militant group’s photographic
campaign. The military’s killing of senior militant leader Abu Duaa al-Ansari along with dozens
of his aides in airstrikes devastated Wilayat Sinai’s ranks and likely explains the temporary
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disruption of the group’s media operations and the dissemination of only one image over an
almost two-month period. The military conditions on the ground in Sinai, coupled with the
battlefield outcomes, offered crucial insights on the two side’s media decisions in the visual
conflict.
Given the broad scope of ISIS’s presence in 2016-2017 and its operations in the Arab
world, the regional military context also played a role in the war of images between Wilayat
Sinai and the Egyptian military. Although ISIS’s regional attacks did not coincide with changes
in the visual contestation between the Egyptian military and Wilayat Sinai, the onset and
completion of regional counterterrorism operations marked clear shifts in the images in the Sinai
media campaigns. As regional forces launched attacks on ISIS in Mosul and Raqqa, for example,
Wilayat Sinai increased its use of high angle, close shots of dead enemies to emphasize the
group’s potency and resistance. Upon the liberation of the ISIS’s two occupied cities, however,
the provincial group in Sinai failed to maintain its steady stream of death images and reduced its
photographic output. Simultaneously, the Egyptian military boosted the number of its images,
increasingly utilized wide-angle shots of destruction to depict the opponent’s losses, and
portrayed smiling leaders visiting injured soldiers in hospitals. The regional military events and
their corresponding visual shifts in Sinai suggests that the Egyptian state was in close
coordination with the global coalition and that Wilayat Sinai had close linkages to ISIS’s central
media infrastructure.
7.1.2

Political

The political context in the conflict zone also serves as an important backdrop to the
visual contestation between state and non-state actors. Following the ouster of former President
Morsi in 2013, the 2016-2017 Sinai visual conflict took place in the post-Morsi period. First
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Lieutenant General Sedki Sobhi, who assumed the role of Minister of Defense in 2014, became a
major figure in President Sisi’s administration during the period when the military became
increasingly involved in Sinai. The military portrayed Sobhi as the key leader and vanguard of
the state’s counterterrorism efforts in its Sinai media campaign in 2016-2017. The photographic
campaign also depicted other ministers, senior security officials, governors, and members of
parliament in the field or visiting injured soldiers in hospitals. The images highlighted the
appointment of new leaders in Sisi’s administration, including Major General Mohamed Fareed
who replaced Major General Mahmoud Hijazy as Army Chief of Staff and Major Mohamed
Abdel Illah who succeeded Major General Ossama Askar as the military commander of the
unified leadership east of the Canal in 2017. Like Sobhi, however, the governor of North Sinai
Major General Abdelfattah Harhour and governor of South Sinai Major General Khaled Fouda
remained in their positions and appeared in campaign photographs documenting launching
events for new projects. Wilayat Sinai, by contrast, avoided the portrayal of its leaders altogether
and instead presented the conflict as one between state forces and a group of organized, selfempowered militants. Thus, the state’s images reflected power transitions, introducing the new
administration’s central characters and their roles in the Sinai conflict; the non-state actor, in
contrast, presented its members as part of a nonhierarchical, grassroots movement effectively
challenging the government forces.
The relationship between the state and its constituents was a key area of political
contention evident in the 2016-2017 Sinai images. Former Minister of Interior Habib al-Adli
cracked down on Sinai following the 2004 attacks, which further exacerbated the Bedouins’
immense frustration with the Egyptian political establishment under Mubarak’s rule. Community
sentiments erupted in 2011, with increasing violence targeted against police forces in Sinai in the
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post-revolutionary period. The new military strategy in the peninsula during the post-Morsi
period placed more constraints on North Sinai residents, ranging from curfews and forced
evictions to home demolitions. The military’s 2016-2017 Sinai images challenged the notion that
such conditions resulted in a strained relationship between the state and the local Sinai residents.
Instead, the photographic campaign showed the Sinai residents rallying around leaders and
government representatives in the North, as well as Bedouin tribes publicly expressing support to
the military in the South. Wilayat Sinai, on the other hand, presented its own militants as
alternative and more favorable political actors in the North. The group’s images emphasized the
local residents’ fear of and respect for Wilayat Sinai through scenes of the civilians handing their
identification cards to militants at checkpoints, receiving their handout statements, and
surrounding them as they destroyed confiscated materials. Thus, in the political arena, the state
portrayed a relatively stable political climate in Sinai, while the non-state actor undermined the
stance by presenting militants as an emerging force in the community.
7.1.3

Human Rights

The human rights context contributes to how state and non-state actors’ approach their
visual conflict in the online space. Human rights organizations have reported violations against
Sinai residents since 2004, including mass arrests and torture (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2005).
Addressing the right of freedom from arbitrary arrest and the rights to life and fair trial, the
Egyptian military’s 2016-2017 images pictured smuggling, drug dealing, and supporting
terrorists as grounds for arrest and referral to further interrogations. Using displays of dead
militants equipped with lethal weaponry, however, it presented fighting alongside the terrorist
group as carrying out an act of war that warranted killing in response. Wilayat Sinai applied a
different approach in its photographic campaign by stripping soldiers, state collaborators, and
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Sufi Muslims of their right to life and fair trial altogether as a result of their “apostasy.” The
provincial images showed brutal and humiliating executions of apostates unless they repented
and pledged allegiance to the militant group. While the state emphasized its respect for human
rights in the Sinai operations, the non-state actor discounted those rights by sanctioning its
actions as resulting from higher power, religious callings.
The Sinai visual contestation also addressed civilians’ deprivation of basic human rights
in the peninsula. As chapter two of this dissertation documents, North Sinai residents have
suffered a lack of educational opportunities and healthcare facilities for decades. Human Rights
Watch’s reports (2015, 2018) also pointed to the demolition of thousands of homes and the
forced eviction of families in the North as part of the military’s plan to create a buffer zone since
2013. The Egyptian military specifically tackled the right to education in its online campaign by
picturing government officials as they opened new schools and educational facilities in Sinai.
However, it avoided any depictions of healthcare beyond the services injured soldiers received in
the posted photographs. Furthermore, the military’s photographic campaign never directly
engaged the issue of evictions at the border areas throughout the two-year period. The depictions
of Wilayat Sinai’s efforts to serve as the solution to the same issues, in contrast, were limited to
several images of militant-run clinics in the North. Otherwise, the militant group relied on
exposing the destruction of schools, farmland, and civilian property as direct outcomes of the
military’s actions. It also depicted Sinai civilians evacuating their homes in late 2017, which
coincided with public reports announcing the continuation of the military’s eviction policy.
Hence, in the arena of human rights, the state actor presented its efforts as needed solutions to
overcome some of the human rights issues in Sinai and avoided any contentious displays of
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eviction-related scenes, while the non-state actor attempted to downplay these efforts and
undermine the military’s credibility by showing its alleged violations.
7.1.4

Economic

The economic context interacts with non-military photographs in the visual contestation
between state and non-state actors. Economic conditions in North and South Sinai have changed
over the years. Building on the infrastructure in South Sinai after the Israeli occupation, Egypt
further developed the tourism industry, which in turn provided economic opportunities to the
residents. But the more populous Northern region has continued to suffer from economic
marginalization. The Egyptian military offered itself as a solution to the economic inequalities in
Sinai by highlighting the state’s new policies and projects in the North. The 2016-2017
photographic campaign showed ministerial visits marking the launch of new manufacturing and
agricultural projects and emphasized the happiness of North Sinai residents as they received food
aid from military personnel. Wilayat Sinai, on the other hand, failed to provide any solutions that
could alleviate poverty in the North. Lacking resources, the militant group instead resorted to
several depictions of destroyed farmland resulting from the state’s military airstrikes. In the
economic arena, the state displayed a roadmap for North Sinai’s economic development, while
the non-state actor portrayed the military’s actions as destructive to the agricultural sector and
the local economy as a whole.
The issue of illegal trade was a critical economic issue in the Sinai visual contestation
between the state and the non-state actor. With widespread poverty in North Sinai, underground
smuggling emerged as an alternative source of income for the residents. Not only did it become a
profitable industry after the Gaza siege of 2007, but it further facilitated the Salafi militancy
spillover into North Sinai until the Egyptian military announced its official plan to create a buffer
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zone in 2013. The military’s photographic campaign frequently highlighted its security measures
to stop illegal trade and border breaches by showing the discovery and destruction of dozens of
underground tunnels in 2016-2017. For Wilayat Sinai, however, the underground industry did
not generally appear in the campaign photographs. The militant group’s images only showed its
crackdown on the smuggling of cigarettes through scenes of confiscation and burning of the
packs. This move, which the group framed as a measure to stop religiously-prohibited
substances, reportedly angered some of the tribal members and played a role in al-Tarabin tribe’s
decision to side with the military forces (Sweilam, 2017). Although the state and non-state actor
both pictured their crackdown on illegal economic activity, the apparent motives shifted from
national security for the former to religious norms for the latter.
7.1.5

Social

The social context also intersects with the visual contestation between state and non-state
actors. The Sinai occupation period generated suspicions among many mainland Egyptians who
equated the Bedouins’ life under an Israeli administration for 15 years to treason (ICG, 2007;
Pelham, 2012). The involvement of some Bedouins in illegal trade, drug dealing, and smuggling
in the post-occupation period added to the cultural stereotypes that further isolated the group
from Egypt’s social fabric over the years. The Egyptian military reinforced the stereotypes in its
images by frequently picturing Bedouins as criminals under arrest for collaborating with
militants and for smuggling drugs or other goods across the border. Recurring shots of soldiers
confiscating and burning drugs in Sinai further reinforced that image. Nonetheless, the military
attempted to mitigate its mediated crackdown portrayal with other photographs stressing the
integration of Sinai residents into the population. In these images, Sinai residents carried
Egyptian flags and warmly interacted with military personnel on the ground. Although Wilayat
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Sinai’s displays of seized contraband cigarettes arguably played a similar role in affirming the
image of Bedouins as smugglers, the group also depicted the subgroup as its main constituency.
By providing an insider’s look on the life of Bedouins, the images highlighted the group’s social
isolation further by showing a unique, nomadic lifestyle in deserted locations. Although the state
and non-state actor’s images both propagated preexisting cultural stereotypes of the Bedouins,
the former promoted their social integration to reinforce a message of stability, while the latter
depicted a social schism to reinforce the achievement of its goal of challenging the state.
The Sinai visual contestation between the state and the non-state actor revealed nuanced
differences in social demographics. Bedouins, Egyptians from the Nile Valley, and Palestinians
constitute the main groups that reside in the Sinai Peninsula. With their origins in the Arabian
Peninsula and the Levant, the Sinai Bedouins enjoy strong ties with their fellow tribal members
in neighboring countries and often uphold communal identity at a higher level than loyalty to the
nation-state. The Egyptian military did not necessarily distinguish between the different groups
making up the North Sinai population in its photographic campaign. Although some of the
arrested smugglers, dead militants, and civilians were wearing Bedouin clothing, the identity of
most depicted characters was not clear. On the other hand, Wilayat Sinai emphasized the
different groups involved in the conflict. Eulogizing its martyrs, for example, the militant group
displayed a pool of smiling Bedouin, Nile Valley Egyptian, and Palestinian fighters looking to
the viewer before their participation in the militant attacks. The photo captions presented the
martyr’s unique origins, despite the appearance of their similar, embodied looks and identical
military fatigues. The militant group further identified its local enemies, who often knelt on the
ground before executions, by full name and Bedouin tribe. Demographically, the state defined
the Sinai conflict in broader terms as an Egyptian war on terrorism and crime, but the non-state
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actor pinpointed the different cultural identities to emphasize the diverse ethnic and transnational
buildup of its ranks and to warn local Bedouins against siding with the military.
7.1.6

Geographic

The geographic context breaks up the conflict zone into meaningful locales in the visual
contestation between the conflict’s state and non-state actors. The Sinai Peninsula is a large
desert that makes up about six percent of the size of Egypt and shares land borders with Gaza
and Israel to the east. In their visual media campaigns, the Egyptian military and Wilayat Sinai
defined the peninsula’s topographic nature and border areas in different ways. Although both
sides often depicted the desert as a site of combat, the militant group also transformed North
Sinai’s urban center al-Arish into a battlefield. At times, Wilayat Sinai even displayed green
fields, trees, fruits, and water streams. Meanwhile, Sinai’s northeastern border areas appeared in
the military’s images only as a site of underground tunnels that threaten national security. In
militant group’s images, by contrast, the border areas constituted scenes of military excavators,
airstrikes aftermath, destroyed houses, and displaced civilians. Geographically, the state
highlighted North Sinai’s open battlefields and unsecured borders to justify its intense
crackdown on militant activity and on the residents’ ties with Gaza, while the non-state actor
juxtaposed the beautiful sceneries with the military’s destruction to garner support for wide-scale
retaliation.
The Sinai conflict images also revealed the nature of the two main divisions in the
peninsula. Sinai comprises the northern region, which has housed the militant insurgency in
recent years, and the southern region that is imperative for Egypt’s tourism industry. Although
the Egyptian military and Wilayat Sinai both depicted the North as the center of the fight, they
differed on the display of the southern part of the peninsula. South Sinai appeared in the
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military’s photographic campaign as a secure region juxtaposed with the volatile North. The
images showed international leaders taking part in forums in Sharm El Sheikh and Egyptian
soldiers securing the streets. The militant group, in contrast, failed to disseminate any images of
South Sinai. The state pictured the southern part of Sinai to ensure viewers of its stability and
security as a key tourism hub, while the non-state actor focused only on the northern region
perhaps due to the intensity of battle operations in that sector, the militant group’s inability to
operate freely in the South, or as the key target area for militant recruitment.
7.2

Immediate Context
Two immediate visual contextual factors influence the meaning of the state and non-state

actors’ images in the model. The proximate text presents the communicator’s narration on the
scene, while the frequency helps generate areas of emphasis. The image can work in tandem with
the text to deliver a common, reinforced message or direct the viewer to the key elements in the
scene. For example, several images showing dozens of half-buried IEDs can complement photo
captions describing the military’s success in foiling roadside attacks while visually emphasizing
the militants’ weapon of choice. Thus, interactions between the two contextual variables and the
images can alter the viewing experience and the meaning-making process in visual contestations
between state and non-state actors.
7.2.1

Proximate Text

The proximate text contextualizes depicted scenes and their components. It is unique in
many ways to each image and source. The “apostate” and “takfiri” labels in Wilayat Sinai and
the Egyptian military’s text, for example, were frequent derogatory identifiers describing the two
opposing forces and their belongings in Sinai. Simultaneously, the two sides utilized text to hail
their own members as heroes and martyrs. Beyond the labelling of in and outgroups, the
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proximate text further described the nature and setting of the on-ground activities. The military
used much more text with combat and battle aftermath images, specifying the phase of the
Martyr’s Right operation, the locations of the soldiers’ actions, the numbers of casualties and
arrests, and the types of weapons that had been confiscated or destroyed. It also described the
non-military activities, such as hospital visits and school openings, by identifying the leaders in
attendance, the outcome of the events, and the state’s counterterrorism goals. The military
spokesman’s tendency to post in such details may have been an effort in transparency, given the
fines that journalists had to pay in Egypt for reporting terrorism-related information contradicting
the military’s official statements.
On the other hand, Wilayat Sinai was more succinct in its photo captions. It used
additional labels to describe the types of the attacks, ranging from suicide bombings, suicide
attacks, and sniping to IED detonations. It also used captions to pinpoint the exact locations of
the attacks within Sinai. But in non-military images, the militant group specified neither cities
nor regions, but rather broadly presented the Sinai province as the location housing all the scenes
of media distributions, feast celebrations, medical workshops, and natural landscapes. The
unique locational identification strategy in those images implies the militant group’s control over
large swathes of land across Sinai. The group’s labels and short photo captions further engaged
the viewer by filling in missing pieces of information relevant to the scene. For example, the
photo caption “Targeting the Egyptian apostate army with snipers,” which complemented an
image of a militant pointing his sniper outside a window, allows the viewer to imagine the target,
outcome, and frequency of such attacks. The proximate text in each of the state and non-state
actor’s photographic campaigns played a critical role in emphasizing the meaning of the images
and defining the Sinai conflict at large.
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The format of the proximate text further influenced the images’ meaning in circulation
throughout the online environment. In the Sinai conflict, the proximate text that the Egyptian
military used appeared in the form of Facebook posts and photo captions. The text in one
Facebook post served as a standard description for several images that the Egyptian military
would release together as a collective. This format constrained the clarity of the visual message
as the viewer had to toggle back and forth between the image and the attached lengthy text.
Circulating such images on other digital platforms without the text could further distort the
images’ meaning. Wilayat Sinai, by contrast, described each scene using a superimposed photo
caption. In so doing, the militant group’s images and text together created individual media
products that could retain meaning both at the initial point of dissemination and beyond. In short,
the differential text-formatting decisions limited the circulation potential of the state’s
photographic campaign, while allowing the non-state actor’s images to operate consistently and
efficiently across platforms.
7.2.2

Frequency

The frequency of images serves as a means of presence in the online environment. The
Egyptian military boosted its online visual presence in 2017 through a 260 percent surge in
photographic output, compared to Wilayat Sinai’s images whose frequency remained relatively
constant. The frequency of images on both sides, however, did fluctuate throughout the 24month period in correspondence to events on the ground. When al-Tarabin tribe sided with the
state, for example, both the military and the militant group increased their photographic outputs
to imply strength on the battlefield. At other times, the militant group could not maintain its
visual presence due to apparent disruptions to its media operations, signaling the precariousness
of its resources in comparison with those of the state. To make up for these interruptions, the
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group resorted to disseminating more images of its more limited attacks in 2017 to give the
impression of sustained online presence. Despite these ebbs and flows of production output, both
the state and non-state actor treated visual presence as a necessary tool to convey their strength
on the ground.
The Sinai conflict also revealed different levels of visual emphasis on certain content
elements over time. The military’s media campaign, for example, displayed underground tunnels
in 11 percent of its images to emphasize the state’s law enforcement activities at the Sinai border
areas, while Wilayat Sinai visually ignored the tunnels altogether. By contrast, both the state and
non-state actor heavily relied on military images, but did so in different ways. Seventy percent of
Wilayat Sinai’s military images showed impending IED, group, and sniping attacks to highlight
its battlefield actions. The military, instead, focused on the resulting destruction, confiscation,
and death in about 90 percent of its military images to emphasize dominance and success in the
battlefield confrontations. The repetitive output of visual images conveyed strategic messages in
the state and non-state actor’s media campaigns.
7.3

Image Components
The image in the model is comprised of three main components. The scenic elements,

character types, and visual semiotics all serve as message fragments that combine to attribute
meaning to the photograph. For example, a scene that shows a burning military tank, a militant,
and a smile would likely suggest an insurgent’s happiness after taking belligerent action against
the state. Changing any one of these components could alter the meaning of the message.
7.3.1

Scenic Elements

The scenic elements mediate the conflict setting in the online environment. Destruction
and presumed death were recurrent elements in the Sinai images that shifted over time. The
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Egyptian military and Wilayat Sinai often presented their military actions and victories through
depictions of the ongoing destruction of the opponents’ weapons, vehicles, and buildings. The
surge in the Egyptian counterterrorism operations from 2016 to 2017, for example, translated
into more than a 700 percent increase in the military’s displays of ongoing destruction. Although
depictions of destruction dropped in the militant group’s images amid decreasing attacks during
the same period, they remained a central feature in the campaign. The bulk of the state and nonstate actor’s images defined Sinai as a devastating warfront where the enemy forces are always
losing.
Death and identity symbols also emerged as frequent scenic elements in the Sinai visual
contestation. The two players typically circulated images of dead corpses highlighting the lethal
consequences to the opponents in major attacks on checkpoints and military bases in Sinai.
Operating outside the bounds of battle, the militant group went further by showing Egyptian
solders, state collaborators, and Sufi Muslims about to die in public executions to emphasize the
deadly beheading and shooting punishments that await its enemies. In the meantime, both sides
demonstrated contrasting identities. The military often used the Egyptian flag as a scenic
backdrop to both civilian and military gatherings in Sinai. The militant group instead employed
the Qur’an, prayers, and the monotheism gesture as religious symbols present in the barracks and
on the battlefields. Using scenic elements, the state evoked a sense of patriotism that can justify
killing the enemies of the nation-state, while the non-state actor sanctioned its brutalities as a
necessary part of a holy war.
7.3.2

Character Types

The human character types identify the key actors in the visual conflict. Despite
appearing in only 56 percent of the Sinai images, the character types set the parameters of the
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message in each photographic campaign. The Egyptian military and Wilayat Sinai differed in the
portrayals of their own fighters. The militants, for example, emerged as the most recurrent
character type in the provincial group’s images, almost always appearing as the powerful,
victorious players in the field. The same character type was the least prevalent in the military’s
campaign whose images presented them as dead corpses or helpless individuals under arrest. In
the meantime, Egyptian soldiers were the most recurrent type and the only competent fighters in
the military’s images. They were also prevalent in the militant group’s photographic campaign as
weaker individuals under attack, injured, dead, or on the run. The state dismissed the militants by
downplaying both their number and strength, while the non-state actor bolstered its image by
juxtaposing the soldiers’ large presence with their defeats.
Some character types were generally limited to only one of the photographic campaigns.
Top security officials, for example, were an exclusive character type and the second most
recurring type appearing in the military’s images. They always appeared as caring leaders in
support of their subordinates fighting on the field or recovering in the hospitals. In contrast, Sinai
civilian collaborators with the state were a key character type that appeared mainly in the
militant group’s images. The photographic campaign did not display the acts of collaboration
themselves, but rather showed their deadly consequences for civilians whether on the battlefield
or in public executions. Although the military also portrayed Sinai civilian supporters in some of
its images, they appeared only as secondary actors ready to receive aid or attend launching
events while surrounded by military personnel. Collectively, the state media campaign’s images
emphasized the role of its leaders in directing its counterterrorism campaign, while the non-state
actor pictured death threats to local civilians thinking of siding with the military.

211

7.3.3

Visual Semiotics

Visual semiotic elements associate symbolic meaning to the characters in the scene. Both
the Egyptian military and Wilayat Sinai utilized viewer distance, camera angle, facial
expressions, eye contact, and subjective shots in much the same way. For example, each side
typically presented shots of its opponents at a distance from the viewer to encourage
dissociation, while displaying its martyrs and/or injured soldiers at a close distance to prompt
viewer connection and empathy. At times, the two groups also photographed their enemies from
a close distance in humiliating situations to send a clear warning. Although both players
displayed a group of their fighters and enemies looking directly at the viewer, the immediate
context conveyed contrasting meanings. Direct eye contact underlined the high status of martyrs
as the text underscored the sacrifices they had made. But the same semiotic element also
emphasized the vulnerability of opponents kneeling in captivity as they awaited their lethal fate.
Moreover, the two sides positioned the viewer inside combat scenes using point-of-view shots to
prompt identification with their fighters. Without developing unique strategies for their own side
in the conflict, the state and non-state actor strategically employed semiotic tools to present a
positive image of their members and degrade their enemies.
Nonetheless, the two sides in the Sinai conflict revealed different levels of reliance on
particular semiotic elements. In its depictions of human characters, the militant group was
generally more dependent on many semiotic tools, including intimate/personal distance, low
camera angles, subjective shots, and direct eye contact. By doing so, it constantly reinforced its
differential portrayals of the two main character types: militants and soldiers. One key exception
involved the use of positive facial expressions, which the military utilized about 10 times more
than Wilayat Sinai. The military often pictured its own soldiers, leaders, and civilian supporters
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smiling in hospital visits and food distribution drives. Instead, the militant group limited its use
of positive facial expressions to a small number of images showing martyrs before they attacked
the military. The state stressed the unity between its military and the population by regularly
displaying positive facial expressions, while the non-state actor emphasized martyrdom as the
only pathway to happiness by rarely using the semiotic tool.
7.4

Ways Images Interact in State/Non-State Media Campaigns
Interactions between the state and non-state campaigns in the visual contestation model

occur both at the levels of content and form. The image components (scenic elements, character
types, and visual semiotics) work together to generate the campaign’s visual frames (i.e., image
content) and semiotic constellations (i.e., image form), which then engage with the opposing
communicators’ messages in a number of identifiable ways.
7.4.1

Visual Frames

The 2016-2017 Sinai images revealed three interactive strategies between the visual
frames of state and non-state actors: competition, negation, and expansion. Wilayat Sinai and the
Egyptian military each claimed superiority through the use of competing visual frames. In their
use of the martyrdom frame, for example, the militant group presented religiosity as the sole
driving force behind its fallen fighters’ sacrifices, while the military emphasized the patriotic,
nationalistic motivations of its martyrs. The two sides also utilized negation to challenge the
credibility of the other side by presenting alternate interpretations of events embodied in their
visual frames. To negate the military’s claimed success from precision airstrikes against
militants, for example, the non-state actor pictured the bombings’ destructive outcomes to
civilian property, mosques, and lands. To undermine the military’s announced accomplishment
of opening schools and providing aid for Sinai residents, Wilayat Sinai displayed images of
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destroyed schools and evacuated civilians resulting from the state’s shelling and eviction policy
in the North. Finally, the state and non-state actor expanded the available means of persuasion by
incorporating unique frames of their own. The frame showing military visits to hospitals was a
prime example that clearly emphasized the intimate relationship between the leaders and
soldiers. Together, the three visual framing interactive strategies explain how opposing content
in visual images interacts in the contested online environment.
7.4.2

Semiotic Constellations

The state and non-state actor’s semiotic constellations serve as a second site of
interaction in the visual contestation model. Three semiotic interactive strategies emerged from
the two conflicting sides in the Sinai conflict: competition, alignment, and expansion. Wilayat
Sinai and the Egyptian military, for example, competed over which characters qualified for a
positive semiotic constellation rendering. The militant group used a combination of
intimate/personal distance, positive facial expressions, and direct eye contact to symbolize the
humanity of its own militants, while the military’s campaign deployed a similar favorable
semiotic treatment to its own soldiers. The two sides aligned over the identity of a character type
that qualified for a negative semiotic treatment. They combined high camera angles,
intimate/personal distance, and negative facial expressions to symbolize the humiliation of
civilian law breakers under arrest. Further, the two groups expanded the use of semiotic
constellations by encouraging viewers to imagine character types operating outside of the
photographs’ boundaries. Egyptian fighter pilots, for example, functioned as a notable
protagonist in the military’s visual campaign despite their absence in the photographs; instead
the campaign encouraged viewers to imagine them through the use of public distance and high
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angle, POV shots from the cockpit. The three semiotic interactive strategies reveal how visual
form serves as another way visual images compete in the online environment.
7.5

Implications of the Visual Contestation Model
The proposed model fills a gap in the visual communication literature. Expanding beyond

Birdsell and Groarke's (1996) visual argumentation framework that accounts for image elements,
context, and change over time, this model presents a holistic approach that maps visual conflict
into the three pillars of context, content, and form, as well as the ensuing interactions amongst
them in the online environment. It combines visual framing and semiotic methodologies with
contextual analysis and comparative applications. This new approach allows for a comprehensive
and nuanced study of visual contestation between state and non-state actors. By applying the
model, researchers can further dissect the emerging communicative phenomenon of online visual
contestation in other contexts, including competitions between non-state actors or political
campaigns in the media battlefield. Hence, the model serves as a means to assess the
implications of online digital technologies on the dynamics of contemporary visual conflicts.
The model also demonstrates that communicators in visual conflicts interact at the level
of image collections. The online environment facilitates the dissemination of digital
photographic albums, which explains the high number of images by the Egyptian military and
Wilayat Sinai in two years of the Sinai conflict (N=1905). A small sample size can help identify
select features in and the level of iconicity of individual images in conflict. However, it does not
sufficiently reveal the nature of the dialogue between the two communicators online. The visual
contestation model captures the individual image, but, most importantly, it accounts for the
patterns emerging across content and form in the overall campaigns. The resulting visual frames
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and semiotic constellations are two collections through which the communicators can emphasize
select messages and characters in online visual contestations.
The model’s visual framing component differentiates between competing narratives.
Each communicator creates unique frames highlighting different aspects of the same conflict.
The inductive framing analysis identifies those frames and classifies their functions into
Entman’s four associations: problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and
treatment recommendation. Two overarching stories thus emerge, each with an underlying
rationale and a distinct progression of events. The model further accounts for the interactions
between the content elements of the stories. Investigating the interactive strategies between the
two visual framing blocks over time can detect changes in how communicators present and
adjust their narratives in times of conflict.
Meanwhile, the semiotic constellations component of this model has cross-cultural
implications. The state and non-state actor in the Sinai conflict utilized visual semiotics in ways
that do not align with the assumptions of the western visual grammar. These cultural distinctions
suggest that visual semiotics are polysemic, and thus can convey different symbolic meanings
across audience groups. The model allows for examining how semiotics tools work together with
character types and scenic elements to generate context-specific semiotic constellations that are
key to the process of message construction. This inductive method helps understand unique,
cultural-based visual messages in their immediate communicative environment and challenges
the assumptions that semiotic tools embody a standardized set of meanings.
The study’s findings have practical implications for institutions and content creators
facing the current and future threats that militant groups embody in the digital sphere. States,
civil society groups, and non-governmental organizations can all utilize this approach to better
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understand the mechanisms through which militant groups construct their media campaigns and
to identify their unique strategies of engagement. Creators of entertainment-education projects
emphasizing values of social cohesion, exposing militant groups, and warning against joining
such organizations can also benefit from this approach. The model’s outputs identify the main
areas of emphasis in the two opposing campaigns and the conflicting presentations of character
roles that are both key for building counter and alternative narratives. In sum, the visual
contestation model can guide the process of transforming pro-social messages into more
effective visuals relevant to the conflict.
7.6

Limitations and Future Areas of Research
This study of visual contestation is subject to some limitations. First, the datasets on state

and non-state actors’ military activities provide useful insights and figures, but do not accurately
reflect all the conditions on the ground. By counting regional attacks that ISIS have not claimed,
for example, the GTD dataset provides an exaggerated picture of the group’s military activity,
which can influence the examination of shifts in the media campaigns. Similarly, the level of
secrecy around the state’s military operations can prevent researchers from accounting for
unpublicized military events, such as covert operations or assassinations of leaders. Second,
Wilayat Sinai and the Egyptian military also produce and disseminate videos as part of their
media efforts in the Sinai visual conflict. Hence, the study’s findings are only representative of
the two groups’ most prominent visual medium: photographs, but not the entire visual
campaigns. Third, the study demonstrates that the process of message construction in the
Egyptian context involves the use of visual semiotic tools in ways that differ from the
assumptions of western frameworks. Nonetheless, it does not examine how such semiotic
elements may influence the perceptions of Egyptian or Arab respondents.
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One area of research needed for improving understandings of visual contestation by state
and non-state actors is an expanded focus on contextual variables. The study primarily examined
military conditions as a lens to investigate the relationship between situational context and visual
contestation. This focus on military context, however, is only a useful starting point. The
political, economic, geographic, social, and human rights contexts also interact with the media
campaigns in the conflict, and this study has only examined them in a cursory way. Future
studies should examine these factors as additional lenses for understanding visual contestation
over time. These situational contexts may then generate supplementary variables, such as the
GDP, unemployment rate, or reported cases of human rights violations, to extend the
applicability and usefulness of the model.
Another area of research that would help better understand contestation is an expanded
focus on visual mediums. State and non-state actor’s media can include videos and infographics
that play a role in online visual conflicts. Researchers can further examine visual contestations
by sampling the different visual media products. The components of the immediate context (text
and frequency) and the image (scenic elements, character types, and visual semiotics) in the
proposed interactive model of visual contestation should all apply to videos and infographics.
Yet, the different visual mediums may introduce different elements or interactions that could
expand the model.
An area of research that would also enhance the understandings of visual contestation is a
cross-cultural examination of the role of visual semiotic tools. Researchers can compare
audience responses to semiotic elements in different cultural settings, such as the U.S. vis-à-vis
an Arab country, and account for their technological capabilities, including access to broadband,
activity on social media, and use of smartphones. Such experimental studies can thus reveal how
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similar or different semiotic strategies influence viewers’ interpretations of the same image.
They may even suggest a need to develop new cultural-based frameworks of visual grammar
with set assumptions that do not necessarily align with those of Western studies of visual
semiotics.
Furthermore, the interactions between the opposing media campaigns are an area that
warrants further study. The study identified key visual framing and semiotic interactive strategies
in the Sinai conflict. Competition, negation, expansion, and alignment emerged from the
comparative, inductive approach to the study of visual contestation between Wilayat Sinai and
the Egyptian military. However, these interactions do not necessarily make up a comprehensive
list applicable in every conflict. Each visual contestation is contextual and thus may exhibit
unique visual content and form in the online environment. By exploring states and non-state
actors’ visual frames and semiotic constellations in other settings, future studies may find
additional interactive strategies or recognize situational constraints governing the ones identified
here. Conflicts between Taliban and Afghanistan, the PKK and Turkey, Hamas and Israel, alQaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Yemen, al-Shabaab and Somalia, and the West African ISIS
province and Nigeria offer interesting opportunities for research about visual contestation. Over
time, researchers can develop a broader framework that encompasses a range of potential
interactions between opposing online media campaigns in times of conflict.
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APPENDIX
As you code the images, you may consider the headlines, photo taglines and images.
Please record an answer for each of the bolded categories.
Human Features
Humans: Which of the following best describes the number of humans in photograph? (count
human parts such as legs if that human is dead or about to act in the photograph)
1. One human exists in the image
2. A small group of humans exist in the image (~2-10)
3. A large group of humans exist in the image (>10)
4. No humans exist in the image
Age: What age category best describes the human subject(s) in the image? (Choose category
that best describes the subject(s) in the photo?
1. Infants (up until 3 years old)
2. Children
3. Adults
4. Mixed
5. Not applicable—no human subjects are in the image.
Gender: Which gender category best describes the human subject(s) in the photo?
1. Male
2. Female
3. Mixed. The image includes both males and females.
4. Not applicable—no human subjects are in the image.
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Body Position: Which of the following best describes the body position of the human(s)
displayed in the photograph)?
1. On knees (not praying)
2. Sitting (if can’t discern when riding in vehicles, default to sitting).
3. Standing
4. Laying down
5. Praying (on knees or bent over)
6. Mixed. The humans display a mixture of #1-5.
7. Not Applicable.
Visual Semiotics
Viewer Distance. How far is the viewer away from the subject(s) of the photograph?
1. Intimate Space (facial close-up)
2. Personal Space (1.5 -~4 ft)
3. Social/Public Space (> 4 ft)
4. Mixed. Some subjects are at one distance; others are at other distances.
Camera Angle: When taking the picture, the camera is: (Note: when coding, move image at
your eye level and code accordingly)
1. Low looking up
2. High looking down
3. At the eye level
4. Mixed (use only in cases where more than one photograph are embedded in the image
and are shot from different camera angles)
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Eye Contact: How would you best describe the eye contact of the human subject(s) in the
photograph?
1. Looking directly at the viewer
2. Looking away/Mixed
3. Eyes closed or mangled
4. Not applicable—no humans appear in the photograph.
Facial Expressions: How would you best describe the facial expressions of the human subject(s)
in the photograph?
1. Positive (e.g. happy, joyful)
2. Negative (e.g. Concerned/Angry/Troubled/Afraid)
3. Unclear (Include images that have both positive and negative facial expressions here.
Also include all images shot from a public distance here.)
4. Not Applicable—no human subjects are in the image.
Subjective Shots:
1. Embodied Point of View (i.e., embodied POV shots that neither reveal the photographer
parts nor any props the photographer carries – e.g., sniper shot)
2. Referentially Embodied Point of View (i.e., embodied POV shots that reveal the
photographer’s hand/arm and/or a prop that he carries – e.g., shot from right behind a
rifle in battle)
3. Over the Shoulder (i.e., shots from right behind the subject’s shoulder revealing what he
sees in front of him)
4. Not applicable
Scenic Visual Elements
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Death: Is there presence of the following:
1. Dead human being (Note: can be in casket, in body bags, or exposed)
2. Not applicable—no signs of death appear in the photograph.
Destruction: What features of destruction are present in the image?
1. Presence of fire, explosions, or other acts of destruction in process (must be in the
context of destruction. Cooking fire, for example, does not fall under this category)
2. Destroyed buildings/ bridges/vehicle/ religious iconography
3. Not applicable—the image contains no features of destruction
About to Die:
1. Possible
2. Certain
3. Presumed Death
4. Not Applicable
State-building: Which of the following state-building actions are present in the photograph?
1. Social Services/State infrastructure workers (education, health, parks, playgrounds,
plumbers, electricians, and foot distribution, etc.)
2. Law Enforcement/Punishment (Hudud; tobacco; alcohol; stealing; homosexuality,
adultery; executions)
3. Economic Activity
4. City/Natural Landscape
5. Media Distribution (pamphlets, leaflets, newsletters, and videos)
6. Mixed—more than one of the actions in #1-5 are in the image
7. Not applicable—none of the state-building actions mentioned above are present in the
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image.
Infrastructure: Which of the following infrastructure elements are present in the photograph?
1. Buildings (Outside of Buildings only).
2. Bridges
3. Vehicles (Trucks, Planes, Ships, Trains, Tank)
4. Military weaponry/equipment (AK47s, rockets, RPGs, etc).
5. Mixed—more than one of the infrastructure elements in #1-5 are present.
6. Not applicable—none of the infrastructure elements in the list above are present.
Religious Symbols: What symbols of religious practice are present in the photograph?
1. One finger pointing to heaven
2. Reading Qu’ran, Qu’ranic text, or Qu’rans (don’t include text on IS flag)
3. Individuals engaged in prayer
4. Religious Iconography/Shrines
5. Mixed—more than one of the religious practices described in #1-4.
6. Not applicable—none of the religious practices described above are present.
Flag: Which of the flags below are contained in the image?
1. The image contains at least one ISIS Flag.
2. The image contains a U.S. flag.
3. The image contains an Egyptian flag.
4. Other
5. The image contains multiple flags from various entities.
6. Not applicable—the image contains no flag.

